Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
Lingnan Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

11-23-2000

China's great power aspirations in the Post-Mao era
Sun Yung, Susanna YEUNG

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Yeung, S. Y. S. (2000). China's great power aspirations in the Post-Mao era (Master's thesis, Lingnan
University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/8

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Digital Commons @
Lingnan University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Lingnan Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan University.

Terms of Use
The copyright of this thesis is owned by its
author. Any reproduction, adaptation,
distribution or dissemination of this thesis
without express authorization is strictly
prohibited.

All rights reserved.

CHINA’S GREAT POWER ASPIRATIONS
IN THE POST-MAO ERA

by
YEUNG Sun Yung Susanna

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the Degree of
Master of Philosophy

Lingnan University

October 2000

ABSTRACT

China’s Great Power Aspirations
In the Post-Mao Era

by

YEUNG Sun Yung Susanna

Master of Philosophy

From the Dengist leadership onwards, China sought to increase its capabilities economic, military, and diplomatic - in its quest for great power status in the
international system.

Internally, China began a series of domestic reforms in the

economic, military and high-technology areas. Externally, China directed unusual
energy to establishing normal relations with other major powers as well as with the
Third World. These actions testify to the Chinese leadership’s aspirations and
determination to build China into a strong nation. This study, taking cognizance of
the endeavors begun under Deng, attempts to follow through with post-Deng China’s
continuing quest for great power status.
Methodologically, this study will draw upon the linkage-politics paradigm and
geostrategic theory, in order to take care of both the domestic and external aspects of
the topic that need be examined. The former is useful in explicating the links
between domestic political developments and foreign-policy initiatives.
Geostrategic analysis will illuminate the change in China’s international status from
the Maoist era to the post-Cold War era. It will help explicate how change in the
international environment has presented new challenges, as well as opportunities, to
China in its role and status in international relations, calling for new responses.
To understand China’s perceived great-power status in world politics, two
elements should be considered. The first is the perception of other states in the
world. Being a great power is not self-claimed, it requires recognition by other

members of international society.

The second element is China’s self-image.

Whether China sees itself as a great power depends on both its own aspirations and
its calculated endeavors to achieve it This study addresses both of these elements.
In this study,， I hope to trace both the external and internal changes affecting
China’s position in the world in the post-Mao period. During the 1980s through to
the 1990s, most evidence supports the view that China’s participation in regional and
global activities was increasing. As its role in international relations expanded, its
visibility and status also improved correspondingly. Barring unexpected changes in
the continuing expansion of its involvement in world affairs, all indications are that
China’s quest for great-power status is heading towards the right direction， ,as
intended by the post-Mao leadership.

I declare that this thesis 〈〈China’s Great Power Aspirations in the Post-Mao
E r a » is the product of my own research and has not been published in any other
publications.
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CHAPTER 1
MAIN THEME OF THE STUDY: THEORIES, METHODS, AND
HYPOTHESES

INTRODUCTION:

This chapter introduces the research goal, significance, hypotheses and structure
of this study.

There are precise ideological differences between Mao Zedong and

Deng Xiaoping in China’s domestic and diplomatic policies.

Although the Chinese

leadership wished to make China a strong country after a “Century of Shame” since
1842, China’s national capabilities and the international system strictly confined this
hope.

However, the situation was changed under the leadership of Deng.

China’s

continuous domestic developments and changes in the international system give a
chance for China to search for great power status.

The main theme of this study

will follow this logic.

PURPOSES OF THIS STUDY:

The study has two goals.

The first is to explain China’s great-power

aspirations after the Maoist era by the use of linkage politics and geostrategic
analysis.

To understand China's great-power quest, two set variables must be

considered, the first is associated with domestic changes and the second is changes in
international relations.

These international and domestic changes serve to illustrate

why China has reasons to change its foreign policy behaviour and adjust its
international posture in the post-Mao era.

1
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thinking can help explain the shape of change in China9s diplomacy and global
politics.

Linkage-politics is used to explain China’s domestic change in the Dengist era
in so far as it bears on China’s foreign relations， whereas geostrategic analysis is
used to discuss change in China’s international status from the Maoist era to the postCold War era.

Starting from the 1980s, the Chinese leadership began to launch a

series of domestic reforms, including economic reform, military modernization
programme, which require a new orientation in foreign policy.

The reforms were

aimed at increasing China’s comprehensive national power that would boost China’s
capabilities and status in the world.

In this sense, the linkage paradigm can help us

to understand the relationship between the domestic policies of the national
leadership and their foreign-policy endeavors in the external environment.
Meanwhile, change of the international environment, mainly in the late 1980s,
created an opportunity for China to become a rising power in world politics.

Due to

this global change, the overall reactions of the other nations towards China are no
more as antagonistic as before, but became more conciliatory to China in the
international arena.

Though China is the remaining Communist great power in the

world after the breakdown of the Soviet Union, its ideological difference from the
democratic West does not stop China’s integration into the global economy.

The

overall attitude of the rest of the world seems quite positive for the rise of China.
This phenomenon is probably the result of change in the international environment:
from geopolitical to geoeconomic global structure.

Hence, geostrategic analysis

will tell us more about China’s strategic considerations towards other states in the
international system.

The combination of the paradigm of linkage politics and

2
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geostrategic analysis will help illuminate and explicate this Chinese endeavor to
become a great power in the post-Mao era.

The second goal of this research is to examine relations between the self-image
of Chinese leadership and their foreign policy behaviour， in connection with China’s
quest for great power status.

After Deng Xiaoping consolidated his position as the

second-generation leader in the People’s Republic of China in 1978, he turned a new
page in the annals of China.

During the past two decades, from the 1980s to the

1990s， China started to strive to join the ranks of the great powers in the world.

In

Deng’s tenure， he principally focused on domestic economic development.

He

believed that only an economically strong and prospering China could enjoy political
stability and international respect (Gurtov & Hwang, 1998, p.l).

Deng also said:

We must set up economic construction.........Without sound economic
foundations, it will be impossible to modernize our national defence, and
science and technology should primarily serve economic construction.
Modernization is the core and essential condition for solving both our
domestic and our external problem... The role we play in international
affairs is determined by the extent of our economic growth.

If our

country becomes more developed and prosperous, we will be in a position
to play a greater role in international affairs.
role is not insignificant.

Already our international

With a stronger material base, we will be able to

enhance it (Foreign Languages Press, 1984, p.225).

In Jiang9s era, beginning with the 1990s, he continued to carry out a series of
domestic reforms but turned more attention to China’s diplomatic policy, in search of
a great power status in the world.

Under his leadership， China’s diplomatic power

was enhanced to a large extent in international relations at the end of the 1990s.
Besides, Jiang intended to reshape the world order into a just and reasonable new
3
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international political and economic order, in order to help bring about a peaceful and
prosperous new century of humanity.

As a whole, the self-perception of Chinese leadership is a fundamental element
by which to judge whether China is a great power.

In the following chapters,

evidence will be provided to justify that China is on the road to becoming a great
power in the international system in accordance with the diplomatic policy of the
Chinese leadership after Mao.

SIGNIFICANCE:

Modem Chinese history shows that China has the potentials of a great power.
The First Anglo-Chinese War in 1842 marked the beginning of a “Century of
Shame95 in Chinese history.

It is well known that for centuries the national self-

image of China had been one of superiority to other nations.

Each emperor in

previous Dynasties treated himself as the Son of Heaven, and China was the Middle
Kingdom.

Foreigners were thought to be “barbarians.”

However, China’s

superiority self-image was severely damaged by the brute power of Gunboat
Diplomacy of the West.

Following the end of the Qing Dynasty， China’s continuing

weaknesses in terms of national power made its status and influence limited in
international relations.

In the eyes of the world, China was categorized as a feeble

and developing country.

The traditional pride had to be buried for decades before

China could rejoin the ranks of nations as equals under the leadership of Deng
Xiaoping in the late 1970s.

4
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Starting from Deng5s leadership onwards, China began to acquire the ability to
stand up as a great power in international relations.

Throughout the 20th century,

what the Chinese people wished was to seek an equal status between China and the
world and reestablish their national dignity.

From the realist point of view, the

continuous weakness of the Chinese economy denied to China its rightful place
among nations.

In the Dengist era, China started to treat itself as a great power

mostly because to Deng’s ambitious personality.
great power in the international politics.

Deng prepared to make China a

He said, ''China will be truly powerful,

exerting a much greater influence in the world.” （ Harding, 1988， p.14).

This

statement showing that he had ambitions to make China one of the great powers in
the world.

The pursuit of great-power status became a doctrine of China’s foreign policy
ever since.

This expectation, under the leadership of Jiang Zemin, seems to be

more concrete in practice.

Jiang^s ideas, on building a just world, spreading

Chinese cultural influence abroad, and establishing strategic partnership with other
great powers, are meant to launch China on the road to becoming a great power.

After two decades of sustained development, China has successfully built up
and consolidated its image as a great power at least at the regional level.
step is to extend its present status to the international level.

The next

If the trend continues,

there is a high possibility that China will reach its goal in the new century.

The next

contribution in this study is to discuss China’s self-perception as a great power，
combining linkage politics with geostrategic analysis.

5
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HYPOTHESES:

(1) China9s international status is a function of both its capabilities (military,
economy, and diplomatic leverage) and the general perception of other major
powers.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variable

H (1) is from an objective perspective to testify whether China is a great power
in the international system.

A great power is not self-claimed, it requires the

recognition by other members of the international society, especially of the major
states (actors).

China’s national growth which begun in the 1980s and the

acceptance by other nations are the two pillars supporting China’s claim to be a great
power in the world system.

This hypothesis can be justified by the documents and

commentaries from other states about the great-power status of China in the world.

(2) China perceives itself as a great power as well as the worlds recognition of

6
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China’s global status， as a result of China’s endeavors to upgrade its national
capabilities and of strategic changes in the international balance of power.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

H (2) tries to discuss China7s quest for great power status from two perspectives.
First, China^s self-image as a great power is the result of domestic reforms and
change in the external environment.

Second， the world’s recognition of China’s

great power status is due to China’s national capabilities and change of international
order.

Whether China perceives itself as a great power depends on its own

calculated endeavors and the state of the international system.

Without the reforms

of the 1980s, China cannot have upgraded its national capabilities in quest of bigpower status.

Without the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, China

cannot have become one of the potential poles in the global system.

China^ self

perception as a great power can be shown in its active participation in the

7
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international arena.

This hypothesis can be justified by the publications and

documentation from the Chinese government and Jiang9s visits and his speeches
concerning the world order.

Besides, the general acceptance by international community of the rising China
is most probably caused by the change from bipolar to multipolar international
system.

In addition， China’s economic clout in recent decades has shown an

impressive image to the world.

The two independent variables - China’s

capabilities and change of international order， contribute to the world’s positive
perception of China’s role in the world

CHAPTER LAYOUT:

The overall structure of this study will be divided into three parts.

Part One

gives a preview of this study, including introduction, literature review.

Part Two

presents evidence how China perceives itself as a great power in the post-Mao era.
Part Three is discussions and conclusions.

Chapter 1 introduces the research goals of China’s great-power aspirations，
states the hypotheses and major arguments of this study.

There is a great deal of

difference in ideology on foreign policy between the leadership of Mao and Deng.
The development of China after Deng has reached a certain achievement that allows
China to pursue great power status in the world.

Both China’s domestic

development and attitudes of other states contribute to China’s perception of itself as
a great power in the future.

8
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Chapter 2 briefly and selectively reviews literature on theories and methods in
the study of China’s position in international relations.

The concept of linkage

politics and the geostrategic point of view will be operationalized in the discussion of
China’s change in both internal and external spheres.

And how these changes are

related to China’s great-power aspirations will be explained.

Chapter 3 uses the linkage-politics paradigm to explicate how China^s domestic
capabilities affect its foreign policy posture and how foreign-policy success
contributes to its domestic growth.

China, after two decades of economic refonns

and continuous development, has upgraded its national power.

These achievements

directly affect China9s new approach to foreign policy, which is increasingly more
active in international activities.

Besides, the expanding state to state relations

between China and the other states will bring benefits to China’s capability building.
Linkage politics helps understand this interdependent relationship between domestic
development and foreign policy.

Chapter 4 applies geostrategic analysis to illuminating the change in China’s
international status from the Maoist era to the post-Cold War era.

It will help

explicate how change in the international environment has presented new challenges
to China in its role and status in international relations, calling for new responses.
This approach tries to place China in a global perspective by noting that China’s
changing role is circumscribed by the international structure.

Chapter 5 analyzes China’s great-power status from two angles.
examine the perception of other states in the world.

9
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recognition of the other members of the international society.
at China’s self-image.
own aspirations.

The second is to look

Whether China sees itself as a great power depends on its

Combining these two approaches， both China’s image in the

world and its self-perception as a great power, we will be better able to trace and
analyze China’s quest for global power status.

This chapter is quite important for linking together Chapters 3 and 4, since the
evidence provided in the previous two chapters contains both the elements of the
recognition of the international society and China’s self-image.

First, China sees

itself as a great power probably depends on its own capability building.

Second, the

changes in the international society make China one of the potential countries
seeking great power status in the 21st century.

Finally， combining the US’ positive

attitude towards China in this decade， an objective recognition of China’s status in
the world is described in front of us.

Chapter 6, the concluding chapter, notes both the external and internal changes
affecting China’s position in the world in the post-Mao period.

As China’s national

capabilities increased, its role in international relations expanded correspondingly.
As China’s international ties with other nations grew， so did its national
developments.

China’s expanding involvement in world affairs in the new world

order demonstrates that its quest for great-power status is heading the right direction.

10
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CHAPTER 2
DEFINITIONS, THEORIES AND METHODS - PERSPECTIVES
ON CHINESE GREAT POWER FOREIGN POLICY

INTRODUCTION:

The study of the Chinese quest for great power status is a very complicated task
due to the highly interdependent and interactive world in the post-Mao era.
is necessary for us to give a definition of “great power”.

First, it

Second, a relevant

theoretical framework is an essential part for the study of rising China.

Up to this

moment, there is no one single comprehensive analytical framework for the study of
China’s foreign policy in quest of great power status.

However, there are two

notable frameworks that can be used in an attempt to discuss changes in China^s
power and prestige in the international system.

As I outlined in Chapter 1, the first such framework is the linkage-politics
paradigm, and the second is geostrategic analysis.

These two frameworks provide

different points of view in analyzing China^s great-power aspirations.

The former

is a cognitive approach, stressing the links between domestic developments and
foreign policy initiatives whereas the later is a global approach, specifying how
changes in the international structure will affect the fulfillment of China9s aspirations
in the world.

Due to the complexity of the world, it is not enough to employ just

one approach in this study.

The following sections discuss how these two

approaches are used in combination in my study， to shed light on China’s quest for
great power status.
11
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CONCEPTUALIZATION:

DEFINITION OF CHINA:

China stands for the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in this study.

As in

world politics, the PRC government is recognized by nearly all the worlds countries
except the 23 that recognize Taiwan.
PRC is recognized by the world.

In other words， the international status of the

When the seat of China in the United Nations,

including the Security Council, was transferred from the Kuomingtang (KMT)
regime to the Communist government of mainland China in 1971, it marked the re
entry of China in world politics.

Taiwan’s prestige and influence in the world

began to decline after withdrawing from the United Nations.

On the other hand, the

PRC has increasingly established its solid political status in international relations
after joining the United Nations.

From that time onwards, it gradually acquired the

credentials necessary for a great power.

Actually, its permanent seat on the UN

Security Council, to a certain extent, represents a symbol of great power in global
terms.

DEFINITON OF GREAT POWER:

Power, in its modem form, is concerned with which groups or persons dominate,
get their own way or are best able to pursue their own interests in societies (McLean,
1996， p.396).

In international relations, power is a key concept that defines an

international system and the status of its actors.

The basic meaning of “power” in

the international structure is the ability of one actor to influence another to do, or not
12
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to do, something desired by that actor.

K. Waltz categorizes and ranks power to be

the capabilities of states with reference to “how they score on all of the following
items: size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability,
military strength, political stability and competence (Waltz, 1979, p.131).

This

explanation shows that there is a close relationship between exerting power and
actual capabilities of the actor.

The core definitions of power or paradigms of power relationships are as
following (McLean, 1996, pp.396-397):

(1)

A has effects on B5s choices and actions.

(2)

A has the capability to move B?s choices and actions in ways that A intends.

(3)

A has the capability to override opposition from B.

(4)

The relationship between A and B described in propositions 1, 2, 3 is part of a
social structure and has a tendency to persist.

In the complex world, the above tenets just describe part of the meaning of
power， but cannot give a foil meaning of power.

In its basic meaning, power

connotes the ability of one actor to influence another actor to do, or not to do.
Actually, there is a wide diversity of definitions of power in the realist sense.

N. J.

Spykman defines power as the ability to move the individual or the human
collectivity in some desired fashion, through ''persuasion, purchase, barter, and
coercion.” （ Spykman， 1942, p. 11).

According to R. Gilpin, power encompasses the

military, economic, and technological capabilities of states, while prestige consists of
the “perceptions of other states with respect to a state’s capabilities and its ability and
13
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willingness to express its power” (Gilpin， 1981， p.33).

From the above definitions, we can see that there are total three important
components: “power”， “influence”， and “prestige”. The power of a state is said to
consist of different kinds of capability, such as the military, economic and
technological capabilities as shown in the study.
the decisions of others.

Influence is the capacity to affect

Indeed, influence is derived from “power”.

In

international relations, when a state owns a certain degree of capability, its capacity
to affect others9 decision will increase at the same time.

Thus, in most cases, power

and influence are interdependent in describing how powerful a state is in the
international system.

Prestige is the respect which is paid to a power by other

powers.

The definition offered by R. Gilpin is particularly suitable for this study.

What

the Chinese leadership pursued in the early 1980s was to make China become a
strong state in the world.

To do so, in the views of Deng, China had to boost its

national capabilities in the areas of economy, military, and technology.

The twenty

years5 reform and modernization programmes have been supportive of this pursuit.
The next step to the goal of great power status is to gain the respect of and equal
footing in the community of nations.

In fact, great power status is not self-claimed,

it has to be recognized and accepted by other great powers.

This means that China

has to show its ability to stand up in the world, through participation in regional and
international forums.

Great power status also depends on whether China can

demonstrate its contribution to the maintenance of world peace and stability.

In R.

Giplin’s definition of power， both comprehensive national power and perceptions of
14
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other powers are equally important.

It is equally applicable to the case of China.

In a rapidly changing international environment, the concept of great power is
subject to continuing redefinition and reassessment.

Within different periods, the

definition of “power” may require somewhat different combinations of ingredients.
During the Cold War period, a great power was one that mainly commanded strategic
military weapons and technological know-how.

After the Cold War, the notion of

great power tilts toward a combination of high-tech knowledge, military capabilities,
and the ability to influence major decision making in international affairs.

The

concept of power therefore needs to be modified in view of the changing
international setting.

In other words, embedded in an interactive and interdependent

world are multiple games on multiple chessboards (issue areas) requiring different
kinds of power (Baldwin, 1979, p.161).

Based on this interpretation， “power” is an

idea, which needs to be conceptualized in simulated terms.

Synthesizing various

conceptions of power, the most appropriate definition of a great power is as follows:
A state that is among the top five in the primary global structures - economic,
military, knowledge, and normative - and that, because of massive resource and skill
differentials and relative economic self-sufficiency, enjoys security interdependence
(Kim， 1998, p,9).

Having discussed the definitions of power, a clear picture of this study is shown.
As will become clear， “hard power” - a state’s economic and military power to
coerce - is adopted in this thesis in order to discuss China’s aspirations on becoming
a great power.

“Soft power” - the ability to attract through cultural and ideological

appeal - will not be included in the discussion in this study.
15
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possesses a significant role in the current world environment.

However， a state’s

values and culture will be spread to the world when its hard power is strong enough
to challenge the world’s predominance.

According to this precondition, hard power

is more important than that of soft power in the following discussion.

The concept of great power status in this study includes two items: power and
prestige.

In terms of power, the definition is not static, but dynamic in nature.

The

changing international environment may require a re-definition of what is power.
This characteristic of power， consequently, will bring a different index of
international prestige that a great power commands from other states.

During the

1980s to 1990s, the Chinese leadership resolved to search for great power status, by
upgrading the country’s comprehensive national capabilities (diplomatic leverage，
economic and military power) and seeking due recognition from the rest of the
world.

IMPORTANCE

OF

THEORY

IN

STUDYING

CHINESE

FOREIGN

RELATIONS:
BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY OF CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:

Several decades ago, there were not so many researchers and specialists who
were interested in investigating China’s behaviour in foreign policy and its status in
international relations.

On the one hand, China was still a closed country, and it

was not so easy to get information from mainland China.
was a difficult task for scholars outside mainland China.

The study of this field

On the other hand, during

the first half of the Maoist regime, China was still a very weak country in terms of
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economic, military and industrial-technological capabilities.

Its diplomatic network

with other nations was still under-developed. China’s strategic power in terms of
exercising influence abroad was very limited.

This condition could not arouse

much interest abroad in making China’s foreign policy and its external behavior a
serious subject of study.

By the late 1960s, the study of Chinese foreign policy was regarded as an
“emergent discipline” in international relations (Hsiung， 1980， p.l).
two reasons contributing to this change.

There were

First of all, the Sino-Soviet split and the

shifting winds in Sino-US relations in the late 1960s made China become an
increasingly prominent actor besides the two superpowers in the bipolar system.
The Washington government was showing signs that it would try to play China as a
counter weight against the Soviet Union.

Second, China was the only power other

than the superpowers with a fully independent nuclear force in that period.

The

international environment was predominated by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence
and high technological development in the Cold War period.

If a nation possessed

powerful nuclear weapons, its international status would be boosted accordingly.

Due to changes in the international environment and within China, these
developments altered the mind of specialists.

To the world, China was on its way to

becoming the next important force in the global system.

From the Chinese point of

view, the possession of a nuclear arsenal of China9s own making gave it the
necessary credentials for the quest of great power status.

Under these

circumstances, China9s ascendancy on the world stage became an important topic for
students of global politics.

Also from this time onwards, China’s international
17
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status and its national power became a contentious issue as well.

IMPORTANCE OF THEORY:

This the background of how the study of Chinese foreign policy became a
research focus from the late 1960s on.

However, much of the literature was largely

Sinocentric and ideographic, uncommunicative with the body of theory, methodology,
and findings that had developed in the broader fields of comparative foreign policy
and international relations (Hsiung, 1980, p.l).

In fact, analytical framework and

methodology are the essential elements in the study of China’s foreign policy.
Without them, the whole research will lack a skeleton in explaining why the
phenomenon occurred.

Indeed, most studies use an idiosyncratic approach in analyzing China’s
international status and its foreign policy in the world nowadays.
methodological point

of view,

From the

this approach contains the problems

of

conceptualization, operationalization, and hypothesis testing and theoretical
framework.

Ad hoc explanations just focus on the discussion of a particular issue in

a particular period, they cannot provide any cumulative meaning to the study of
Chinese foreign relations.

For example, when the NATO “accidentally” bombed

the Chinese embassy of Yugoslavia in May 1999, most experts believed that it would
create a hostile relationship between China and the US.

In addition, they would

probably predict that the Sino-US relationship entered into a dead end, and that it
would affect China’s entry to the WTO.

Nevertheless, these speculations failed to

explain why China reacted the way it did, why it insisted that the NATO must
18
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apologize for the incident.

The idiosyncratic approach fails to account for the

changing international environment, the perception of the larger world towards China,
and China9s self-perception.

In other words, this approach does not highlight the

importance of causal relationship between variables.

To understand China9s journey to become a great power, theory should be
brought in, to bear on the subject.

Theory is an explanatory device derived from

generalizations of earlier cases applicable to future similar cases, all things being
equal (ceteris paribus).

A coherent theoretical framework can illustrate a logical

causal relationship between independent variables and dependent variables.

After

identifying this causal relationship, findings regarding China’s foreign policy
behavior will become more comprehensible and credible.

This research aims at

asking three main questions: (1) How do changes in the international environment
and in the domestic development affect China’s great-power aspirations?
is the other states9 perception of China as a great power?
image on this matter?

(2) What

(3) What is China5s self-

To search an answer to these questions, we need a coherent

theoretical framework.

DIFFERENT APPROACHES ON THE STUDY OF CHINESE FOREIGN
POLICY:
COGNITIVE APPROACH:

The cognitive approach to the study of Chinese foreign policy is trained on the
top policy makers, in particular their perceptions of the domestic and international
environments.

The premise of the cognitive approach is that “human perception
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and motivation is the ultimate source of human behaviour.(Shih, 1992, p.56).

A

cognitive study of foreign policy entails the examination of the beliefs, ideals, and
experiences of the policy makers.

The main focus of the approach is the element of

“perception.” It emphasizes the importance of cognitive beliefs of people in the
actual process of foreign policy making.

In this regard, Shih developed a

“psychocultural cybernetic mode,” which contains two main arguments.

First, it is

argued that foreign policy mainly serves to dramatize, actualize, and confirm
statesmen’s national self-image (Shih， 1990, p.17).

Second, it is asserted that, in the

event of inconsistency between the self-image and the reality of world events, the
policy ultimately adopted boils down to the statesmen’s commitment to the
fulfillment of their world view (Shih, 1990, p.17).

This means that self-image and

world structure must be analyzed in combination.

Applying this approach in this study, the idea of national role as a source of
foreign policy behaviour and motivation can be used.

After Mao, China entered a

new era, in which it strove to have the ability to pursue a first-rank status in the
world.

The implication of this change in Chinese foreign policy is that China has

certain self-expectations in the contemporary world.

After having experienced a

century of humiliation, the Chinese people wish for an equal status among the
nations in the international community.
China’s foreign policy.

This aspiration is the motive force behind

Hence, the cognitive approach can give a full exposition to

this point.
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LINKAGE-POLITICS PARADIGM:

The theoretical model known as the linkage-politics approach aims at
explicating the causal relationship between domestic level factors and the
international system, which is the determinant in foreign policy decisions.

This

approach recognizes the force of external pressures and their impact on foreign
policy decision-making, but it also keeps an eye on the importance of domestic
political institutions and policies in the timing and framing of specific responses to
such external pressures (Kim, 1998， p.23).

That means, the linkage between

domestic factors and external factors is an interdependent and reciprocal interaction.
''Instead of being a cause of international politics, domestic structure may be a
consequence of it.

International systems, too, become causes instead of

consequences.” (Gourevitch, 1978， p.882).

Linkage, in the study of a nation’s

foreign policy, is defined as any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in
one system and is reacted to in another (Rosenau, 1969, p.45).

Due to the

increasing globalization dynamics, the linkage between domestic and external
variables becomes a prominent factor affecting a state’s foreign policy.

For the study of China’s great-power aspirations in the post-Mao period, the
model of linkage-politics leads us to searching for a causal relationship between
domestic variables and international variables that will help explain Chinese leaders5
psychological profile and their perceptions of and responses to international material
and normative pressures.

During the late Maoist regime, China began to integrate

into the global system, as indicated in its entry to the United Nations in 1971.

In the

Dengist era, the Chinese leadership carried out an open door policy as well as
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domestic reforms, which were designed to develop the nation’s national capabilities,
in the economic, military, and diplomatic sphere.

However, these internal changes

inevitably brought about the reformulation of Chinese foreign policy behaviour.

To

fulfill the national development goals of making China a strong power, the Chinese
leadership realized that they cannot continuously follow the doctrine of selfsufficiency and isolation of the Maoist era.

From this time onwards, the Chinese

leaders have come to understand and appreciate the implications of the domestic and
external linkage.

Due to the increasingly complex and interdependence between domestic and
foreign policies, the model of linkage-politics is appropriate to the task of explaining
the existing Chinese foreign policy behaviour.

However, the indicators of domestic

and systemic factors are very complicated and some of them are not very relevant to
the study of the Chinese quest to be a great power.

This study will simplify the

causal relationship in the linkage-politics paradigm in order to explain China’s
aspirations to become a great power.

There are two steps in establishing a causal

relationship between Chinese domestic power and foreign policy.

First, in Deng’s

time， the most urgent domestic policy was to establish China’s economic
development.

To fulfill this goal, China carried out several types of reforms, which

included agriculture, industry, finance, and property estate in order to enhance its
economic capability domestically.

Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership realized that

merely depending on internal reforms could not make China into an economically
strong country, and that foreign investments would also play an important role in
China’s economic development.

Therefore, the orientation of Chinese foreign

policy became more open-mined, and it showed a cooperative goodwill towards the
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outside world.

The change of Chinese foreign policy was based on the needs of

national development.

Second, the relationship between China’s quest for great power status and
linkage politics can be illustrated in this way: in the post-Mao era, Deng sought to
make China into one of great powers in the world.

From Deng’s point of view,

China should have a thorough preparation to fulfill its great-power dream in terms of
its economic power, military power and diplomatic leverage.
continues to guide China in Jiang’s period

This overall concern

If China’s great-power aspirations are

to be fulfilled the most essential element to make China become a great power is the
possession of a strong comprehensive national power.

If China is a weak country

and has less power capability; its international status will be less respected by the rest
of the world.

When China's national power increases, its status will receive greater

respect, and its foreign policy will become more active.

China has accumulated its

national power after two decades of reforms and continuous developments.

These

achievements directly affect China's new concept of foreign policy, which is more
active in international activities and establishes normal ties with other nations.

In

addition, the expanding state to state relationship between China and the other states
will relatively benefit China's capability building.

Since the Chinese leaders

increase their practice in international arena, at the same time, the established trade
with other countries on military and economy will strengthen China1s national
capabilities.

As a whole， there are two types of linkage to describe China’s great-power
aspirations in these two decades.

The first step started from the Dengist era, which
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mainly focused on the complementarity between domestic development and external
relations.

The “vertical” domestic-foreign linkage has been established for the two

decades.

Since the Chinese leadership realized the importance of foreign

investments on China9s economic capability building, the integration into the global
system was an inevitable trend for the Chinese modernization.

A cooperative

goodwill towards the outside world and friendly relations with the other nations are
the main elements in the Chinese “vertical” domestic-foreign linkage.

The second

step began in Jiang5s tenure, which developed the expansion of China9s influence
abroad.

In the 1990s, China has accumulated its certain economic power in the

Asian-Pacific area.

These achievements make China become more active in both

the regional and international institutions.

This “horizontal” linkage vis各 vis other

countries was achieved by China9s participation into different kinds of organization
in the world.

Hence, the links between China9s great-power aspirations, domestic

development and foreign policy can be explained under the concept of linkagepolitics paradigm.

The next chapter further illustrates this relationship with

evidence in order to make this structure more concrete.

GEOSTRATEGIC POINT OF VIEW:

The concept of geostrategy uses a global perspective to describe the relationship
between the nature of international structure and the role of a nation in the world.
Actually, geostrategic concept is primarily derived from geopolitics.

Before

examining the concept of geostrategy, it would be appropriate to touch upon some
traditional concepts of geopolitics.

According to the supplement to the Oxford

English Dictionary, geopolitics is the study of the “influence of geography on the
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political character of states, their history, institutions and especially relations with
other states.”

（
Mazari,

1998, p.l).

This theoretical conception is given to

understand the principal international security issues.

It is about the “high politics”

of security and international order; about the influence of enduring spatial
relationships for the rise and decline of power centers; and about the implications of
technological, political - organization, and demographic trends for relations of
relative influence (Gray, 1988, p.4).

Therefore, it is an approach, which takes a

worldwide perspective in discussing state relations.

Typically, this theoretical

approach focused only on superpowers or great powers in international power
relationship, and concentrated on the relation of international political power to the
geographical landscape.

From this point of view, geopolitical ideas provide a

framework that let us realize how international politics runs in a dynamic world,
from what considerations, what aim, and what strategies the state will behave like
this.

Geopolitical concepts are grand theory indeed.

It concerns with the essential

nature of phenomena, and gives a precise argument on existing international politics.
Basically, geopolitics is identified as three main notions in discussing politics at the
international level.

First is the geographical setting which means the size, the

contained raw materials and the defensive capability of a state.
difference of ideology.

Second is the

This factor is prominent in the “game” of geopolitics, since

the ideological differences would determine the military and technological strategic
principles of states.

It indicates that countries with same official ideology will be

close to each other and may form alliances in the sense of military defense.

For

instance, NATO is formed by Western capitalist states, which share similar
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ideological principles after WWII.

Third, there is a doctrine over oppositions at

several aspects, such as land power versus sea power, Heartland versus Rimland, and
individualistic Western philosophy versus a collective Eastern philosophy.

In

modem time, after the end of the Cold War, many experts focus on the doctrine of
land power versus sea power, because the international environment follows the
pattern of bipolar system in the Cold War period.

USSR, the landpower of the great

continental state, is on the opposite of, USA, the seapower of the maritime empire.
If a country can either dominate landpower or seapower, its military status in the
world would be enhanced.

There is another substantial concept that is similar to geopolitics in discussing
international politics during the 1990s.

Geoeconomics seems to be another trend

that counterbalances the idea of geopolitics.

This concept even surpasses

geopolitics in the post-Cold War era, and its importance in international system
should not be ignored.

The definition of geoeconomics includes two levels.

On

the marcolevel, all matters pertaining to manufacturing, marketing, financing, and
research and design (R&D) are globalized, while on the microlevel, national power is
no longer measured exclusively by a state’s military might (Hsiung，1997, p.203).
It thus, implies that economic security has eclipsed or overtaken military security in
world order.

The “game” of geoeconomics is very similar to that of geopolitics， but

the most significant difference seems to be the strategic principle.

The main idea of

geopolitics is on the military strategic principle - one nation’s security is all
determined by how powerful of its military strength.

Although geoeconomics also

concerns the strategic principle, its focus is on economic strategy.

The essence of

geoeconomics is the national economic self-containment; the hold of natural
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resources; the independence of trade; and the formation of economic bloc.

If a

country can establish an economic strategic principles and autonomy, its national
power would enhance simultaneously.

Therefore, geoeconomics is derived from

the concept of geopolitics, both are based on strategy that develop national power of
state and form alliance with other states, but the most typical difference is their
essence.

Applying geostrategic point of view in the study of China’s great-power
aspirations provides a world perspective to discuss the relationship between China9s
role in the world and changes in international environment.

Geostrategic analysis is

applied to illustrate the changes in China's international status from the Maoist era to
the post-Cold War era.

Traditionally, the theoretical analysis of geostrategy focused

only on state relations among great powers and superpowers in international relations.
The international structure is determined by some powerful states, this ideology is
famous in realism.

China's quest for great power status in the global system is

bounded by the international structure.
not static.

International relations is a dynamic process,

Changes in the international environment have imposed both new

chances and challenges to China in its role and status.

In the post-Cold War era,

China has gained a higher international status due to the breakdown of the
international bipolar system.

FRAMEWORK OF CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS:

Having reviewed different approaches to the study of Chinese foreign policy, it
is necessary to describe a conceptual framework of this study.
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China’s foreign policy and its great-power aspirations in the post-Mao era， two
approaches, linkage politics and geostrategic point of view will be used.

The

former provides a systematic paradigm explaining the interrelations between
domestic and external variables.

In the post-Mao period, the doctrine of

exploitative constraints is released, and the interaction between China and the world
is enhanced.

Changes in Chinese domestic developments and the detente of tight

international bipolar system stimulate the thought of Chinese leaders that China
possesses capabilities to quest for a great power.

Hence, it is definitely true that

China is entering into world politics, the integration would make the internal and
external factors more complex.

The model of linkage-politics is appropriate to

explain the existing phenomenon of Chinese foreign policy behaviour in the world.

Geostrategic concepts developed a macro-level analysis in China’s foreign policy.
Since international relations is a dynamic process, not static, changes in the
international environment have imposed new challenges to China in its role and
status.

China’s quest for a great power in post-Mao era is bounded by the

international order.

The detente of Sino-US relations in the 1970s marked the

watershed of China9s foreign policy and laid down the foundation of China9s greatpower aspirations in the Dengist regime.

In the Dengist period, he stated that the

closer relationship with the United States was a long-term strategy of China5s foreign
policy (Yahuda，1982, p.36).

It is a geopolitical consideration - establishing a good

relations with the US would be beneficial for China for the long run, because the US
is the only superpower in the existing international environment.

This geopolitical

idea fully represents that Deng has a hope to make China a great power in the
international arena.

Moreover, Deng’s Open Door policy and economic
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development came from the concept of geoeconomics.

Deng perhaps forecasted

that the concept of geoeconomic capability would be the most important element in
evaluating one’s national strength.
Deng’s idea in foreign relations.

During Jiang9s period, he basically follows

In the post-Cold War period, China has gained a

higher international status due to the breakdown of the international bipolar order.
Jiang is more aggressive in developing China as a great power in the world.

He

may not wish China would be “first among equal”， but “equal among firsts”.
Despite the favourable factors of Chinese national growth, the wish of Chinese
leaders to make China a great power is partly determined by the change of
international structure.

Therefore, combing the two approaches, linkage-politics

paradigm and geostrategic analysis would give us a detailed and comprehensive
explanation of China’s great-power aspirations in the post-Mao period.

The cognitive approach, in the study of Chinese great-power aspirations,
provides a background information for this study.
power is mostly caused by its history.

China9s self-perception as a great

After China experienced a century of

humiliation, the Chinese people wish to ask for an equal status between China and
the other members in the international community.

To fulfill this goal, the Chinese

leaders should have a self-conception that China is a great power in order to spread
Chinese value abroad.

Hence, this approach can give an explanation why Chinese

leaders will have an aspirations to become one of the great powers in the world after
the Maoist era.

Based on a set of theoretical frameworks, two hypotheses are formed in this
study.

In the following chapters (3 & 4), evidence will be given in accordance with
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these two hypotheses, two approaches and China9s great-power aspirations.

(1) China9s international status is a function of both its capabilities (military,
economy, and diplomatic leverage) and the general perception of other major
powers.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variable

H (1) is from an objective perspective to testify whether China is a great power
in the international system.

A great power is not self-claimed, it requires the

recognition by other members of the international society, especially of the major
states (actors).

China’s national growth which begun in the 1980s and the

acceptance by other nations are the two pillars supporting China9s claim to be a great
power in the world system.

This hypothesis can be justified by the documents and

commentaries from other states about the great-power status of China in the world.
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(2) China perceives itself as a great power as well as the world’s recognition of
China’s global status， as a result of China’s endeavors to upgrade its national
capabilities and of strategic changes in the international balance of power.

Independent Variables

Dependent Variables

H (2) tries to discuss China’s quest for great power status from two perspectives.
First, China9s self-image as a great power is the result of domestic reforms and
change in the external environment.

Second, the world’s recognition of China’s

great power status is due to China’s national capabilities and change of international
order.

Whether China perceives itself as a great power depends on its own

calculated endeavors and the state of the international system.

Without the reforms

of the 1980s, China cannot have upgraded its national capabilities in quest of bigpower status.

Without the breakdown of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, China

cannot have become one of the potential poles in the global system.
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perception as a great power can be shown in its active participation in the
international arena.

This hypothesis can be justified by the publications and

documentation from the Chinese government and Jiang’s visits and his speeches
concerning the world order.

Besides, the general acceptance by the international community of the rising
China is most probably caused by the change from bipolar to multipolar international
system.

In addition, China’s economic clout in recent decades has shown an

impressive image to the world.

The two independent variables - China’s

capabilities and change of international order, contribute to the worlds positive
perception of China’s role in the world.
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CHAPTER 3
CHINA’S

GREAT-POWER

ASPIRATIONS:

A

LINKAGE-

POLITICS PARADIGM

INTRODUCTION:

Linkage-politics paradigm is used in this chapter to describe how China’s
domestic capabilities affect its foreign policy behaviour and how foreign policy
contributes to its domestic growth.

For these two decades，China’s great-power

aspirations have been stimulated by its increasing national development, especially in
economic growth.

This chapter is divided into three parts in discussing how

linkage-politics can be applied to explain China^ quest for great power status.
Firstly， we will discuss the links between China’s domestic development and its
external relations，hence， the “vertical” domestic-foreign linkage.
policy shift has helped its foreign relations.

China’s domestic

In the early 1980s, the most urgent

domestic policy for China was to push for economic development.

Contrarily,

China’s expanding foreign relations will relatively benefit China’s capability
building, since international trade ties will enhance China’s economic development
and military advancement.

The change of Chinese foreign policy was based on the

needs of national development.

The Chinese leaders realized that merely depending

on internal reforms could not make China into economically strong country and that
foreign investments would also play an important role on China5s economic
development.

As a result, the orientation of Chinese foreign policy became more

open-minded, more active to establish normal ties with foreign states, and it showed
a cooperative goodwill towards the outside world.
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the change in China5s internal growth and its external relations and how they have
complemented each other.

Secondly, we will use the linkage-politics paradigm to explain China’s
“horizontal” linkage vis-i_vis other countries.

Due to the impressive growth of

China’s economy， the expansion of China’s influence abroad has been enhanced.
These achievements can be justified through China’s active participation in both the
regional and the global institutions.

The large gains in China’s economic clout in

recent decades improved its influence in the world.

This linkage will be supported

in the following paragraph.

Thirdly, due to this positive inter-relationship, what the Chinese leadership did
in the past two decades testified China had self-perception to become a great power.
Based on the concept of linkage-politics paradigm, the Chinese leaders realized the
important link between national development and external relations.

When China

has strengthened its national power around the 1990s, Jiang Zemin began its great
power foreign policy, which aimed at making China one of the great powers in the
world.

According to Jiang’s views on foreign policy, he believes that China’s

strong national power will directly expand its influence on foreign relations.

Hence,

the linkage-politics paradigm can help explain the great-power aspirations on the
doctrine of China^ foreign policy.

CHINA，S CAPABILITY IN TERMS OF ECONOMIC POWER:

This section discusses the relationship between China’s increasing and
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comprehensive national development and its active behaviour in foreign policy.
The political victory of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 marked the starting point for the rise
of China in the world.

Deng gave priority to economic modernization in domestic

construction, which put China on the road to fulfilling the goal of obtaining a
superpower position.

From that time onwards, China’s domestic policies started to

play an influential indicator of its foreign policy.

The phase “open door policy”

describes China’s new doctrine on foreign policy consideration， which highlights the
specific nature of its changes.

In reality, the main principle of the Open Door

Policy is the reflection of China’s domestic development.

The linkage between

domestic and foreign policies are inter-related due to the increasingly globalization.

INDICATORS TO ILLUSTRATE CHINA’S ECONOMIC CAPABILITY:

Based on the economic foundation in the Maoist period and rapid economic
growth in the Dengist era, China is the fastest growing economy in the world (Kristof,
1993, p.59).

If this trend continues, according to this source, China may displace

the worlds largest economy - the United States, and become a global economic
superpower around the mid 21st century.

In the post-Cold War world order, the

United States has processed the world’s largest economy for more than a century， but
at present projections China may displace it in the first half of the 21st century and
become the number one economy in the world (Kristof, 1993, p.59).

Although this

prediction is conceivably overly generous in evaluating China’s economic capability
in the world, there is undoubted evidence that the existing international
environment —an era of geoeconomics, is favorable for China’s economic growth in
this century.
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In the following paragraphs, four areas will be employed to operationalize
China’s economic competency.

They include China9s national growth, its trading

volume in the world, its inflow of foreign direct investment, and its accession into
the international economic organization - WTO.

First of all, gross domestic

product (GDP) may be regarded as the best single indicator to measure a state’s
power, which combines overall size, technological level, and wealth (Goldstein, 1999,
p_57).

The index of GDP, thus, can show the comprehensive national capability of a

state.

Second, the trade volume, foreign investments, and integration of the world

economic order are the prominent factors to indicate a state’s economic capability in
terms of global perspective.

Since the world is on the right trend towards

globalization, the interaction among states, especially the economic ties, will increase
in this century.

Hence, these two indicators play a significant role in judging

China’s economic power.

I

CHINA

GDP GROWTH IN THE PAST TWO DECADES:

Since the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh CPC Central Committee
convened in December 1978, the central government made the strategic decision of
shifting the focus of work to social modernization and defined the guiding policy of
revitalizing the domestic economy and opening up to the outside world.

From that

time onwards, a brand new situation appeared in economic development through
vigorously balancing the proportions of the national economy and reforming the
outdated economic system.

This changing economic strategy brought an enormous

enhancement on China’s economic growth.
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In terms of GDP, China has reached a satisfactory and surprising growth level
for the last two decades.

According to People’s Daily (September 14， 1999)，

China’s GDP， which came to only RMB 362.41 billion yuan in 1978, totaled 7955.3
billion yuan, a 20-fold increase over 1978.

From 1979 to 1997，China’s average

annual growth rate is 9.8%, or 6.5% points higher than that of the world.

The other

statistical data in People’s Daily (October 23，1999) mentioned that from 1952 to
1998, China’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 7.7%， much higher than the
world average of 3% in the same period.

China’s present economic boom has

resulted in real annual growth averaging about 7-8% per year, and reached the
highest GNP growth at 12.8% in 1992.

China5s GDP in 1995 was nearly double

that predicted by the World Bank in 1985 (World Bank, 1997, p.20).

This

continuously rapid development was not impeded by the Asian financial crisis in the
late 1998.

In fact, the GDP for 1998 increased by 7.8% over the previous year

(People’s Daily， September 14, 1999).
target of 8%.

The increase was just slightly lower than the

This achievement fully testifies that China possesses enough

economic foundation to meet the challenge in a local regional crisis.

II.

CHINA’S TRADE VOLUME:

After the initiation of economic reform and opening to the outside world, the
growing foreign trade became and constituted a major element in promoting China9s
economic development.

China is likely to be an increasingly important trading

nation in the world, its exports are likely to continue to grow by 10 to 15% annually,
and trade value in 1995 is likely to be between $220 billion to $250 billion (Lardy,
1994, p.105).

The growth of China’s foreign trade is shown in figure 3.1.
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the late 1990s， the data shows that China’s trade volume kept on a right pace even to
meet Asian financial crisis.

The trade value is to be between US$324 billion to

US$360.7 billion, and its growth rate is around 11.3% increase.

As a result, we can

predict that the trend o f China5s foreign trade will be on the positive, increasing
trend.

Figure 3.1

Dual Growth of China’s Foreign Trade in 1999 (Unit US$ 1 billion)
1998

1999

Growth Rate

Export

183.7

194.9

6.1%

Import

140.3

165.8

18.2%

Import & Export

324.0

360.7

11.3%

Source: Beijing Review Vol. 43 No. 14

In terms of China9s imports and exports in GNP? the growth is staggering.
During the late 1970s，China’s imports and exports accounted for about 13% of GNP，
the lowest ratio in the world.

In 1995, China’s trade has surged to more than 30o/〇

of GNP (World Bank, 1997, p.84).

In US dollar terms, trade increased nearly

tenfold between 1978 to 1995. From $36 billion to $300 billion (World Bank, 1997,
p.84).

As a result, according to figure 3.2, China5s total export and import values

have ranked 9,h and 11th respectively in the world, accounting for 4 percent of world
trade.

And by 2020, China could be the world9s second largest exporter and

importer, accounting for 10% of world trade (World Bank, 1997, p.103).

Moreover,

the view that China will become an economic superpower stems in part from the
widely publicized International Monetary Fund report that China’s economy is
poised to overtake that of Japan in absolute size (Lardy, 1994, p.107).

In sum, the

evidence justifies the fact that China will continue to be a major participant in
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international trade and international capital markets.

Figure 3.2

Import and Export by China in 1999.

Import and Export by China in 1999 Ranking The Top 9th of The World
Trade 1999 in (Unit: US$100 million)
Country
(region)

Import and Export

Export

Import

No. 1999 Growth No. 1999 Growth No. 1999 Growth
Rate%

Rate%

Rate%

U.S.A

1 17,549

8.0

1 6,950

1.8

1 10,599

12.5

Germany

2 10,131

0.0

2 5,405

-0.4

2 4,726

0.4

Japan

3 7,271

8.8

3 4,175

7.6

4 3,096

10.4

U.K.

4 5,891

0.2

5 2,684

-1.6

3 3,207

1.7

France

5 5,850

-1.6

4 2,990

-2.1

5 2,860

-1.2

Canada

6 4,588

8.6

6 2,386

11.3

7 2,202

5.8

Italy

7 4,468

-2.5

7 2,308

-4.7

6 2,160

0.1

Netherlands

8 3,931

6.7

8 2,041

1.5

8 1,890

12.9

P.R.C.

9 3,607

11.3

9 1,949

6.1

11 1,658

18.3

Hong Kong

10 3,543

-1.4

11 1,748

0.0

9 1,795

-2.8

Belgium-

11 3,535

2.4

10 1,841

3.0

10 1,694

1.7

12 2,849

14.8

13 1,367

16.3

12 1,482

13.5

Luxemburg
Mexico

Source: Beijing Review Vol. 43 No. 14

III. FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT:

In respect of foreign direct investment (FDI), the growth is gigantic.

Starting

from 1978 on, the opening of China’s market attracted a lot of capital and
management know-how from the west.

Before 1979 China attracted nearly no FDI,

however, by 1995 net inflow had reached $38 billion, accounting for 13 percent of
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domestic investment (World Bank, 1997, p.90).

In 1995 one-third of China’s

exports and half of its imports involved joint ventures between Chinese and foreign
partners (World Bank, 1997, p.90).

China was the second-largest recipient of

foreign direct investment in the world during the late 1990s, just behind the US? and
was probably the largest developing-country host for investment (Lardy, 1994,
p.106).

Since

1979， foreign investment has played a critical role in

internationalizing China’s economy and trade， introducing capital， technology and
management and marketing skills.

In the long term, FDI will bring further benefits

of China’s comparative advantages and provide clearer domestic signals on where to
allocate resources.

Over the past 21 years, the significant increase portfolio

investment by foreigners is as the result of China’s expanding open markets.

In

sum, the role of FDI becomes more important for China’s economic growth when the
Chinese leaders still keep on the trend of open door policy.

IV ACCESSION INTO THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION:

In the post-Cold War world order, the world not only entered into the multipolar
system, but there was a trend towards globalization as well.
globalization is the general trend in the existing international order.

Economic

If China wants

to become one of the most major participants in the international economic order, the
integration into the world is an inevitable movement for the development of China9s
economy.

The WTO is one of the most extensive international economic

organizations.

Its main functions are: First, formulating international economic and

trade regulations and supervising their implementation; second, organizing its
member states to conduct negotiations on opening markets; third, establishing a sort
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of mechanism for coordinating and solving economic and trading disputes between
its member states.

Thus， the success of China’s entry into the WTO promotes

China’s rapid economic growth in today’s world trading order.

The most important

aspect is that China’s accession in the WTO can strengthen its external relations with
other nations, and accelerate its integration into the global economic system.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH TO ITS GREAT POWER
ASPIRATIONS:
I.

THE

COMPLEMENTARITY

BETWEEN

CHINA’S

DOMESTIC

DEVELOPMENT AND EXTERNAL RELATIONS:

Since China has focused on its economic development for two decades, the
open door policy helped China establish its foreign relations.

China’s growth rates

in its GDP, foreign trade, FDI and the accession into the WTO are the indicators that
show the interaction between China and the rest of the world has become more
cooperative than that of before.

In addition，China’s expanding and open foreign

relations have proven instrumental in fostering China9s domestic development.

First of all，China’s global trade volume， ranking 9th in export value and 11th in
import value illustrates the developing economic ties between China and the other
nations.

The United States has even become China9s largest export country.

President Jiang Zemin, in the late 1990s, paid visits to the developed countries, such
as the US, Japan, and Western Europe.
ties in economic development.

One of his aims was to establish cooperative

Hence, China’s growth in global trade volume

accelerated its links with the world.
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Second, China5s rapid and continuous GDP growth quickens the process of
economic integration.

Economic globalization is one of the important tasks in the

post-Cold War period.

When the other Western countries view that China possesses

an enough economic foundation in developing its economy, the economic
cooperation between China and the other developed countries will be established and
strengthened.

Thus, the relations between China and the other countries will fasten

China’s GDP growth in the long run.

Third, China9s WTO entry will improve and promote the overall development
of China’s trade and economic cooperation with other economic superpower blocs,
such as the US, the European Union and Japan.

From the data shown in figure 3.3,

Japan， the US and the EU are China’s three largest and major trading partners in
1999.

Two-way trade volume is on an increasing trend in these years.

According

to People’s Daily (November 16， 1999)， Jiang Zemin said that the signing of the
Sino-US bilateral agreement on China’s WTO accession demonstrates both sides
have adopted an overall point of view and made unremitting efforts in line with the
spirit of equality, mutual benefit, mutual understanding, and mutual compromise.
Recently, the US House of Representatives in Washington has passed on a fiercely
contested trade bill granting permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) to China on
May 25, 2000.

The PNTR issue will help both China and the US develop trade and

economic ties.

It will also help create conditions for the healthy and stable

development of Sino-US relations.

This achievement demonstrates that China’s

entry to WTO has helped build a good trading atmosphere in international relations.

The European Union was China’s third largest trading partner; the trade volume
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hit 55.7 billion US dollars in 1999, up 14% from a year ago, according to figure 3.3.
At the same time, China was the fourth largest trading partner of the EU last year.
The bilateral trade relations should keep to an increasingly trend, because China and
the EU signed a bilateral agreement on China’s accession into the WTO in Beijing
on May 19，2000.
relations.

In fact, the signing of the agreement will accelerate bilateral

In the agreement, the EU officials negotiated access to the mobile

telecommunications and insurance sectors; greater flexibility for auto manufacturers;
and substantial tariff cuts on a wider variety of goods.

The document is not only an

agreement of commercial importance, but also important for the improvement of
bilateral trading relations among China and the EU.

Through China’s accession

into the WTO? the trading development and economic ties between China and other
WTO member countries will be improved.

Figure 3.3

China’s Top Trading Partners in 1999 (Unit US$ 1 billion)
Country &

Import &

Region

Export

i

Japan

2

Export

Import

66.2

32.4

33.8

USA

61.5

42.0

19.5

3

EU

55.7

30.2

25.5

4

Hong Kong

43.8

36.9

6.9

5

ASEAN

27.1

12.2

14.9

6

ROK

25.0

7.8

17.2

7

Taiwan

23.5

4.0

19.5

8

Australia

6.3

2.7

3.6

9

Russia

5.7

1.5

4.2

10

Canada

4.7

2.4

2.3

Rank

Source: Beijing Review Vol. 43 No. 14
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Fourthly， Hong (People’s Daily， January 26, 2000) mentioned that China’s entry
to the WTO can cause development through taking an active part in international
economic cooperation and competition.

Joining the WTO, further opening their

domestic markets and participating in global competition will unavoidably exert a
certain impact and pressure on some of China’s capital and technology intensive
industries.

However, accession to the WTO also provides a golden opportunity for

China to absorb and assimilate advanced foreign technologies and management
expertise, as well as quicken technological innovation.

In this sense， China’s

international competitiveness will be raised at the same time.

Finally，China’s economic growth will inevitably bring a series of domestic
reforms and development in order to enhance its economic competitiveness in the
global economy system and its international influence.

The most substantial task

recently is the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

During the 4th Plenum of

the 15th CPC Central Committee discussed the major issues related to the reforms
and development of SOEs.

The state-owned economy is now facing operational

and production difficulties.

It is a vital time for China to carry out reforms;

otherwise the problem of SOEs will interfere with China5s economic performance.
To achieve a sustainable， fast and healthy economic growth, speeding up the
technological renovation and industrial upgrading are the main goal of SOE reform.
Active efforts should be made to import advanced technology and make it a point of
digesting and absorbing the technology and then China can make their own
inventions.

In reality, Beijing understands that economic sources of power are of

increasing importance as the central element of comprehensive national power in an
increasing multipolar world (Ross, 1995a, p.94).
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firmly on choosing reform over inaction.
to carrying out economic reform.

Thus, the Chinese leaders will still stick

If China continues the trend to upgrade its

economic capability in the future; it is possible for the Chinese to reach the goal of
superpower in the-mid 21st century.

II.

THE EXPANSION OF CHINA’S INFLUENCE ABROAD:

After Deng Xiaoping became China’s leader in 1978, he tried to cause China to
become a great power in the world.

One reason is that he perceived China would

become a strong nation, which could compare with the United States and the Soviet
Union in the future; the other reason is he claimed that modernization and more
economic growth were the prerequisites for the rise of China in the world order.
The doctrine of the formulation of the general policy of readjusting, restructuring,
consolidating and improving China’s economy in the early 1980s signified that the
Chinese leadership had a hope to become a great power.
was through the advancement of economic strength.

The tool to fulfill this goal
In the views of the Chinese

leadership, if China could enhance its economic strength and develop its economic
system, other development and national growth will continued to be increased.

In

the following paragraphs, several implications for the achievement of China’s
economic development will be discussed in order to realize China9s great-power
aspirations during these two decades.

Firstly, a greater economic power will help China build up a larger role in the
international order.

Economic capability is one of important elements in the

definition of power as aforementioned.
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capability.

After the end of the Cold War, the international environment is on the

right trend towards economic globalization, and becomes more interdependent on
trade development.

Wang Jisi, the director of the Institute of American Studies at

the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, said that economics is now central to world
affairs, and so China’s overall foreign and global posture would be advanced by the
kind of integration (Bergsten， 2000, p.6).

When China’s economic capability

increased to a great extent, it was an undeniable fact that China’s comprehensive
national strength increased simultaneously.

During the new century, comprehensive

national strength has become an increasing leading factor to determine the future and
date of a country.

In sum, the direct consequence brought by economic growth is

the rise of the diplomatic leverage of China in the world.

When China began the Open Door Policy in the late 1970s, its increasing
interdependence with the world’s trade and investment systems was perhaps the most
striking phenomenon of China’s recent development

China was active in

participating in regional multilateral financial institutions and regional forums such
as APEC, ASEAN Post-ministerial Conference and ARF.

Recently, China has

successfully completed talks on its WTO entry with more than 30 members of the
global trade organ.

China’s participation in regional organizations will be

illustrated in more detail in the next section.

What is the most important evidence to signify the positive relation between
China’s economic development and its international role is that China has enjoyed a
certain degree of independence and respect to act in the world.

Specifically,

China’s diplomatic leverage has counterbalanced the international status of the US —

46

CHAPTER 3
CHINA'S GREAT-POWER ASPIRATIONS: A LINKAGE-POLITICS PARADIGM

the dominant state in the post-Cold War world order, in this new century.
at some examples to illustrate this point.

Let’s look

Last year, the US-led NATO bombed

Yugoslavia and the hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.

This Belgrade Embassy

disaster killed three Chinese and prompted days of angry demonstrations outside the
American Embassy in Beijing.

Protests were heard not just in Beijing but also in

other cities around the world.

The Chinese government showed a strong stance to

protect its dignity and its international status in the world through continuously
criticizing the US’ arbitrary intervention on other nations’ internal affairs.
this event, China gained the support in the rest of the world.

From

Regarding the

negotiation between China and the US on China’s accession into the WTO, China
did not make a great compromise to the demands of the US.

Both sides are on the

equal footing to discuss the bilateral agreement on China’s entry to the WTO.

It is

true that the entry to the WTO will bring lots of benefit to China as its economy is on
the rise.

However, the Chinese leaders also realize the importance of defending

their national interests.

Finally, the agreement was signed by US Trade

Representative Charlene Barshefsky and Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation Shi Guangsheng on behalf of their respective governments.

According

to People’s Daily (November 15, 1999)， Shi called the agreement a “win，win” deal
because the deal was mutually satisfactory.

This agreement showed that China

possessed enough diplomatic bargaining power on its economic activities.

As a whole, this evidence illustrates that there is a positive relation between
China’s economic growth and its international status.

In the views of the Chinese

leadership， without a strong economic power， China cannot play an active role in the
international arena.

At the same time, China cannot fulfill its goal of great-power
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aspirations.

Thus, economic capability seems to be a prerequisite for the rise of

China and an essential factor to enhance China5s competition for superpower status
and prestige in international politics.

Secondly, the economic achievement in the past two decades has enlarged the
Chinese spirit and confidence to reach its goal of becoming a great power in the new
century.

There are many studies, which focus on the prediction of China9s power in

the new century.

A lot of research uses China’s economic capability to forecast

China9s power in the 21st century.

The world economy these days is in tri-polar,

revolving around the United States, Japan and the European Community (Kristof,
1993， p.61).

This is true that these countries have developed their completed

financial markets, and have owned the financial capability to invest in other countries.
However in terms of global trade, market size and sheer economic bulk, China is
becoming a fourth pole in the international system (Kristof，1993, p.61).

Having

examined the IMF, Work Bank, Department of Commerce, Maddison, and Penn
World Tables data, a conclusion is that China, at current growth rates, will pass the
United States in GDP in the middle of the first quarter of the twenty-first century
(Tammen, Kugler & Lemke et. al, 2000, p.210).

Most analysts view that China will

become the next superpower in the first half of the 21st century.

Bergsten (2000, p.2)

said that the United States is now the great superpower, however, China is clearly the
next superpower, certainly in economic terms and more broadly as well.

Bracken

(2000, p.104) believed that the rise of Beijing does not automatically translate into a
decline for Washington， but it is a challenge to America’s superpower position.
A.F.K. Organski even said:
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The question is not whether China will become the most powerful nation
on earth, but rather how long it will take her to achieve this status ... The
United States will retain world leadership for at least the remainder of the
twentieth century, perhaps even for a longer time, but the position will
eventually pass to China (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke et. al, 2000, p.210).

These favourable data will probably influence Chinese leaders on developing a
long lasting goal of the Chinese - a superpower status for China.

In fact, the

economic gap between China and the West has narrowed due to the opening up of
China in the late 1970s.

The success of China’s integration into the world economy

signifies the precise and accurate strategy that was built in the Dengist period.
Indeed, the view of China9s economic cultivation articulated by Deng Xiaoping and
developed by Zhao Ziyang has become a central element of official Chinese
nationalism (Crane, 1999, p.220).

In this sense, the advancement of economic

development does represent the Chinese leadership on the achievement of China’s
great-power aspirations in the world.

In the new century, it is believed that China

will still keep on a right pace fulfilling the goal of superpower development, which
has been based on an economic build up in the past two decades.

Third, Hong (People’s Daily， January 26, 2000) stated that China’s joining the
WTO represents a major practical step it takes in its active participation in the
economic globalization process, and the necessary choice in persisting in
development.

Over the two decades of opening up to the outside world, the

Chinese leadership has realized that “development is the final choice” for the future
of China.

Acceleration of the economic globalization process is the salient
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tendency for China to speed up its rapid economic growth in order to consolidate its
economic capability in the world.

Although economic globalization is unequal to

the developed and developing countries in terms of profit and risk, the developing
nations must go with the tide of historical development if they do not want to remain
in a long term, backward state and stay in a passive position.

China is a developing

country, its open door policy over the past 21 years testified that China can develop
itself in a faster and better way by unswervingly opening to the outside world and
making full use of international and domestic markets and resources.

In actuality, China’s accession into the WTO is an important practical step it has
taken in its active participation in the economic globalization process, in further
perfecting the pattern of its opening to the outside world and in vigorously
developing its exported-oriented economy.

According to People’s Daily

(September 16, 1999), Jiang stressed that China will push forward the reform and
opening-up drive, steadily expand the mutually beneficial cooperation with all
countries in the world.

At the same time, China will continue its efforts for the

establishment of a complete and open international trading system so as to make
positive contributions to world peace and development.

If China succeeds in its

admittance to the WTO after the negotiations with other members in this year, it is
possible for China to achieve more development opportunities in the vast
international economic arena.

Moreover, China can gain a greater say in the

formulation of international economic and trading rules and in handling trading
disputes, and receiving relatively fair and just treatment.

In this sense，China’s

WTO entry will probably bring the enhancement of China9s prestige in the world as
well as China’s continuously economic development.
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Moreover，China’s accession into the WTO has accelerated the integration of
China into the global economic leadership.

Specifically, China can move

deliberately toward membership in the inner steering committees that really run the
world economy: the G7 and the so-called Quad group of four within the WTO that
does the real decision making (Bergsten, 2000, p.4).
in terms of economy.
network is limited.

China is a major rising power

However, the influence of China in the global economic

If China can play a central role along with the US, the EU and

Japan, its leading role in the international trading system is consolidated.

Thus, this

advantage is very important for China to make any strategic plan of its economic
development at home and prepare changes in the international economic order.

As a conclusion, in terms of China’s GDP growth， foreign trade volume， and
FDI, China can reach its goal of becoming a superpower in several decades.
Obviously, China will become a potential economic superpower in the world.
Based on the above evidence, it is possible to predict that China will become a
balancing power, which may challenge the dominant position of the US.

Moreover,

economic growth will directly bring the expansion of China9s influence abroad.

In

the following paragraph， cases will be illustrated to explain how China’s increased
influence abroad

CASES

SHOWING

THE

RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN

CHINA’S

ECONOMIC POWER AND ITS INFLUENCE ABROAD:

As China’s national power has increased, its foreign policy has become more
active and aggressive.

From the above evidence, China has accumulated its
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national power in terms of economic capability, and other continuous developments.
These achievements directly affect China’s new concept of foreign policy.

This

section focuses on discussing China’s regional participation to show China’s quest to
become a superpower.

REGIONAL PARTICIPATION:

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Asian-Pacific region can be proclaimed as
an ascending area in worldwide intercourse.

With the descending intensity of the

US-Soviet conflict in the Pacific, a tight regional unfavourable environment in Asia
is being released.

In the Cold War period, this region took the role as a rivalry spot

between the two superpowers, the nations such as the Korean Peninsula, Vietnam
and even China became competitive places which these two great nations aimed at
capturing as their satellites in Pacific.

Some regional wars were fought at earlier

stages of the Cold War.

However, entering into the 21st century, Asia-Pacific today is a region that will
embrace not only Japan and the NIES, but also the ASEAN nations and China, as
well as the Pacific Coast of North America.

This is a potential region that most

observers agree will most probably become the centre of both political and economic
activities.

China, in this region, is the most energetic continental power nation,

which could possibly serve as a leader in connecting the international regime to
regional affairs.

To enhance China’s participation in world activities in order to

consolidate its influence in international intercourse, it is not enough for the Chinese
leadership to get a constructive relationship with those great powers outside the
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regional level.

Searching superpower status, simultaneously, China realizes the

importance of developing its status and prestige in regional diplomacy.

Therefore,

starting from 1990s, China has been active in integration in regional activities.

Firstly, the most typical and oldest of institutions is the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

ASEAN was founded on August 8， 1967 as a

regional cooperative organization of the developing countries in Southeast Asia.
According to the “Bangkok Declaration”， the goal of the organization has been “to
strengthen the basis for peace and prosperity of the South East Asian nations, and,
through joint endeavors, to promote economic growth, social progress and cultural
development in the region in the principle of cooperation and equality.”

From the

wording of the declaration, the association laid more stress on the promotion of
regional economic cooperation than on political cooperation.
total of 10 formal nations in ASEAN.

Nowadays, there are a

The expansion of membership will stimulate

economic integration in the Asian-Pacific region.

Secondly, based on the idea of regional cooperation since the late 1960s, the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum established in 1989 represents
the first and only regionwide official multilateral forum in the Asian-Pacific Rim.
APEC has expanded to 18 countries since its beginning.

The membership of APEC

stretches from North America to New Zealand， from North Asia to Southeast Asia.
It, then, forms a Pacific belt around those regions.

APEC is the most influential

economic forum and one of most dynamic organizations for economic cooperation in
the world.

In fact, the sole mission of APEC is to promote economic cooperation,

and give a direction for intra-regional economic activities.
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the function of APEC is slightly different from the ASEAN, the latter only focuses
on economic development within the Pacific Rim; from a narrow scope to enhance
the growth of a nation.

However， the principle of ASEAN concentrates on regional

development, not just specifically on the importance of economic development.
Moreover, the core of ASEAN aims at dealing with East Asia affairs, while APEC is
more worldwide, its members come from the two sides of the Pacific Ocean.

The third substantial regional institution in the Asian-Pacific region is the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

This institution， as a multilateral security

organization embracing some 22-member states from the Asia-Pacific, was begun in
1994 with a yearly summit of foreign ministers.

Now, it includes senior officials

meetings, and starting from 1996， military officials have become involved the
deliberations.

The main task of the ARF looks like the most promising avenue for

gauged security discussions at the regional level.

The mission of ARF is a forum

that concerns peace and military development in the local level.

However, over the

longer term, the ideal is to create an Asia-Pacific Community, in which ARF not only
strengthens preventive diplomacy, but also functions as a conflict-resolution
mechanism.

Actually, these three regional institutions are very influential for the
development of the Asia-Pacific region in several areas.

The nature of ASEAN is

like a connection within those Southeast Asian countries.

It is probably in creating

a sub-regional community, let all developing countries gather together in order to
enhance their political claims internationally.

With respect to the APEC， it is an

economic institution that includes more powerful states around the Pacific, such as
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the United States, Canada, Japan, China and even Russia.

The importance of APEC

is to bring those East Asia countries to an international level, and to make those
countries strong enough in bargaining with the dominate West.
ARF serves the function as the security-related forum.

Also the function of

Similar to the APEC, the

members of ARF comprise those great powers, which will have a meeting every
year.

Without a doubt, the end of Cold War provides a chance for the development of
Asian-Pacific region.
in this period.

Those three organizations, except the ASEAN, are founded

And the common characteristic of APEC and ARF are that both

communities include the US, Japan, and China.

In the new world order, these three

states play a dominant role in political, economic and security aspects in the Pacific
region.

Taking an optimistic view, the involvement of great powers will likely to

enlarge the prestige of the regional institutions in the world.

On the contrary, this

type of development will reduce the local power in solving a regional crisis.

Back

to the essence, the idea of forming these kinds of communities must be traced back to
the formation of ASEAN.

Those small Southeast Asia countries aimed at creating a

community that was strong enough to prevent colonialism again and develop a
connection between the regions.
cannot achieve its goals.
pivot of ASEAN.

However, from the development of ASEAN, it

From 1989 and on, APEC and ARF are derived from the

Although the ASEAN members are the essential members in

these three institutions, it must greatly depend on great powers.

This definitely

shows that the trend of regional institutions was to increase the membership to the
world.

In ARF, the European Union and Russia are the newly joined members.

APEC, Russia joined in the late 1990s.
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region has become a strategic area, which draws the others^ institution in it.

China, under this favourable condition, increasingly became incorporated into
the Asia-Pacific at the early 1990s.

The Chinese new regional foreign policy was

commensurate with its great-power aspirations, and aimed at seeking an international
role and status.

If the above statement is correct, then China needs to begin with the

regional area.

First, the Chinese leadership intended the climb up in the

international arena through regional cooperation, and treated this kind of
participation as a stepping stone to become a great power in the world.

Second, if

China needs to upgrade its power, it is necessary to develop and consolidate its
regional regime in the Asia-Pacific. Meanwhile, the rise of those regional
institutions have attracted the focus of the world.

Thus, by the end of Cold War,

China5s foreign policy turned to be a more comprehensive one.

And the link of

regional countries becomes the main task of China’s diplomacy in the new world
order.

It is widely understood that China has showed its active role and influence in
those regional institutions.

From the development in 1990s, China got on the right

track to develop its strategy in East Asia.

During the first half of 1990s, China has

joined key regional organizations, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
forum in 1991 and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993.

In July 1992,

China Foreign Minister Qian Qichen suggested that ASEAN and China sign a treaty
that formed the ASEAN Post-ministerial Conference (ASEAN-PMC) with other
great nations.

During the second half of 1990s, the Chinese leaders tried to get

more deeply involved in these regional institutions and other regional affairs in the
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Asia-Pacific.

By 1997, China became an active participant both in ARF and the

unofficial dialogue，so-called “track two”. At the same year, China co-chaired with
the Philippines an “intersessional support group” (ISG) meeting of ARF on
Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) in Beijing.

Qian Qichen pointed out that

this would be the “first time for China to host an official multilateral conference on
security issues” （Foot, 1998, p.426).

Meanwhile, other Chinese officials praised the

success of ARF, and appeared sanguine about the continuance and development of
ARF discussions.

In their economy, China has succeeded in developing the

Northeast Asian sub-regional regime, which includes China, Japan and South Korea.
This regime attracted the attention of the ASEAN.

In 1999, heads of governments

from these three big nations in Asia and 10 South Asian nations held the 3rd ASEAN
Informal Summit in the Philippines, so called “ASEAN plus Three” meeting.
During the meeting, all the governments5declared that in future they would present a
united front to the world and agreed to find concrete ways of enhancing the flow of
funds and technology within the region.

From this trend, China has successfully

integrated into the regional institutions; both formal and informal, China is always
counted as a prominent participant in every meeting.

Moreover, this development

still continued to the Asian financial crisis and would last for this century.

From the two decades of development，China’s participation in these regional
institutions is on a rising trend, both on economy and military aspects.

These

regional activities serve as a symbol to show that there is a close relationship
between China’s national capabilities and its active foreign relations.

When China

carried out a series of domestic reforms in the early 1980, its national power also
increased simultaneously.

This development stimulated China’s active manner in
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foreign relations.

During this two decades, China has succeeded in reaching its goal

of being a regional great power in the Asian Pacific region.

China’s “horizontal”

linkage vis-a-vis other countries, mainly in the Asian Pacific region, can be proven
by the above evidence.

CHINA， ROLE IN REGIONAL CRISES:

During the late 1990s, several events happened, which created an opportunity
for China to perceive a great power nation in solving regional crisis.

Firstly, China,

in the mid-1997 Asian financial crisis, posed as a benevolent regional leader in Asia.
The financial crisis really destroyed the financial systems in several countries, such
as Indonesia, Thailand, South Korea and Hong Kong.
derived from this financial contagion.

The turmoil in Asia was

Although China was affected in this crisis,

its decision has won goodwill in this region.

From an economic perspective,

China7s leadership protected the region by pledging not to devalue its currency and
by dispensing aid.

In the most serious nation - Indonesia, China offered $200

million export credit facility and $3 million in medicine and food aid to the
government.
Fund.

This action has released the painful burden of International Monetary

Moreover，China’s benevolent doing undercut Japan which clearly owned

the region’s most advanced economy.

However, Japan suffered in this crisis too

and could not provide any assistance to the region.
made a quiet bid for regional political leadership.

Thus, from this crisis, China

At least, the Beijing government

sacrificed China9s benefits in order to preserve the economic and political stability
within the region.
WWII.

This was similar to the US, which also took the leading role after

To become a world leader, a nation must give up something in order to take
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some actions in a crisis that protects the peace of the world order.

Moreover, a

nation should carry the responsibility in maintaining world and regional peace.
China, in this case, fully fulfilled these criteria which made it a potential leader in
Asia both in politics and economy.

From the Asian economic crisis, actually， it is a fact that Asia’s multilateral
institutions - the APEC forum, ASEAN and ARF - had failed to play any role in
addressing the crisis, and underscoring the extent to which regional economic and
strategic stability depend heavily on the policies and initiatives of major players, that
is the US.
Washington.

This means that Asia’s welfare depends on strategic understanding in
Take the financial assistance between South Korea and Indonesia as

an example, South Korea received quick and significant economic assistance from
the US, because it seemed to be the last buffer of the US in this crisis.
South Korea maintained its strategic status for the US in the Asian affairs.

Indeed,
If the

financial system of South Korea is broken down, the Communist North would take
action, which would threaten the security of Northeast Asia.

However, Indonesia

did not receive any financial support from the US immediately.

The Washington

government even let the International Monetary Fund (IMF) impose dangerously
destabilizing measures on Jakarta, including the removal of the national subsidy on
fuel and the government’s monopoly on the distribution of basic food commodities.
Since Indonesia did not serve as an important country for the US against communism
in the Cold War.

Thus, this shows that the US is no longer a reliable great power in

Asia when its regional interests are not been threatened.

The uncertainty and

limited power of the US in Asia is a continuous strategy over five decades even in
the new world order.

To secure peace and stability in East Asia, the most

59

CHAPTER 3
CHINA'S GREAT-POWER ASPIRATIONS: A LINKAGE-POLITICS PARADIGM

appropriate strategy for the Asian countries is to offer a real regional great power.
This strategy will fill and constrain the vacuum of the US strategy interest in Asia.

Second， the case of East Timor shows the weakness of ARF and the apparent
leading gesture of China in the regional level.

The foundation of ARF aims at

preserving peace and stability in the Asian-Pacific region.
contribute to resolving actual security problems.

However, ARF cannot

In fact, the multilateral

arrangements of ARF seem very weak to build understanding and trust between
nations, which involves 22 members.

There is no major step forward for ARF in

issues such as North Korea and the Spratly Islands.
action concerning the uprising in Indonesia.

Recently, ARF has taken no

From the idea of ARF， those countries

can build a strong sense of common regional strategic interests through practical
multilateral cooperation (Dibb, Hale, Prince, 1999, pp.18-19).
resources for helping nations in crisis.

ARF should offer

However, ARF has played no role in

assisting Indonesia when it has security trouble.

Actually, Indonesia should be able

to call on ARF, as an independent and neutral body, to help to broker and finance a
way forward (Dibb, Hale, Prince, 1999, p.19).

Finally, East Timor, after its

referendum, became an independent state and separated from Indonesia in late 1999.
If ARF could take a role as a peace broker in this crisis, the internal instability of
Indonesia perhaps would be under control.

In regional security, the function of

ARF has been insipid on the case of East Timor.

ARF cannot play a meaningful

role in regional security and that indirectly provides a chance for China to build its
superpower status in Asia.

Due to the weakness of ARF, beyond confidence building, this institution has
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failed to move on to preventative diplomacy and conflict prevention at the regional
level.

This provides a chance for China to bolster its position in the Southeast area.

It is a fact that the ASEAN countries are the pivotal members of ARF? but in the case
of East Timor, the attitude of ASEAN towards sending troops to Indonesia truly
reflects the diversity of those countries.
travel to East Timor.

Vietnam refused to let Thailand troops

Malaysia and Thailand reluctantly took military action.

Because of different strategic interests among the ASEAN, it causes ARF to become
a secondary supportive organization in regional crisis.

After East Timor claimed to

be an independent state, the United Nations (UN) formed a Transitional
Administration in East Timor in order to maintain a peaceful environment for the
development of new government.

From the request of the UN, China has sent a

police contingent, which includes 15 civil policemen to East Timor in January 2000.
This mission seems very important for China, not just to assist the UN in settling the
regional crisis, but also implies a significant role of China.

It is the first time China

has sent members of its force abroad at the request of the UN.

This event shows

China has consolidated its active role in maintaining regional peace.

In world

politics, it is a successful step to build up a good image to China9s neighbours.

To

be a potential great power, good diplomatic skill is an essential criterion to establish
a nation’s political power in the world.

The first step must start from its neighbours

around China, with a good relationship with regional nations; China will gain more
time to enlarge its influence towards the world.
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CHINA’S CAPABILITY IN TERMS OF MILITARY POWER:
MILITARY CAPABILITY OF PLA，S FORCES:

In the modem history, the role of militaxy always serves as a significant
component to evaluate the comprehensive national strength of a nation.

Before the

outbreak of the First World War in 1914， those great powers in Europe had
completely finished their military development.

Both Germany and Britain owned

huge and powerful naval forces, while France and Russia had the preparation to
mobilize their ground forces to the regional disputes.

From this development， a

global conflict could be started and only caused by a local quarrel.

Indeed, it is

believable that an armament race between the great powers is one of the underlying
causes for the outbreak of WWII.

Similarly, the technological military contest

between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War period also
explains the importance of military development in the terms of a nation9s strength
and its international status.

Thus, these phenomena indicate that the position of the

military， in every historical process， plays a prominent role in representing a nation’s
power in the world.

In fact, the role of the military has not been weakened even through the world
has increasingly emphasized global trade activities from the detente of the Cold War
period to the new century.

As mentioned before, to evaluate a nation’s power in

terms of global level, both military, technological advances and economic
development should be counted as equally significant components that constitute
measuring national capability.

Christoffersen (1996，p. 1067) claimed that China

should develop its “grand strategy” to articulate its great-power aspirations.
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term C6grand strategy^ refers to a political-military-economic means-ends chain that
integrates the military and nonmilitary instruments employed by a state to achieve a
broadly defined goal of national security.

In sum, each component cannot be

ignored to measure a nation’s power in the world.

In the meantime， it is worthwhile

considering the factor of military technology in discussing China’s comprehensive
power in the world system.

Owing to the parallel importance of military and economic capacities in
constructing a country^ comprehensive national strength, this section focuses on the
discussion of China’s military power and high technological advances.
section will describe China’s military strategy after the Maoist era.

First， this

Having viewed

the overall picture of China9s strategy, we can understand its active foreign policy
behaviour during these two decades.
capability in terms of global level.

Second， it will examine China’s military

Though the component of the military is just

one of indicators to measure China’s national capability， its importance to assess
China’s great-power aspirations must not be neglected.

Third, several cases will be

shown to describe China9s self-perception as a great power in the Asia-Pacific region.
These cases can help demonstrate China9s military power at the regional level and
China’s ambition to become a great power.

L

THE RATIONALE OF CHINA’S MILITARY SECURITY STRATEGY AFTER
THE MAOIST ERA:

Starting from 1979, the new Chinese leaders formulated a new military doctrine
and strategy, which was more practical, and made the Chinese military enter a high
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rate of development.

In Deng’s tenure，China’s defense modernization programmes

mainly focused on updating the military equipment of the PLA9s force and reducing
the overall size of the PLA.

The strategy in the early stage of military reform tried

to simplify the abundant size of the military force in order to achieve an advanced
military force.

In Jiang9s period, the military doctrine has become more active than

that of Deng’s time.

The Chinese leaders believe that the high technological,

powerful and modem weapons will increase China9s national strength in the existing
world order.

In the following text, two periods of leadership will be divided in

order to discuss changing China’s military strategy.

(1) 1980s:

During Deng’s office，China’s military strategy was different from that of the
Maoist doctrine.

The intention of Chinese military growth, obviously, shifted from

the concept of “people’s war” to that of “local war”. In the Maoist era, faced with
the threat from the Soviet Union, the doctrine was very aggressive and active to
defend Chinese territory.

In the meantime, the international atmosphere was

covered by a global nuclear armament competition.

To protect China’s security

interest, Beijing’s defense policy brought strategic weapons advocates into debates
about national priorities (Feigenbaum，1999b，p.96).
required an economic trade-off during the Maoist era.

Yet, this rapid military growth
All the economic resources

were just the supplementary instruments for the development of military.

This was

the main reason for the Chinese economic backward and stagnation in the 1950s to
1960s.
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However, this military doctrine was changed under the Dengist regime.

As the

1970s ended, the emphasis on strategic weapons as a basis for national high-tech
efforts began to erode (Feigenbaum, 1999b, p.96).
focused on the concept of global war again.

The Chinese leaders had not

In contrast, the ‘local war” doctrine

was applied which means political objectives can be achieved without nuclear
escalation (The Military Balance, 1995, p.270).

This new doctrine indicated that

the Chinese central government aimed at altering the security strategy on the military
from a global nuclear war to a local regional war.

The other characteristic of the

“local war” doctrine is the large reduction of PLA force.

Several reasons contribute

to this decision.

Firstly, China9s overall strategic environment of international relations
underwent a change.

The threat from the Soviet Union towards China had declined

due to the rapprochement with the United States and Japan in the early 1970
(Feigenbaum, 1999b，p.96).

Indeed, the international environment has been on the

right trend towards the detente of the Cold War period.

The crisis of global war

faced by China tends to be less threatening in the late 1970s.

The post-Mao

leadership under Deng Xiaoping felt sufficiently confident of China5s national
security by reducing the armed forces.

He believed that, even if the world situation

deteriorates, this reduction will still have been necessary (Foreign Language Press,
1994, p.131).

Secondly, Deng highlighted the importance of economic development; so other
kinds of national construction had a lower priority.

Deng believed that a good

economic foundation made it possible for China to modernize its army’s equipment
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(Foreign Language Press， 1994，p.133).

The highest priority was shifting from

being military oriented to economic oriented.

In Deng’s view， everything must be

subordinated to the development of economy.

From this idea, it was necessary for

the Chinese leadership to give up resources to develop military force.

Thirdly, due to the changing resource allocation, the central government finance
for research and development (R&D) system on weaponry also needed to take a
certain modification in adopting a new strategic consideration.

Definitely speaking,

the military strategic doctrine had moved from fighting against a great war to a small
localized war.

This implied that there would be reform in the PLA, which aimed at

decreasing the abundant numbers of PLA armed forces.

Fourthly, however, the expense of technology and equipment would be
increased in order to accompany the modernization of PLA5s force structure.
China5s defense R&D community began to confront mounting evidence that its Maoera technical system had ossified (Feigenbaum, 1999b, p.96).

Under the violent

phase of China’s Cultural Revolution (1966-76)，China’s military force and other
technological development were stagnated which could not compare with the other
great powers.

To make China strong in terms of military defense, it was necessary

for Chinese leaders to reorganize its military programmes in order to counterbalance
the high-tech development of the West.

The main approach of military reform

focuses on pursuing high technology of all ground, navy and air forces.

Based on the above reasons, the strategy of national security accommodated the
doctrine of “local war”. Since China’s military strategists predicted that the world
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order would become a multipolar world, and military strength should focus on the
increasing crisis of local wars around China’s boundary.

Chinese analysts focused

on the operational requirements for local, limited wars of a short duration (Godwin,
1996, p.467).

To tackle the risk of small-scale and limited wars in the future, the

demand of equipment must on the swift and effective application of military force.
This strategic approach is quite different from that of Mao’s strategy of “people’s
war”. The doctrine of “local war” would not mobilize the entire country to conduct
a protracted and an extensive war.

Modem limited war used advanced military

technology, modem combined arms warfare and advanced equipment in the opening
of the war, the involvement of populations for war was no longer feasible (Jia, 1988,
p.48).

In fact, the PLA’s force was still on the stage of obsolescence and

backwardness.

Thus, from the early 1980s, the Chinese armed force, based on the

concept of small-scale war, prepared to carry out a series of military reforms and
reconstruction in order to enhance the capability of Chinese armaments.

Yet, by the end of the Cold War, the PLA5s basic military doctrine and concepts
of operations during the 1980s met another amendment that aimed at increasing and
upgrading China’s military capability.

Actually, in the decade of the 1980s，China’s

military development had comprised capability to hold limited and local war.

It is

definitely a fact that the quality of PLA5s force was improved compared with the
Maoist era.

(2) 1990s:

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s? some incitements brought about the
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revision of the national military doctrine.

The new Chinese military strategy was

slightly different from the doctrine of “local war” in the 1980s.

In the post-Cold

War era, China entered a period of rapid military modernization.

The PLA’s force

was sharply increased both in quality and quantity.

Some incidents happened in the

1990s that contributed to the new doctrine of military strategy for China.

Firstly， the Tiananmen Incident in 1989 did block and constrain the PLA’s
access to advanced military technology from the Western high-tech countries,
especially the United States.
on western technology.

In actuality，China’s military advances should depend

The Chinese leadership in the early 1980s realized the

weakness of its PLA’s force.

Therefore, its military strategy in the 1980s initially

focused on the organization of elite units, so-called rapid-response or fist forces, that
are better supplied and take the lead in using more advanced equipment to master the
techniques of combined arms and joint service operation (Goldstein, 1997, p.42).
After ten years’ development, the PLA’s force did improve its ability to exercise new
weapons and equipment.
modernization.

It was an appropriate time to continue the other wave of

However, the June Fourth Incident created a sour feeling between

China and Western countries.

Most western countries not only suspended trade

activities, but technological activities with China too.

In the aftermath of the 1989

crackdown， Washington suspended arms sales and “Peace Pearl” programme which
was China9s largest military transition to update the air force with the West in the
early 1990s.

This indicated that China’s military modernization would not depend

on the West only in the following years.

Secondly, in the meantime, the resumption of military contacts between China
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and Russia played an important role in the modernization of the PLA9s weaponry,
especially the PLAAF.

Since China’s deteriorating relationship with the United

States, China started to knock at the door of its northern neighbour - Russia.

When

Mikhail Gorbachev was appointed as Soviet General-Secretary in 1985, it was a
symbol for Sino-Soviet rapprochement.

The ideological rift between Moscow and

Beijing formally ended with the restoration of party-to-party ties during the May
1989 Deng-Gorbachev summit (Menon, 1997, p.101).

Starting from that year

onwards, military-to-military relations and the initiation of negotiations over arms
sales reopened between two states.

In 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union and

the new government — Commonwealth of Independent States accelerated the
modernization of the PLA’s weaponry.

This change did not stall the military

relationship but facilitated the weaponry exchange among two states.

During the

1990s, Russian arms sales to China accelerated the modernization process of China5s
military force.

Thirdly, the Gulf War in 1991 provided another stimulus to the PLA’s
modernization programmes.

From this regional war, it highlighted the absence of

modem armaments of the PLA?s force.

In fact, the 1991 Gulf War had a profound

influence on the Chinese military leaders; at least, it created a sense of insecurity of
the PLA9s force when compared with the western countries.

China’s military

strategists were much impressed by the accuracy and destructive capability of the
high-tech weaponry employed and the speedy victory of the coalition forces (Yu,
1993， p.308).

This devastating display of military technology destroyed the

doctrine of limited war formulated in the 1980s.

It is not enough for the PLA’s

force to prepare a limited war9s requirement but with combined arms warfare too.
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Thus, following that war, several hundred scientists and defense specialists
reformulated the new doctrine of China’s defense technology, which tried to
modernize the equipment of PLA’s force.

During the 1990s, China’s strategists reformulated the doctrine of military
capability after some stimuli at the early stage.

The crisis of regional conflicts, such

as the Taiwan issue and “Nansha” islands in the South China Sea, still existed.

This

created a threat to China around its territories, then the doctrine of limited war still
applied to China’s survival in a real world.

However, the concern of China’s

military strategists was not restrained on this idea only.

Following a series of events,

they placed even greater emphasis on technology, modifying their depiction of future
conflict from limited war to “limited war under high-tech condition” （Godwin, 1996,
p.473).

This incentive did accelerate the PLA’s modernization programme on

ground, air, and naval forces.

This doctrine has lasted for a decade.

In the new

century, it is predicted that China will still follow the idea of this strategy.

From the development of China’s military strategy and doctrine during the
1980s and the 1990s, the emphasis on military establishment is on a renewed trend.
When we trace back to Deng9s strategy in the early 1980s, his idea seems to be
correct that economy means security in the modem world.

If a country owned

economic capability, its national strength will increase at the same time.

In the

post-Cold War period, economic might precisely represents the power of a nation in
international relations.

However, the military cannot be excluded in terms of

comprehensive national strength in a complex world.

China’s burgeoning arms and

technology developing arrangement reflects the idea of Chinese leadership in dealing
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with the new world order.
modified.

Military technology for China, nowadays, is still being

The following section will demonstrate China’s military capability.

How China can become a superpower in terms military will be answered.

II.

MILITARY AND TECHNOLOGOCAL CAPABILITIES OF CHINA:

A great power, traditionally, is a state that plays a leading role in the
international system.
several indicators.

Actually， in measuring a nation’s great power status, there are
The ability to exert significant influence on the course of

international politics and on the security, interests, and status of other states all are
crucial factors that should be considered in evaluating a nation’s power on a global
perspective.

Though the world is entering military deterrent period in the post-Cold

War world order - Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is an important
agreement between big powers on strategic arms reduction, military capability still
poses as an indicator that can not be neglected to assess one’s current and future
international power.

Frankly speaking, in terms of military capability, China cannot be regarded as a
“first-rank power” in the post-Cold War period.

Even China began military reform

from the mid-1980s until now, and China’s military modernization programme has
reached a great success in the late 1990s, but its military warheads still cannot
compare with the only superpower - the United States.

Comparing the two

strategic warhead totals， the United States force is 375 times larger than China’s;
United States nonstrategic nuclear warheads number 1150, outnumbering China9s by
11.5 to 1 (Godwin, 1999, p.261).

China, for the several decades, experienced the
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ravages of civil war and Cultural Revolution, its domestic development was greatly
damaged and this has made China’s military progress far behind other great nations.
Though China had established its nuclear warheads in the Maoist era, and China was
the third country countering the US and the USSR in the Cold War era, its
conventional arms, military technology and military industrial complex were still
backward.

This background was a key factor for China to begin a series of

modernization programme of the PLA5s force in the past two decades.

Besides, the

United States, the only superpower in the post-Cold War world order, is the leading
military power in the world today; it alone has the capability to project force
throughout the globe (Yauhuda, 1999, p.266).

Moreover, the United States has

outpaced all other major powers in the development of the latest and high-tech
military technologies, this dominant trend would probably continue into the 21st
century.

Comparing China and the US, there is still a great distance between two

countries in terms of military weaponry.
in the Asian Pacific region.

However, China is a regional great power

China’s new military doctrine and its offensive strategy

are evidence to support that China is acting as a military great power in the local area.
Several fields will be shown in the following text.

After two decades of military reform, China has established its national
strategy - local war under high-tech conditions.

To fulfill the goal of advanced

techniques, the whole military modernization and technological programmes support
this doctrine.
world.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the biggest employer in the

It has 2.82 million personnel, including 1.27 million conscripts.

also 1.2 million reserves.

There are

Structurally it is split into the Strategic Missile Force, the

Army, Navy, Air Force and People’s Armed Police.
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modernization programme will streamline the bloated military and make the PLA
more professional.

Examining things from the perspective of a strategic pattern, the main potential
threat of China comes from the sea, such as the Taiwan Strait, the Spratlys, and
Diaoyu island territorial dispute.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is

manned by approximately 268,000 officers and men, including 28,000 coastaldefense forces, 25,000 naval air forces and some 7,000 marines (Kaplan, 1999, p.29).
In these years, the PLAN’S maritime mission has evolved from a role of static coastal
defense to one of “active off-shore defense”. The objective of this new strategy is
to assert China’s role as regional maritime power in Asia (Kaplan， 1999，p.28).
According to the existing PLAN capability, China cannot compare with the super
status of the US.

Where China can upgrade its military capacity must be focused on

regional level first.

Recently， the Russian Government considered transferring more naval weapons
to China.
area.

Undeniably, this action will improve China9s naval force in the regional

The Russian government is considering transferring more SS-N-22 Moskit

supersonic anti-ship cruise missiles China to go abroad (eight launchers per ship) its
new Sovremenny-class destroyers, and well-defended SA-N-7 Shtil surface-to-air
missiles (Copley，2000, p.2).

In fact, Russian arms sales to China play an important

role in China’s military modernization.

Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers

will improve the PLAN’S surface-combatant capabilities.

Besides, the sale of the

SS-N-22 to China is potentially enormously effective against US aircraft carriers.
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In terms of nuclear forces, China can be counted as a great power in Asia.
Besides India， Pakistan and North Korea, China is the fourth country， which owns
nuclear warheads.
level.

But its capability must not be underestimated at the regional

China possesses ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), some of which

have MIRVs (multiple independent targeting re-entry vehicles), and also a range of
IRBMs (intermediate range ballistic missiles).

As well as land-based missiles,

China owns several submarines quipped with nuclear tipped ballistic missiles.

In

the late 1980s? Chinese analysts have adopted the concept of ciimited deterrence
(Godwin，1999, p.263).

This doctrinal concept incorporates nuclear fighting, which

provides China with the ability to respond to any level of nuclear attack, from tactical
to strategic.

In the new century, satellite technology can support a military application.
China’s first experimental spacecraft， part of the country’s manned space flight
programme, successfully concluded its first flight of the system in November 1999.
This launching and retrieval of the spaceship marks China9s new major breakthrough
in manned space flight technology and is a milestone in China’s astronautical history.
The space vehicle， named “Shenzhou” was launched with new model of “Long
March” rocket.

Indeed, the spacecraft and carrier rocket were made by China itself.

In the 21st century, China will still continue to help other nations launch satellites.
The success of this launch shows that China has the ability to take a predominant
position with satellite technology in Asia.
improve military advancement.

Moreover, space technology can help

The radar system of the military will be improved

when satellite technology develops at a right pace.
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In conclusion, China is building up its military capability in these two decades,
especially its naval and missile forces.

The above evidence illustrates that China

has become the dominant power on the Asian continent.

However， China’s

capacity to project power beyond its borders is limited (Halloran, 2000, p.55).

First,

Chinese naval units are not yet up to the standard attained by the navies of Japan,
South Korea, or even Taiwan (Kaplan, 1999, p.33).

Second, its nuclear warheads

cannot create any threats to the US in global means.
technology lags far behind the US and Russia.

Third, its aerospace

Thus，China’s military status at this

moment can only be called a regional power.

However，China’s military actions in the late 1990s show that it has the ability
to act as a great power.

The following section will prove this statement.

III. CASES SHOWING CHINA ’S MILITARY CAPABILITY:
(I)

The Spratly Islands:

The South China Sea, in the 1990s, is undeniable ranked at the top of Southeast
Asia’s potential hot spots.

There are total five nations, having a territorial dispute

with China about the Spratly Islands, including Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Taiwan and Vietnam.
Spratly Islands.

All the nations believe that they own parts or all of the

For China, there is only one major reason, which makes the leaders

stand for a strong stance in the South China Sea.

Although the South China Sea

contains potential oil deposits and other seabed resources, the core issue makes the
Chinese government concerns this area is sovereignty.

The Chinese leadership

often claims that China maintains indisputable sovereignty over the Spratlys and
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their adjacent waters.

During WWII, Japan launched a war of aggression against

China and occupied most of China’s territory, including the Spratlys.

It was

explicitly provided in the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the other
international documents that all the territories Japan had stolen from China should be
restored to China, of course, this included the Spratly Islands.

Beginning from the 1970s, countries like Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia
have by military means occupied part of the islands and reefs of the Spratlys, gone in
for big-scale resource development in waters adjacent to the Islands and laid claims
of sovereignty over them.

In view of these activities, the Chinese government has

made solemn statements that these acts constitute a serious infringement upon
China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

At the very beginning, China claimed sovereignty of the Islands in terms of
words and diplomatic leverage.

When China’s military capacity increased to a

certain level, its action to protect China9s territorial integrity has become more active
and aggressive.
sovereignty.

In early 1995, Beijing used the PLA naval forces to protect its

The Chinese navy forcibly ejected some Filipino fishermen from a

reef in the disputed Spratly Island archipelago (Rodman, 1998, p.46).

The Chinese

government stands in sharp contrast to decisions by the ASEAN states and Taiwan.
China has stated that joint military exercises are prohibited in the South China Sea.

From the case of Spratlys, we can see that China’s military power at a regional
level is increasing.
also.

China exerts its claim of sovereignty not by words but by deeds

Its military action in the regional conflict verifies that China is on the way to
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act as a great power.

Without enough military capacity, China cannot take an

aggressive stand to proclaim its sovereignty externally.

Hence, the conflict among

China and the other nations on the Spratly Islands in the 1990s shows that China
possesses the capability to quest for great power status in terms of military in the
Asian-Pacific region.

(2) The Taiwan Issue:

The other event to demonstrate China5s strength in military development is the
Taiwan issue.

In the views of Chinese leaders, the development in Taiwan in the

1990s seems to be one of a road towards independence.

In this event, the Beijing

government tried to apply its military force to make the Taipei government go back
to the basis - unification of China.
primarily China’s air force.

Around 1993, the Chinese force emphasized

This focus derives from the Taiwan problem, where

China will need to establish air dominance in the event that hostilities break out in
the Strait (Feigenbaum，1999a, p.81).

Between the summer of 1995 and the spring

of 1996, Beijing deployed ground, air, and naval forces to the region, staged military
exercises including the repeated launching of missiles that disrupted the sea-lanes
around the trade-dependent island (Goldstein, 1997, p.53).

The Taiwan Straits “military exercises” in March 1996 provided some
implications on China’s quest for great power status in global terms.

First, Beijing

tried to scare Taipei off from any thoughts of independence by conducting live-fire
missile exercises.

The Beijing government was prepared to use force if necessary

to ensure Taiwan’s future political reunification with the mainland (Goldstein，1997,
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p.56).

Second， the “military exercises” showed that China’s military capacity grew

up in the regional level.

It was the first time that China used its military area to

carry out missile bombardment.

Third, China demonstrated to the world that the

PLA had the ability to reply on the military to coerce Taiwan in order to preserve its
territorial integrity.

Though China did not have the amphibious and airborne forces

capable of crossing the 160-kilometre-wide Taiwan Strait to defeat Taiwan’s armed
forces totally, the growth of China9s military capacity was definitely a fact in the late
1990s.

As a conclusion，China’s military development is following the doctrine of
limited war under high technology.

To evaluate China’s great-power aspirations in

terms of military power, China can only be counted as a regional great power in the
Asia region.

Though China9s military capacity is very active in its maritime border,

its navy force can only be effective around China9s periphery.

In fact， the US’

superior maritime capabilities make the US a great sea power in the Asian region,
and even in the world.

In terms of military, China is not a superpower， and its

leadership in global military issues and institutions is more limited, but its leadership
in the Asian-Pacific region may satisfy its demands for regional leadership.

JIANG ZEMIN，S VISITS AND SUMMITS:

In Jiang9 time, China has established enough national capabilities in economic
and military perspectives.

Meanwhile, Jiang consolidated his power in the late

1990s and that provided a favourable internal environment for him to take the active
role in foreign relations.

There is a lot of information to show that China9s intends
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to be a superpower in Jiang’s tenure.

As of March 1997, the draft of Jiang’s report to the fifteenth party congress,
which was held in autumn, met a barrage of criticism from the left.
comprise with the left.

He had to

Since the Tiananmen Square incident, the power of left

wing greatly dominated and affected the decisions of the central government.
opposition from the left eliminated some progressive reforms.

The

Even Deng had a

trip to southern China in support of the reform effort in 1992; obstacles from the
conservatives still played a prominent position in the Political Bureau.

However,

this situation altered a lot after the death of Deng Xiaoping in early 1997.
May 1997, it can be proclaimed as the launch of “Jiang Zemin era.”
was not swung even due to the death of Deng.
power among the central party members.

In late

His position

Jiang had grasped his domestic

His speech in Central Party School in

May seemed to be his most important political speech of his career (Fewsmith, 1998,
p.252).

Jiang， for the first time， publicly declared that “there is no way out if we

study Marxism in isolation and separate and set it against vivid development in real
life.” （Fewsmith，1998, p.252).

Apparently, these words directly pointed to the left

and criticized their interference on reform.

Moreover, his action also showed a

strong stance of being a moderate and open-minded reformer in Chinese history.
Jiang9s position further developed after the 15th National Party Congress in
September 1997.

In this party congress, Jiang Zemin previewed his major theme which led China
be a more powerful state.

First， Jiang highly appreciated the contribution of Deng’s

reform and his ideology to China.

This idea shows that Jiang would follow Deng’s
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theory in guiding China， and based on Deng’s thinking in order to accelerate the
integration into the world.

He put Deng9s theory into the party constitution during

the congress aimed at giving a proper status of what he would reform afterwards.
Indeed, to confirm the achievement of Deng was a necessary process of Jiang,
because it made his reforms， which followed the blueprint of Deng， sound more
persuasive.

Second，Jiang’s report restated the “primary stage of socialism，，’ which

was originally expounded from Zhao Ziyang in 1987.

In his party report, Jiang

used this thesis to endorse the joint-stock system as a way to reform state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) (Fewsmith，1998, p.252).

This action indicates that Jiang will

recycle and carry out Dengist economic pollicies, enhances the theory of "building
socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

In fact, the theory mainly provides a

rational explanation for Jiang to carry out Chinese economic reform in the years
ahead without deviating from the doctrine of Marxism.

He declared that China had

its own style and interpretation of Communism and every nation contained different
situations to apply the idea of Marxism.

To make a nation strong enough to

compete with the challenge from the capitalist west was the most meaningful and
substantial matter in carrying out the spirit of Marxism.

Jiang’s speech implied that

he would still follow the instruction of Deng and speed up China’s integration into
the world.

However, Jiang Zemin did not completely imitate Deng Xiaoping theoretical
rationale in China’s reform， and did not just accelerate the openness to the world.
In other words, Jiang5s central government in the late 1990s adopted a further step to
fulfill the goal of making China become great power.

The essence of Deng’s theory

concentrated on national economic development, focused on self-strengthening
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programme.

This idea can be expressed fully from Deng’s four cardinal principles，

Deng’s theory of building Chinese-style socialism， and Deng’s Open Door Policy.
All these policies allowed economic changes in order to make China a strong country
to contest in world arena.

From this explanation, this means that Deng’s

concentration aims at building internal strength rather than external strength.

In his

mind, the international status of one nation can be highly reflected from its domestic
capability, economic power is one of the most concrete indicators to measure one9s
position in world politics.

Although Jiang is still stuck to Deng’s model， his

speeches, starting from 1996, seem quite obvious which has deviated from
developing China’s economic power only.

More specifically, Jiang tried to carry

out some outstanding policies which were not touched by Deng Xiaoping’s theory，
and those policies can make China stronger in the existing world order.

From this

logic, it implied that Jiang seemed too aggressive to do more constructive work for
China.

After the Fifteen National Party Congress in 1997, Jiang took command and
consolidated his power in the Central Committee.

First, the dismissal of Qiao Shi

from the leadership of the Central Committee lessened the threat of Jiang9s power in
the Politburo.

Qiao is a more moderate leader in the Politburo Standing Committee.

His political reform on enhancing the power of the National People’s Congress
causes to be an attack target from the left conservatives.
present a political problem for Jiang.

Indeed, Qiao does really

Without a liberal minded person in the central

government, the challenges from the left wing will be decreased to a certain degree.
Moreover, this can cause Jiang5s works to sound more constructive for China.

The

second factor is that the congress further established Jiang9s era in the central
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government.

His position was being consolidated during the congress.

Military

representation on the committee has declined, and, more important, no military
representatives now sit on the powerful Politburo.
commander in chief in military seems solid.

Moreover, his position of

In reality, the support from the military

is a crucial factor to strengthen a leader’s position in domestic politics.

During the

congress, Jiang had definitely showed his strong leadership in front of the world.
The core leadership led by Jiang Zemin was initially formed and that provided a
suitable environment for Jiang to carry out a series of reforms internally and
diplomatic policy externally.

To make Jiang5s work sound more contributive to China, the first step was to
build his own style of governing instead of following Deng’s framework.

What

Jiang could do to enhance his prestige in Chinese history was very limited.
Substantially, Jiang Zemin, perhaps, should establish his achievements in two aspects.
The first is political reform.

After the adoption of the Open Door Policy in 1979,

the Chinese leadership headed by Deng Xiaoping only focused on economic
development and developed its economic ties with other countries.

However, in

addition to the economic aspect, Deng still strictly controlled the political power in
the hand of the communist party.

There was never any intention for Deng to carry

out political reform during his office.

The party determines the central decision,

and the communist party leads all the policies.

This then meant that besides

economic development, China will probably maintain its authoritarian form of
government under the control of Communist leadership.
China to become a great power of world importance.

The second was to cause

During the Dengist era, there

was a rapid growth in internal national development, especially in agriculture,
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industry and service industries.
the Open Door Policy.

The total living environment was improved due to

The inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) stimulated

economic activities around the coastal provinces.
came from the ideas of Deng Xiaoping.

All these achievements basically

Deng’s leadership put China on the right

track to becoming an economic superpower in the world.

For the past twenty years,

Deng mainly concentrated on the development economy, and was less concerned
about foreign policy.

Actually, Deng just kept a good-neighour policy towards

other Asian countries when China’s foreign policy met its lowest point after 1989.
He had no ambition of enhancing China in international relations.

What he put

effort in during his office was the economy and national development.

Deng

believed that the foremost work for China was that it must establish economic
capability rather than puts efforts on political reform and international status.

For Jiang Zemin, the second choice was a rational way to establish his
contribution and make himself remembered in history.

First, political reform or

institutional reconstruction of a government was a long-term project for China.
road reaching for democracy seems to be a remote goal in China.

The

Moreover, Jiang,

in the Fifteen Party Congress, called for the ^gradual institutionalization and
codification” of rules and procedures governing socialist democracy (Baum, 1998,
p.146).

And he reiterated his basic political vision for China’s future was that

China should uphold and improve the existing fundamental political system, instead
of copying any Western models (Baum, 1998, p.147).

This implies that Jiang will

not use political transformation as a tool to establish his reputation.

Second, due to

the failure model of the Soviet Union, Jiang prefers to establish economic reform
instead of political reform.

China would not carry out any great institutional
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changes in the foreseeable future.

What Jiang could touch in the political system

was to improve the quality of cadre and communist members, fight against
corruption, and maintain the party stability.

In fact, the ideology behind the

governing must keep a strict attitude and the Chinese leadership should uphold it,
otherwise, the sovereignty of Chinese Communist Party will collapse just like the
former Soviet Union.

Thirdly, it was viewed that to make China into the great

powers in the world was the best and quickest method for Jiang to establish his
achievement for China.

As to the existing situation, China had become a potential

economic power in front of the world.

To show and upgrade China’s position to the

international was the next step to consolidate China’s economic capability.

If Jiang

hoped to make his name parallel to Mao - the founder of the People’s Republic of
China, Deng - the chief reform-architect who made China economically strong, then
diplomacy would be the only area for him to make China politically strong in the
world.

Since the second half of 1990s, Jiang has had an ambition to adopt new foreign
relations， which is away from Deng’s direction.
from that of Deng.

Jiang’s attitude is quite different

To make China into strong power, it is not enough to develop

internal competitive power, but to establish a diplomatic network is also important to
China as Jiang proclaims.

Jiang’s “great power diplomacy” has added in Chinese

foreign policy as well as Deng’s “good neighbour diplomacy” in China’s foreign
relations during the late 1990s.

Actually, his idea to make China a world power,

which can compete against other strong powers, is very obvious.

There has several

characteristics to indicate Jiang’s ambition to make China a potential great power so
that its position is “equal among firsts” in international relations.
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Firstly, Jiang paid more attention to developing relationships with great powers
like the US, Russia, Japan, and European Union as well as the third world countries.
During the Maoist era, China preserved itself as the leader of those developing
countries, and maintained the just demands of the developing countries.

It is the

fact that there was no foreign policy principle to construct a relationship with those
great powers of the capitalist west countries during Mao Zedong’s leadership.
Since the introduction of the reform and open door policy, some adjustments
concerning some aspects in international strategy and foreign policy have been made
under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping Theory.

And these guidelines are

continuously carried out by the third generation of collective leadership with Jiang
Zemin at the core.

Jiang still follows the principles like upholding the principles of

self-independence and absolutely safeguarding China1s national sovereignty and
national dignity, establishing and developing normal relations with other countries
according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, strengthening solidarity
and cooperation with the developing countries, opposing hegemonism and
safeguarding world peace.

However, despite the basic foreign principles, Jiang

Zemin built his own style based on this after he had consolidated his leadership.

The most important characteristic is Jiang’s great-power aspirations.

Jiang’s

visit and speeches in the late 1990s fully indicated that he has an ambition to
establish China as one of great powers, competing against other major powers in the
world order.
around 1997.

To achieve this goal, Jiang started his own foreign relation principle
First, he focused on dealing with the US.

Through the two high

level summits between 1997 and 1998, both China and the US have strengthened the
idea of “strategic partnership” in the new century.

85

Though there are still issues such

CHAPTER 3
CHINA'S GREAT-POWER ASPIRATIONS: A LINKAGE-POLITICS PARADIGM

as the Taiwan problem, human rights, and the trade deficit that create many obstacles
to formulate a long lasting normal relationship between two nations, the success of
forming a “strategic partnership” testifies that China has climbed to a higher stage
which contains a bargaining power with the US.

The recent diplomatic relations

between the two powers seems more equal than before.

At least, China will be a

partner of the US on some cases, such as the negotiation of Korean Peninsular, Asian
financial Crisis, and bilateral trade relations.

However, it is far too soon to claim

that China has reduced, contained, and diluted the US influence - the only
superpower in the world.

There are still major differences between two states, but

the development shows that the US government cannot despise the rising power of
China.

The US’ China policy has become a significant item in Washington

government during the late 1990s.

This perhaps proves Jiang has aroused the

concern of the West and that China is active in playing a superpower position of
world importance.

Jiang declared that the Sino-US relationship would enter a new

stage of sound and stable development， and both nations would share responsibility
to preserve peace and stability.

From his speech, Jiang has put China on the same

status of the US, two great powers from the east and the west worlds.

According to

the Financial Times (December 1， 1998)， Michael Yahuda said that Jiang has
personally attached himself to Chinese reform initiatives, he is the one defining
China’s power place in world affairs as a major power equal to the US.

Besides visiting the US, Jiang Zemin also visited Russia, Japan and European
countries during the late 1990s.

The aim of his speeches in those countries mainly

showed China is a strong power, and implied that China owns the ability to compete
against them to a certain extent.

Russia and China established a strategic
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partnership of equality, mutual confidence and mutual coordination towards the 21st
century in April 1996.

Both two countries signed a joint statement on the

multipolarization of the world and the establishment of a new international order in
April 1997.

Recently, the two countries signed the joint declaration in 1999, which

reconfirmed the standpoints of two countries on a new international order.

In fact,

the good relationship between China and Russia contains geopolitical strategy.
Both nations are mutually benefited.

To achieve a high-ranking of status, Russia

will be a good partner for China to reach the goal in the short run.

CONCLUSION:

After having reviewed China economic and military capabilities, and Jiang
Zemin’s ambition to make China one of the great powers in the world, we can draw
the two concluding remarks.

Firstly, when China is more active in international

activities and establishes normal ties with other nations, this expanding state to state
relationship will relatively benefit to China’s capability building.

During the late

1990s, the visits between China and the other states were quite frequent.

The

normal relations between China and the other states assist China5s continuous
domestic developments.

When Sino-Russia established “strategic partnership” in 1994, the military
interaction increased to a great extent.

The reduction of Russia’s military on

quantity enhanced its military ties with China.

After the breakdown of the Soviet

Union, the functions of its military-industrial complex and high-level aerospace were
sharply decreased due to economic hardship and the international agreement on
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conventional force reduction with the west.

Under this circumstance, China became

a good partner in the buyer’s market” for arms.

In April 1990, Premier Li Peng

visited Moscow to sign a border agreement between China and the Soviet Union.
During the meeting, the senior Deputy Chief of Staff, General Xu Xin, had raised
with his Soviet counterparts the possibility of arms sale and technology transfers
(Godwin, 1996, p.473).

Following in early June, Beijing sent a high-level military

delegation to Moscow, headed by General Liu Huaqing, vice-chairman of the Central
Military Commission.

Thus, the successive military exchanges between two states

were established in the 1990s.

China’s massive demand for high-tech weaponry

with Russia’s difficulty in its internal economic problem，hence， constituted a large
amount of arms sales from Russia to China in the 1990s, especially of advanced
aircraft.

Actually, the contribution of Russia’s arms sales to China seems very

significant for PLAAF.

The purchase of Russia’s fighter aircraft not only increased

the capability on their air force, but enhanced the technological know-how of
Chinese weaponry through a series of modification of models.

For the long-term

development, China should establish its own high-tech weaponry to counter the
threat rather than “buy” technology from outside.

Moreover，Jiang’s Five-nation tour to the Middle East and South Africa in 2000
also strengthened China’s relationship with Israel， which is one of China’s military
partners.

After the Tiananmen Square Incident, the deteriorating relations between

China and the western countries seemed to hasten the military ties between China
and the other non-Western countries.

This achievement definitely accelerated the

military growth in China.
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The established economic ties between China and the US and the European
countries can strengthen China’s economic development in the new century.
China9s accession into the WTO will also bring a closer relationship between China
and the western countries.

These kind of economic activities, in the 21st century,

will play an important role for the rise of China.

Secondly，China’s continuous national growth directly enhances its influence
abroad.

China’s accession into the WTO will help China strengthen its role as a

great leading nation in the world.

In addition， the rapid growth of China’s economy

will consolidate its influence in the Asian Pacific region.

China’s participation in

the regional institutions and its role in the regional crisis during the 1990s
demonstrate that the expansion of China9s influence is on the positive trend.

In conclusion, the linkage-politics paradigm explains how China9s domestic
capabilities affect its foreign policy behaviour and how foreign policy contributes to
its domestic growth.

During the past two decades of development, the relationship

between China’s domestic growth and foreign policy behaviour is interrelated and
interdependent.

The above discussion shows the significance of this relationship.

Besides, the doctrine of linkage-politics illustrates how Chinese leadership perceives
itself as a great power in the world.

To become a superpower, China must

consolidate both its comprehensive national strength and international influence.
The Chinese leadership is on the road to reach this goal in international relations.
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INTRODUCTION:

To understand China9s great-power quest in the current international order, the
factor of global environment plays a significant role in affecting China9s rise and
decline.

From a historical dynamic of international relations, a nation^ up and

down is largely bounded and constrained by the situation on the chessboard - the
international environment.

In reality, change of the international environment will

probably create an opportunity for the rise of a nation.

Geostrategic reasoning is

one kind of analytical method in investigating state relations in international politics.
This chapter tries to apply this method in illuminating the change in China9s
international status from the Maoist era to the post-Cold War world order.

First, the

importance of geostrategic analysis will be highlighted in explaining China9s rise in
international relations.

Second, the general trend in the international order from the

Maoist era to the post-Cold War era will be illustrated to see how the international
change has affected China9s present great-power aspirations.

Third, China’s

national strategy for seeking a superpower status in the new century will be discussed
under geostrategic analysis.

This analytical framework provides a worldwide

perspective to illustrate how China yearns for a higher rank in international arena.
Fourth， implications of China’s geostrategy will be discussed.

As the world

structure is under the US unipolar system, China’s foreign policy is basically
following the principle of geostrategic thinking, which on the road to achieving the
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goal of great power.

SIGNIFANCE OF GEOSTRATEGIC REASONING IN UNDESTANDING
CHANGE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:

Before we discuss the importance of geostrategic analysis concerning the rise of
China in the current international order, we first need to understand how the
international structure is formed and who dominates or leads the world order.
Basically, the modem international environment is shaped by the great-power or
superpower system, which is often dated from the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648.
The principle of state sovereignty and the principle of state equality - the two core
principles of the Westphalian world order system - are declared to be the cornerstone
for the existing international order system as the chrysalis of a new international
order (Kim， 1995，p.48).

Key to this system was the ability of one state, or a

coalition, to balance the power of another state so that it could not gobble up smaller
units and create a universal empire (Goldstein, 1999, p.27).

However， the basic

structure and principle of international relations nowadays are not following this old
Treaty.

In what is known as the power transition theory, Organski (1958, pp.313-16)

argued that there is usually a dominant power that sits atop an international hierarchy,
positioned above several lesser great powers, other medium and smaller states and
dependencies.

The dominant power shapes the “international order” in which

relations between states are stable and follow certain patterns and even rules of
behaviour promoted by the dominant power (Organski, 1958, pp.326-30).
Applying this great power system into the existing new world phenomenon, the
international order is definitely shaped by those great powers among the world.
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The term “world leaders” is used to describe the kind of great powers that have a
significant impact on the global system (Nijman, 1993, p.2).

In fact, in the modem

history, how great powers or superpowers emphasize the development of world order,
represents the trend of world politics to a certain extent.

Great powers owe their

special status to the unusual roles they play in the international system.

As

mentioned in Chapter 2, the judgement of great power is through the projection of
power and influence into the global environment to assert the status of great powers
in the international level.

However, great powers are also under constraints

imposed by the international environment too.
the change in the international system.

Their national strategy must follow

Thus, the relationship between great powers

and the international system are inter-related and influence each other.

In the 20th century, the study of international relations drew heavily on
geography as an explanation for state behaviour.

The role of geography seems to be

a crucial factor to investigate state relations and world politics.

Now, several

characteristics of geostrategic analysis will be given to explain how world politics
functions.

First, the factor of geography plays a crucial role in understanding of the

relationship between those great powers and their strategy for seeking the
international status.

From past experience， a nation’s foreign strategic planning is

always bounded by the systemic factors.

Closely related is the term geopolitics,

which links the study of the relationship between geography and politics to include
the study of power in its geopolitical dimension (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 1996,
p.148).

Geopolitics refers to the impact of spatial features on political power.

Owen (1999, p.60) states that geopolitics is essentially the study of the political and
strategic relevance of geography to the pursuit of international power.
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of geopolitical analysis is the relation of international political power to the
geographical setting.

Issues of international conflict and cooperation and security

issues have inherent geographic dimensions (Nijman, 1993, p.30).

In sum, we can

say that there is a close relationship between the systemic factors， a nation’s strategy,
and the great power international system.

Second, the geographical location of a superpower will directly affect its
national strategy in the world.
globalization.

A century ago the world entered the first age of

Trade and investment spread rapidly around the world.

order in the 19th century was under the influence of expansion.

The world

National strategy

and security of the great powers started to extend out from their core power,
overwhelming smaller nations, surrounding the spheres of influence of lesser powers
and lapping against each other at the edges (O’Sullivan，1986, p. 69).
one of great powers in the international system at that time.

Britain was

Under this international

situation, the British government, first, tried to expand its influence to other
continents, such as Africa and Asia.
in the competitive world.

It seemed to be the only method for surviving

Second, the government focused on using its geographic

advantage to fulfill its expansion abroad.
the European continent.

Britain is an island that is separated from

The British geographic condition provided a comparative

advantage for Britain to develop its great naval force, which ensured open access to
world markets and resources.

Thus, the example of Britain helps explain that a

nation’s geographic location will formulate a different national strategy to fulfill the
goal of ascertaining international status.

The spatial condition of a nation often affects its international strategy.
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the fact that the status of a world power is determined by the wave of global change,
the location of a great power seems to be a necessary condition for global power
status.

Starting from 1500 onwards, sea power has been an essential part of

international politics.

It was at the beginning of the sixteenth century that the global

system was transformed into an oceanic system, as a result of naval technologies
linking previously isolated continents and opening the world for European imperial
expansion and colonization (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr.? 1996, p.154).

Those

great powers, such as Portugal, Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United
States successively became major powers based on their ability to master the naval
innovations of the era and to contribute decisively to maintaining international order.

However, at the beginning of 20th century, the another type of geographic power
became important in international politics.

The landpower of the great power

continental state became a balancing power that competed with the seapower.
criteria for becoming a superpower now must contain a vast land area.

The

Moreover, a

landpower must possess ability to control its hinterland or periphery all around its
border in order to increase its superpower status in the world.

In sum, spatial

condition constrains a nation’s great power seeking in international relations.

The

geographic location and natural resources of a country play a crucial role in affecting
its rise and decline in the world.

Third, the geostrategic scope of a great power’s interests will be influenced by
the trends of international environment.

A great power or superpower is by

definition a vital player in the international system.

The national security of a great

power can be threatened or destroyed by the international system disruption.
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powers emerge as a consequence of a process of elimination - most typically by war,
but also through the relative economic and perhaps demographic decline of previous
rivals (Gray， 1988， p.32).
international politics.

Indeed, there is no law of stable equilibrium in

There are many unpredicted factors in international relations,

which affect changes of a great power’s strategy.

When the Soviet Union acquired

the status of great power in 1945, its success in becoming one of the superpowers
was largely through defeat or exhaustion of the other traditional European great
powers in the two global wars in the first half of the 20th century.

Faced with the

superior maritime force of the United States, the geostrategic planning of the Soviet
Union had to expand its landpower into eastern Europe in order to consolidate its
continental capacity to counterbalance the power from the US.

From the case of

Soviet Union, we can see that geostrategic consideration of a great power, to a
certain extent, is bounded by the trends of international environment.

Having viewed the original concepts of geostrategic reasoning, the next section
will see how this analytical method can be applicable in the case of China.

As

China is on the road to becoming a great power, geostrategic analysis is from a
worldwide perspective to evaluate China9s great-power aspirations.

A study on the

bipolar system in the Cold War period can show the importance of geostrategic
analysis in order to understand of international relations and strategic interests among
the two superpowers.

The second reason is that we can investigate how change in

international environment affects China9s role in international relations from the
study of Cold War.
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GENERAL TREND OF INTERNATIONAL ORDER - INFLUENCE ON
CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL STATUS AND PRESTIGE:

This section aims at explaining how change in the international environment
affects the role of China in the world.

The discussion will be divided into two parts.

The first focuses on describing the general trend of the international order in the Cold
War era.

The international environment in the Cold War period is an example to

showing how the two superpowers survived and extended their influence in the
world order. After the end of the Second World War, a new distribution of power
emerged.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union were under geographical

strategy to compete with each other in order to preserve the dominate roles in the
bipolar world system.

The superpowers shaped the hierarchical structure of the

international system in the Cold War period.

At the same time, geopolitical and

strategic considerations are critical in determining the focus, the substance, and
eventually the outcome of the historical contest between the leading oceanic power
(the United States) and the dominant land power (the Soviet Union) (Brzezinski,
1986, p.ll).

The bipolar international structure helps us understand how the world

system is limited under geopolitical reasoning.

Second, we will see how the changes in the international structure affect the
international role and prestige of China during the Cold War period.

The

explanation of this relationship can help us understand China’s great-power
aspirations throughout the 1980s.

Since a nation’s rise and decline is always

bounded by the international structure, China’s perception of being a great power is
caused by the alteration of the bipolar system.
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detailed analysis on this assumption.

CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE:
I.

A TIGHT BIPOLAR SYTEM:

In the 1950s, the international structure was under a tight bipolar system that
was led by the US and the USSR.

In the early Cold War period, due to ideological

and strategic reasons, the international order was under the context of the US-Soviet
bipolar conflict.

The conflict was expressed predominantly through the extension

of power and influence over territory and people and through acquisition by military
might designed to intimidate or contain the opponent (Brzezinski, 1986， p.ll).
While I am using Brzezinski5s formulation in this discussion, I am aware that
scholars were divided on his characterization.
bipolar system”.

Many referred to it as a “loose

The regional affairs were largely determined by the two

superpowers, which was based on the idea of strategic consideration.

During this

period, the rational strategy in international relations was the idea of containment, a
process that strengthens a nation’s alliances in periphery in order to increase its
regional influence.

If one nation could control more satellites in the regional level,

its power in international status would be increased.

The Moscow government focused on consolidating its continental power in
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, Northeast Asia, and the Middle East countries.

This

geostrategic plan formed a security buffer for the Soviet Union if attacked by the
United States.

At the same time, the national strategy of the Washington

government aimed at containing the expansion of the USSR from Eurasia.
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was essentially on the periphery of world affairs that applied isolation policy
between the two global wars.

To extend and preserve American’s influence, the

control of maritime force was the essential strategy for the Washington government.
The US strengthened its power by forming a strategic alliance with Western Europe,
and setting up military bases in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and the Philippines.
Hence, this strategy provided a sea belt that protected against on attack from the SU.

China, under this tense international environment, could not play any significant
leading role.

After the foundation of PRC in 1949, Mao Zedong had a belief, which

made China an independent state without any influence from foreign countries.
Besides the limitation of China’s national capability, there was a strategic reason that
limited its quest for great-power status.

The PRC was bom in the campaigns

against imperialism， feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism, and suffered imperialist
hostility, as well as a blockade and armed threat at their beginning.

As the

international order was sharply separated from the two leading blocs - the
Communist Soviet Union and the Capitalist United States, there was no any
diplomatic spatial area for China to develop the third pole.

Therefore, China

entered an alliance with the Soviet Union, and became one of followers of the Soviet
camp.

China was one of the geopolitical satellites for the Soviet Union, which

preserved as the interest of the Soviet Union in the Far Eastern Eurasian territory.

As a whole，China’s international role in the 1950s was very small.

Even

though China had appeared in some international conferences, the rigid international
environment bound its global power.

In April 1954, initiated by the Soviet Union,

the Geneva conference was held to discuss the issues of Korea and Indochina.
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Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai was invited to be one of participants in the meeting,
which involved the Soviet Union the United States, Britain and France.

According

to People’s Daily (September 14, 1999)，China， for the first time, took part in a key
international conference as one of the big nations to discuss major issues.

However,

this event did not show that China possessed global influence and prestige on some
issues.

In fact, China largely depended on the power of the Soviet Union in

international relations.

China’s quest for great power status could not begin under

this situation.

II.

A LOOSE BIPOLAR SYSTEM:

In the 1960s, the international environment entered into a loose bipolar system.
The main reason constituted this phenomenon was that contradictions and conflicts
between China and the Soviet Union became increasingly intensified in the late
1950s.

Ostensibly, the principal cause of the Sino-Soviet break was Soviet

“revisionism”， the first indication of which came with Khrushchev’s 1956 anti-Stalin
speech, which was given without prior warning to Beijing and embarrassed the
avowedly pro-Stalin CCP (Roy, 1998, pp23-24).

Since the Soviet Union was

towards military parity with the United States, the Moscow government tried to
avoid any conflicts with the United States, and maintain the status quo.

In Mao’s

view, the Soviet leadership appeared to be abandoning basic revolutionary principles
and retrogressing back toward capitalism and imperialism.

Conflicts of interest

outweighed their common interest in opposing US influence.

The split of the Sino-

Soviet relationship is one of reasons that decreased the tight bipolar international
system.

Since China was the geopolitical satellite for the Soviet Union in East Asia,
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the deteriorating relationship between the two sides inevitably accelerated the
predominance of the bipolar system.

This loose bipolar system altered the role of China during the 1960s.

After the

spilt of Sino-Soviet relationship, China became an isolated country, which radically
advocated world revolution.

Mao Zedong realized that China should adopt an

independent foreign policy that could not depend on the Soviet Union anymore.
Yet Mao was not a geopolitical theorist as such, but like Lenin, considerations of
power and the balances of forces were the important components of his political
vision (Yahuda, 1982，p.20).
theory.

During the I960, Mao developed his three-worlds

He divided the world into three categories in his three-worlds theory: the

first world consists of the two superpowers, the second of the industrialized medium
and small powers and the third of the less developed former colonies and semi
colonies.

China placed itself within the third world, because of its backward and

underdevelopment.

In fact, China was a dissatisfied country - undeveloped,

humiliated, irredentist - trying to move into a better position in the international
system (Roy，1998, p.28).

China, in the 1960s, emerged as an independent polar

point in the configuration of world politics, because the second world was the
satellite of the two superpowers.

China, therefore, served as a representative of

those third world countries, which fought for the interests of the Third World.
Hence， Mao auspicated the road of independent China’s foreign policy in order to
balance the bipolar system in world relations.

China nearly isolated from the

international activities in the 1960s.

The change indicated that China was dissatisfied with the bipolar world order.
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The international strategy of China shifted to advocating a global struggle against
imperialism, colonialism and hegemonism.

The concept of “people’s war” should

be led by the Third World and China was the representative of these countries.
Mao’s idea has given China’s successive leaders the self-confidence to pursue an
independent line in geopolitical area affecting the central balance between America
and Russia (Yahauda, 1982, p.20).

Although China had established a revolutionary

role, its influence in the mainstream of international system was limited.

III. A STRATEGIC TRIANGULAR ORDER:

Beginning in the early 1970s, the world entered into a strategic triangular order.
As the global environment was still under a loose bipolar system, the tense
atmosphere disappeared to a large extent.

The “strategic triangle” refers to the

relationship in which China held a flexible position vis-a-vis the United States and
the Soviet Union, affording Beijing the opportunity to benefit by playing the two
superpowers against each other (Roy，1998, p.28).
Sino-US rapprochement in early 1970.

The relationship began with the

After the spilt of Sino-Soviet relations in

the past decade, the Washington government recognized that China was not a Soviet
satellite state.
the world order.

Moreover，China’s international status became more significant for
The PRC government was largely admitted and then continuously

enjoyed a global standing.

The United States tried to woo the friendship of China

in order to counterbalance the threat from the Soviet Union.

On the other hand, the

Soviet Union maintained the conflicting relation with the US and China.

The

international structure, thus, was under a triangular great power relationship.

The

United States, the Soviet Union and China became the most three influential and
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important countries, which dominated the world order in the 1970s.

After the bipolar system had developed for two decades, this international
structure began to decline.

The ideological confrontation between the US and

China was to be relieved due to the geostrategic consideration.

As the US saw that

the threat from the USSR would be increased, the best national strategy for the US
was to establish a friendly relationship with the other great power - China.

The US

new geopolitical concern changed the role of China in the 1970s.

First, the “strategic triangle” relationship made China one of dominate powers
in world politics.

Although China was the weakest power in this triangular relation,

the balancing factor between the two superpowers could not be ignored.

The

segregation of the US-China pair and the Soviet Union on two opposing sides in the
triad interactions, which has been flaunted by the China-card players as most
conducive to the interests of combating the Soviet threat, represents what is usually
known as a “romantic triangle” （Hsiung，1985, p.122).

Second, the quasi-alliance

with the United States had several important benefits for China.

After the US

established a normal state relationship with China in 1972， the joint Shanghai
Communique formally recognized the position of China in the international order.
Specifically， the PRC replaced the ROC (Republic of China) as “China” in the
United States, taking up as well, a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.
Moreover, China was universally accepted as legitimate actor in international politics
(Zhang, 1998, p.59).

By the end of the decade, 120 countries had established

diplomatic relations with China, compared with 52 in 1970.

Hence， China was

regarded as an important actor in the international community.
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China’s status was largely increased due to the establishment of relations with the
United States and the entrance into the United Nations.

The former represented the

predominant power in the world, while the latter represented the highest organization
organ in the world.

The recognition of China’s status by these two entities, at the

same time, changed the others’ perception of China.

Third, the connection has

obviously provided the Chinese an added leverage in dealing with Moscow, as they
can play the “American card” （Hsiung，1985, p.123).

China’s diplomatic power has

been increased after the establishment of US coalition.

Since the power of the Sino-

US connection could constrain the Soviet expansion, China has more reasons now
than before to expect some concessions from the apparent Soviet willingness to be
conciliatory (Hsiung，1985, p.124).

In sum, the triangular relationship provided a chance for China to become one
of great powers in the world.

The China factor contributed significantly to the

emergence of a new pattern of the global distribution of power (Zhang, 1998, p.59).
This pattern, tripolarity, was the structural transformation from the post-war bipolar
world into a stage for a truly multi-polar world.

The triangular relationship was an

essential stage in international relations since it marked the starting point for the
multi-polar system after the collapse of the Cold War period.

China, in this decade,

strengthened its global status by entering into the UN Security Council and
establishing normal relations with other countries.

These achievements laid down

the foundation of China9s quest for superpower status during the Dengist era.
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IV. REACHING A DETENTE PERIOD:

Throughout the 1980s? the world was reaching the end of the bipolar system.
As the triangular world system had marked the decline of bipolarity in the last
decade, the development of international relations seemed on the road to reaching a
detente rather than sharpening confrontation in the 1980s.

A series of high level

summits between the US and the USSR on the issues of military, global peace and
normalization between the two states demonstrated a sign of changing geostrategic
considerations among them.

The Soviet threat declined sharply due to internal

problems and the rise of Gorbachev in the Kremlin office in mid-1980s.

He

actively developed a normal relationship with the US and China.

Meanwhile, the rise of the East Asia region accelerated the decline of US-Soviet
strategic balance.

There was a possible scenario, which predicted that the Asian-

Pacific region would become the center of world politics in the new century.

Japan

had become an economic giant in this region and moved into a pivotal position in
Asia.

The economic success of Asian NIEs (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and

Singapore) strengthened the economic ability in this region.

This development in

the world balance increased the significant role of Asia in international politics.

Under this changing global structure, China had potential to become one of the
poles in the world.
international structure.

The detente of the bipolar system began to change the
This change formed a gap for the rise of a potential country

that possessed the capability to quest for the position of great power.

With the

adoption of opening door policy at the beginning of 1980s，China’s integration into
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international society prepared for its rise in the global means afterwards.
of China became more important when compared with the last decade.

The role
Hence,

China’s great-power aspirations began in the Dengist regime and developed on a
right trend under this favourable condition.

V.

MULTIPOLAR/UNI-MULTIPOLAR SYSTEM:

By 1991, the collapse of the Soviet Union marked the end of the Cold War
bipolar world system.

The bipolarity that dominated the world system for more

than four decades came to the end, yielding to a new multipolarity (Hsiung, 1992,
p.68).

The United States, the remaining superpower, now dominates the global

scale, with at least six other major powers - Russia, Japan, China, Germany, Britain,
and France.

In other words, contemporary international politics can be described as

an uni-mulitpolar system with one superpower and several major powers
(Huntington, 1999, p.36).

The post-Cold War world order should be counted as a

transition of the next world order.

Thus, this period gives a chance for the rise of

another superpower.

In the post-Cold War world order, multipolarity gives China more geoeconomic
leverage and more geopolitical space than the bipolarity before.

Under this global

environment, the Chinese leaders can take a more active role in reaching the goal of
superpower position in the new century.

In the following section, China’s

geostrategic plan in pursuit of its international status in the post-Cold War era will be
illustrated.
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As a whole, according to the development of international relations in the Cold
War era, we can see that the change in the international environment will inevitably
bring change of a nation’s global role in that particular period.

This change is a

dynamic process, not static.

Geostrategy is a method, which lets us understand how

international politics works.

In fact, China’s quest to become a great power in the

global system is bounded by the international structure.

In a multipolar world,

China can gain more spatial conditions to develop its influence over territory.

In the

following paragraph, evidence will be given to illustrate China9s quest for great
power status under the geostrategic reasoning.

CHINA’S STRATEGY IN PURSUIT OF GREAT POWER STATUS:

The post-Cold War global structure is characterized by American unipolarity.
Though the world is reaching multipolarity, the US predominance in the global
structure will still play an outstanding role in the post-Cold War transitional period.
If China aims at strengthening its international status in order to equalize the status
with the US in the new century, the Chinese leadership needs to consolidate its power
in East Asia.

This region contains economic and strategic importance for the

emergence of a superpower in the 21st century.

When China establishes its power

and prestige in East Asia region, its international status will be counted as a
superpower that shares the same influence as the US in global politics.

The

following section will try to discuss China’s geostrategic moves in the East Asian
region in order to understand its comparative strategic advantages.
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CHINA?S PREDOMINANCE IN THE EAST ASIA REGION:

As aforementioned, geography of a nation always influences international
structure effects.

There are many factors that comprise great power status; the

previous chapter has discussed China’s national capabilities in quest for great power
status.

Although economic development and levels of technology and education are

some of crucial indicators, geography determines whether a country has the
prerequisites of great power status (Ross, 1999, p.81).

This part tries to use a global

perspective to discuss China9s self-perception in becoming a great power.

China enjoys geographic advantages, which lets it get the major strategic
beneficiary in East Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

In the post-Cold

War world order, China has successfully filled the vacuum of a collapsed bipolar
system.

Firstly, China possesses a huge amount of territory and a large population.

This geographical location provides a chance for China to become a great landpower
that dominates the Asian continent.

Secondly， China possesses the world’s largest

supply of coal reserves (Ross, 1999, p.93).

In terms of energy support, China can

be self-reliant; it is not very dependent on foreign markets.

Thirdly, the location of

China can sustain its economic development and geopolitical strategy in the new
century.

China enjoys a long coastal line on the east.

The provinces along the

coastal line are the most convenient areas, which can obtain foreign capital and
technology and carry out business trade with other nations easily.

At the same time,

China is located at the center of Asia; this area contains geopolitical advantages.
Some small countries in Central Asia and Southeast Asia can serve as a geopolitical
buffet for China in a war.

Moreover, China can pass through Central Asia to extend
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its influence into the Middle East.

Comparing to the other two major powers in

Asia- Russia and Japan, China enjoys comparatively good geopolitical conditions.

Russia is a declining state in the post-Cold War era.
collapsed after the end of the Cold War.

Its superpower status

Although Russia has accumulated its

military capability in the bipolar system, the world is on the right trend towards
strategic arms reduction.

The second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (STRAT II)

will reduce Russian and American strategic weapons from 8,000 today to between
3,000 and 3,500 each (Godwin, 1999, p.265).

Hence, its large territory for

developing warheads cannot serve as an advantage anymore.

Besides,

contemporary Russian presence in the Far East is closed to the historical norm (Ross,
1999, p.89).

China has replaced the status of Russia in the Asian region.

In some

cases, Russia must depend on the leverage of China in order to join the regional
activities in the Asia-Pacific region.

In short, Russian geopolitical advantage - a

nation that can bridge the east and the west, does not provide any benefits for the
Moscow government.

Japan is constrained by its geographical conditions, and it cannot become a
dominant pole in international politics.

Rather, it will remain a second-class great

power，or， in Schweller’s terms， “lesser great power’’， whose security depends on
cooperation with a pole (Schweller, 1998, pp.16-19).
contains a tiny amount of territory.

In fact, Japan is an island that

To become a regional pole, Japan must have the

resources to support self-reliant regionwide military deployments (Ross, 1999, p.90).
However, Japan lacks of natural resources is a fatal element, which makes it unable
to become a great power in the new century.
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world for energy is virtually complete: Japan imports more then 80% of its overall
resource needs in the form of oil, coal, and natural gas (Johnstone, 1998, pi 071).

In

China9s main exports to Japan, almost 70% are raw materials and mineral fuels,
which are the vital resources for the development of any nation.

Japan’s

dependency on foreign resources, eventually, limits its strategic influence in quest for
global power status.

However, Japan has consolidated its image as a great economic giant in the
Asian-Pacific region, and even the world.

Apparently, the most typical impression

of the Asian-Pacific region to the world is its rapid economic development
throughout the Cold War period.

Most experts used the flying-geese pattern to

describe the economic development in Asia, Japan is at the head, the East Asian
NICs constitute the second tier, and ASEAN the third tier.

In this three-tiered V-

formation model, Japan plays the most important role in the Asian-Pacific area; its
foreign direct investment (FDI) has contributed to other Asian countries to a large
extent.

Japanese total investment in Asia in 1992 reached $60 billion in comparison

with $19.5 billion in 1985 (Deng, 1997, p.354).

By the 1990s，Japan’s policy shift

to “return to Asia” had reached an unprecedented level in the post-Cold War period.
Traditionally, Japan is the economic head in Asian Basin.

More specifically, it can

be said that Japan is an economic superpower in the world.

In the post Cold-War world order, geoeconomic leverage cannot be treated as
the sole indicator to measure a nation’s great power status.

Although Japan has

consolidated its ties with the US for over four decades, its dependency on the US
also means that Japan cannot become a great power in the futxire.
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dependency on access to the US market, its dependency on imported energy
resources, including petroleum from US allies transported through US-controlled
shipping lanes, and its dependency on US military forces, creates vulnerabilities for
Japan’s quest for a great power status (Ross，1999, p.92).

After WWII， the US and

Japan established their closer relations both in economy and politics.

The US

government tried to make Japan become an economic great power in the AsianPacific region in order to serve as the buffer for the US in its regional interests.

In

addition, Japan was a significant nation of the Rimland strategy of the US when
mainland China became a communist nation after 1949.

This means that Japan

contains its strategic position for the benefit of the United States.

Other Asian

states, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Philippines provided a belt of Rimland to
contain the expansion of the communism in Asia.

Due to the geostrategic

calculation of the US, Japan could have become the economic giant in Asia, however,
this phenomenon just shows part of the facts.

From Japan’s geographic situation, it

is insufficient for Japan to claim as a great power.

Indeed, Japan will not be able to

make a bid for full-fledged great power status in the 21st century (Ross, 1999, p.92).

CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES:

Having discussed the development of international relations under the Cold War
period, we now see that the geostrategic considerations of the two superpowers
shaped the global structure.

After the discussion of geographical conditions in Asia,

the chance for China to become a great power is more than that of Russia and Japan.
In the post-Cold War period, China is predicted to be a challenging power that will
threaten the status of the US by the-mid 21st century.
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on the right trend to establish its influence and prestige around its territories.

To

understand China5s great-power aspirations under geostrategic analysis, the omni
directional foreign policy or the good-neighbour policy should be mentioned.

This

diplomatic strategy is an extension to other parts of the world of what begins as a
good-neighbour policy toward China’s immediate fringes (Hsiung，1995, p.576).

In

other words, according to geostrategic reasoning，China’s great-power aspirations
should start from the neighbours that surround it.

Based on China’s geographic conditions， its geostrategic calculations in quest
for great power status should first begin in the Asian region.

Indeed, China has

adopted the policy of “omnidirectional peaceful coexistence”， which features a
reduction of tensions with virtually all of its former rivals and adversaries, and forms
a friendly foreign policy with is neighbour countries.

This sector divides China’s

strategy into three categories: Southeast Asia region, Central Asia region, and Middle
East and Africa region.

The discussion mainly focuses on the development of

China’s diplomatic relations with these three regions.

L

CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA REGION:

Having showed China’s active participation in the regional organizations in
Chapter 3, the importance of the East Asian area for the growth of China is
undeniable.

In the post-Cold War era, the economic might of Asia Pacific will have

a peculiar significance for world politics in the new century (Hsiung, 1993, p.9).

In

other words, the Asian Pacific region will sooner or later become one of prominent
economic centers in the world.

This explains why China needs to have closer ties
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with the Asian regional institutions.

Besides, the Southeast Asian region serves a

geostrategic tactic for China’s great-power aspirations.

Thus, from the 1990s

onwards, China began to develop bilateral relations with the Southeast Asian
countries.

In the early 1990s, China established diplomatic relations with Singapore,
Malaysia, Vietnam and Indonesia.

After the Tiananmen incident in 1989, China

began a diplomatic strategy designed to solidify ties with it neighbours.

This

achievement testifies that China could make a breakthrough from the western
diplomatic isolation.
nations.

In the following year, China was recognized by the ASEAN

The links between China and the ASEAN countries were strengthened.

More recently, China has signed bilateral amity and friendship accords with Thailand
and Malaysia (Manning & Przystup，1999, p.57).

When Jiang visited Thailand in

1999, the bilateral ties between China and Thailand were enhanced.

According to

the Peopled Daily (November 26, 1999), Jiang expressed satisfaction over the long
term and close exchange and cooperation between the two countries, which he hoped
would to be further enhanced.

China’s good-neighbour policy contributes to its

economic and political securities.

China, in May 2000, signed two joint statements with the Philippines and
Indonesia.

China and Philippines have made great progress in their cooperation in

the political, economic, cultural, educational, scientific and technological and other
fields on the basis of equality and mutual benefit since the establishment of
diplomatic relations on 9 June 1975.

The two sides believe that it is now an

opportune time to establish a framework for further bilateral cooperation.
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framework will strengthen their historical friendship and geographical proximity in
order to advance their cooperation and development in Asia.

A long-term and

stable relationship on the basis of good neighbourliness, and mutual trust and benefit
were established between the two governments.

Although both sides have conflict

about the sovereignty of Spratly Islands, they have committed themselves to the
maintenance of peace and stability in the South China Sea.
also signed a joint statement with Indonesia.

In the same year, China

Since the restoration of diplomatic

relations between China and Indonesia on 8 August 1990, the bilateral relationship
between the two countries has developed rapidly and their mutually beneficial
cooperation has continued to expand in all areas.

In order to consolidate the

existing traditional friendship, strengthen bilateral cooperation in all areas in the 21st
century, the two sides have agreed to establish and develop a long-term and stable
relationship of good-neighbourliness, mutual trust and all-round cooperation.
Hence, the increasing ties between China and the ASEAN countries has justified the
success of the Chinese good-neighbour policy.

China, at this moment, has

established formal diplomatic relations with all nations in the Asian-Pacific region.

There is a positive trend for China to develop its influence throughout the
Southeast Asian region.

Based on the above illustration, the ASEAN countries has

shown their willingness to establish diplomatic ties with China in the 21st century.
Thus, strengthening the cooperative relations with the Southeast Asian region is one
of the major task for China’s geostrategic calculation.
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II.

CHINA fS GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES IN CENTRAL ASIA REGION:

Beginning with the mid-1990s, China started to extend its influence to the
Central Asian republics.

In the views of Beijing, this region contains geopolitical

benefits for its quest for a great power position.

After the implosion of the Soviet

Union into its constituent republics, Central Asia became an important geostrategic
region for China to extend its influence there.

First, a new set of nations with

transnational ethnic ties now bordered China9s northwestern autonomous regions and
provinces, which were areas of continual ethnic unrest (Walsh, 1993, p.272).

China

must establish friendly foreign relations with these new nations, otherwise, there
could be plausible for China to be faced with the challenges of ethnic separatism.
Secondly, following the independence of the Central Asian republic, the Chinese are
taking a more prosperous view of the potential chance emerging forming the region.
The decline of Russia in this region provides a chance for the rise of China.

In this

sense, it is worthwhile for the Chinese leadership to consolidate its role in Central
Asia.

In the following paragraph, China’s perception of the emerging geopolitics in

Central Asia and the strategic choices being made by the Chinese leadership will be
assessed to see whether the focus of this region helps justify China’s great-power
aspirations.

Although the importance of Russia’s leadership in Central Asia has declined in
the post-Cold War period, China still needs to depend on closer diplomatic ties with
Russia in order to establish cooperation with the Central Asian republics.

TheSino-

Russian rapprochement in the 1990s did improve the diplomatic relations between
two nations.

Starting from 1992 onwards, China has successfully developed its
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bilateral strategic partnership with Russia.

In 1992, President Yeltsin’s visit to

China yielded the first joint statement by the two countries, affirming that China and
Russia “regard each other as friendly states” （Ren, 1998, p.98).

This joint statement

is characterized as a good signal for improving bilateral relations.

By the time

President Jiang visited Russia in 1994, which produced the second joint statement
defining the bilateral relationship as a “constructive partnership oriented towards the
21st century’’， the nature of their bilateral relations had changed (Ren，1998, p.98).
Both governments saw the need to strengthen their relations in international relations.
The second statement also implies that both China and Russia draw closer together to
counterbalance US dominance.

In 1996, the two governments issued a third joint

statement formally proclaiming the forging of a "strategic partnership of equality,
mutual confidence and mutual coordination towards the 21st century (Ren, 1998,
p.99).

This statement reiterated their closer relationship in the new century by the

summit meetings.

Moreover, the term “strategic partnership” between two

countries begins a new type of alliance in international relations.

By the year 1999,

Beijing and Moscow signed the Sino-Russian Joint Communique.
strategic partnership is confirmed.

The bilateral

In fact, the establishment of Sino-Russian

strategic partnership is beneficial for China and helps to establish its power in the
Central Asian region.

A more multipolar world gives chance for China to take a more active role in
regional area.

Geopolitically speaking, the emergence of the Central Asian

republics - Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan gave China the opportunity to reassert traditional regional interests (Walsh, 1993,
p.273).

China’s strategic partnership with Russia enabled China to establish its
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friendly relations with the newly Central Asian countries.

When China and Russia

signed the joint statement in 1996, Presidents of China, Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan and Russia launched their first meeting in Shanghai and agreed on a series
of confidence-building measures along the border.
five-nation summit held the meeting together.

In the following every year, a

In 1997, the five governments signed

an agreement on the mutual reduction of military forces in their border areas.

From

geopolitical standpoint, China’s military security is being strengthened in the Central
Asian region.

With the cooperation of Russia, China can develop its ties with those

new Central Asian countries.

In the late 1990s, the friendly relations between China and Central Asian
countries have been further consolidated.

In 1999, according to Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (December 30, 1999), President Jiang attended the 4th five-nation summit
meeting, during which leaders of the five countries achieved an extensive consensus
on the world situation, regional security and economic cooperation.

Meanwhile,

they issued the Bishkek, a document of great significance to enhancing their goodneighbourly relations, friendship and cooperation and their joint efforts to combat
and curb nationalistic separatist forces on August 25, 1999.

China also built

economic links with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in order to strengthen
their economic cooperation.
respectively.

The presidents of these three countries visited China

According to People’s Daily (November 24, 1999)， on November 23,

1999? China and Kazakhstan signed the Joint Communique emphasizing their wishes
to strengthen bilateral relations and cooperation in the 21st century.

The bilateral

relations between China and the new Central Asian republics in the past decade show
that China has built its preliminary role in the northwest area.
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their relationship will be strengthened and consolidated in the 21sl century.

III. CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA
REGION:

Since the early 1980s， the international bipolar structure has entered into the end
of detente period.

The Chinese leaders have sought to develop a foreign policy that

reconciled the requirement of modernization with geopolitical considerations
(Calabrese, 1998，p.351).

Starting from the 1990s，China’s global geostrategic

moves became one of prominent elements in the development of its foreign policy.
In the post-Cold War period, the Chinese leaders regard both the Persian Gulf region
and Africa as areas of global strategic importance for China’s great-power
aspirations.
When the Chinese leaders decided to adopt an omni-directional foreign policy
in the early 1990s?the Middle East was regarded as one of important regions that

fulfills China’s foreign policy in terms of geostrategic perspective. Though the
Middle East is located at the periphery, its global strategic value has been increased
in international relations since the end of the Cold War period.
region contains several strategic interests.

For China, this

If China extends its influence towards

the Middle East, its great power position will be consolidated in the new century.

In the past, the attention of the Chinese government in the Middle East affairs
was limited.

For China, the Middle East was a remote place when China was under

a bipolar Cold War system.

The only thing China could do was to stress the

similarities between China and the Middle East countries on the views of
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international politics.

In addition, China firmly supported the Palestinians and

Arabs in their struggle for liberation, which actually was the core of Chinese Middle
Eastern policy in those years (Zhang, 1999, p.150).

Basically, the Middle East

affairs was dominated and politicized by both the United States and the Soviet Union,
the influence of China was strictly constrained under the bipolar Cold War system.
The relations with those Middle East countries were still on the margins of the
Chinese foreign-policy agenda.

However, with the end of the Cold War, the international structure allowed
China to play a more active role in the Middle East region.
longer dominated by the two superpowers.
with the Middle East could be extended.

The world was no

Under this circumstance，China’s links
Chinese officials have long regarded the

Persian Gulf as an area of global strategic importance.

Their views on the

significance of the Gulf have been derived from periodic assessments of the major
trends in world affairs and their probable impact in China (Calabrese, 1998, p.351).
The first step for the Beijing government to increase its influence to the Middle East
was to establish relations with those countries.

This new diplomatic strategy started from the 1990s onwards.

In 1990, China

established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, one of important Arabian
countries in the Middle East.

Another breakthrough of China’s Middle East foreign

policy was to establish diplomatic relations with Israel on January 24, 1992.

China

rejected establishing diplomatic relations with Israel simply because Israel occupied
Arab territories with US support.

In the view of China, the government of Israel

was formulated by colonialist and imperialist aggression.
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confrontation was gradually weakened in the post-Cold War period.

Moreover,

with the progress of the Arab-Israeli peace process, the regional tension was relaxed
by and large.

Economic cooperation is placed as a high priority in the Middle East.

Thus, the normalization of relations between China and Israel not only lay a solid
foundation for further development of relations between the two countries, but also
made it possible for China to participate and influence Middle Eastern affairs (Zhang,
1999, p.152).

Normalizing relations with Saudi Arabia and Israel was to be the first

step for China to seek a more geopolitical living space in the Middle East region.

By January 1992, China had established diplomatic relations with all countries
in the Middle East.

In the following years，China’s Middle East foreign policy

aimed at expanding trade and economic cooperation with the region.
China became more active in regional participation.

Meanwhile,

From 1994 to 1997， China

attended each annual economic conference of the Middle East and North Africa
(Zhang， 1999, p_153).

Furthermore, during 1999 to 2000, Jiang paid a series of

state visits to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Palestine, Turkey, and Egypt.

From Jiang’s

summits with the leaders of these countries, he emphasized the development of
bilateral ties and cooperation between China and the Middle East countries.

In

addition, China has established bilateral friendship and cooperation with Iraq and
Iran, both are the traditional enemy of the US in the Middle East affairs.

China

signed the Joint Communique with Iran when President Khatami paid a state visit to
China from 22 to 26 June 2000.

In the joint statement, two nations reached

common understanding on enhancing bilateral cooperation, opening up new
prospects for bilateral ties and establishing a 21st century-oriented long-term and
wide-ranging relationship of friendship and cooperation.
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between China and the Middle East were strengthened in the late 1990s.

Finally， the strategic importance of Africa for China’s great-power policy will
be illustrated.

Traditionally, there are relatively friendly relations between China

and the countries of Africa.

To show the similarities between China and Africa,

Beijing stressed that both had suffered under colonialism and from foreign
aggression, and both had experienced struggles to gain or maintain independence
(Payne & Veney， 1998，p.870).

Indeed, China has consolidated good diplomatic

relations with Africa in the Cold War era.

Many African countries regarded China

as a representative of their interests in the international organizations.

Mao9s three-

worlds theory aimed at building friendship with those developing countries, mainly
in Africa.

More importantly, African states played a pivotal role in the United

Nations recognition of the PRC - over US objections - as a permanent member of
the United Nations Security Council in 1971 (Payne & Veney, 1998, pp.870-871).
In the post-Cold War period, African’s strategic importance for China was on an
increasing trend.

In the late 1990s, China started to show its emphasis on African diplomatic
relations.

In May 1996, President Jiang visited Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, Mali,

Namibia and Zimbabwe.
China.

In August 1996, Niger reestablished diplomatic ties with

China and South Africa established foreign relations on January 1, 1998.

During 1990 to 2000, Jiang also paid visits to Algeria, Morocco, and South Africa.
According to People’s Daily (April 25， 2000)， Jiang Zemin and South African
President Thabo Mbeki signed a declaration on the partnership between the two
countries.

Moreover， Jiang also expressed China’s hope to discuss with African
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countries about economic and trade relations in the future.

China’s African

diplomatic policy seems very successful in the late 1990s.

As a whole, both the Middle East region and Africa are the two important
continents for China to consolidate its influence abroad.

In views of Chinese

leaders， these two areas possess the strategic significance for developing China’s
great-power aspirations.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA’S GEOSTRATEGIC MOVES:

Having examined China5s geostrategic plans in several regions, including
Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, there is a trend for China
to develop and consolidate its continental power in the center of Asia.

Except the

Southeast Asian region, the other two regions are in the westward extension direction
from China’s geographic location.

Figure 4.1 can help us understand China’s

strategic moves around its periphery.
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Figure 4.1

Beijing’s Strategic Moves on its Fringes

Asia

According to Figure 4.1, the main geostrategic leverage of the Southeast Asian
region is to preserve China’s economic growth in the new century while the Central
Asian region， the Middle East and African countries mainly serve China’s energy
and political fronts.

Both two regions are the main suppliers for China’s energy

import, the Chinese good-neighbour policy is needed to strengthen diplomatic ties in
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the areas.

Moreover, the closer ties between Muslims and Turks will help avoid

minority upheavals in the Chinese northwest inferior.

The African countries play an

important role for China to ask for a great power.

By aligning itself with Third

World states, China is able to gain diplomatic leverage in the international system.
From geostrategic point of view, the surrounding regions of China can establish
different kinds of strategic fronts, which protect China9s interest and security in Asia
and make China a great power in the world.

Besides, there are several geostrategic

implications for China?s consolidation in the above regions.

Regarding the Southeast Asian region, the main geostrategic leverage is to
preserve China’s economic growth in the new century.

As the friendly and

cooperative relations between China and the ASEAN countries can maintain stability
and peaceful environment in the region, continuously increasing economic ties and
the inflow of FDI to China will be increased in the Asian-Pacific region.

In fact,

the consolidation of Sino-ASEAN diplomatic ties will enhance China’s geostrategic
leverage in East Asia.

Firstly, the bilateral ties between China and the ASEAN countries can accelerate
and preserve the stability and peaceful environment in the Asian-Pacific region in
order to increase China’s economic development in the 21st century.

In the post-

Cold War period, the international structure has turned toward a trend of economic
globalization.

Indeed, this world environment is beneficial for the rapid economic

development in the East Asian region.

There is still a lot of room for these Asian

developing countries in economic growth.

When China obtains friendly diplomatic

relations with the ASEAN countries, the peaceful environment will bring about a
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steady growth in their economy.

Still the lingering territorial dispute among China,

Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam over parts or all of the
Spratlys Islands in the South China Sea creates an ill feeling between China and the
other Asian countries.

Meanwhile, the anti-Chinese movement in Indonesia has

formed a gap between the Chinese government and the Indonesian government
recently.

As China improves foreign relations with these countries, its strategic ties

will extend to the Southeast Asian area.

In addition, China9s comprehensive

national growth will be enhanced under this favourable regional environment.

Secondly, the Sino-ASEAN diplomatic ties may increase foreign direct
investments (FDI) in China.

When China adopted the open door policy in the late

1970s, the main task for the Chinese government was to attract foreign investment in
order to improve its economic capability.

After two decades of development, over

80% of FDI comes from the Chinese societies, such as Hong Kong and Taiwan.
Although the US and Japan rank as the third and the fourth largest foreign
investment to China， their contributions are very little， less than 10〇/〇of China’s total
received foreign investment.

This situation shows that the Chinese Diaspora plays a

significant role in China’s economic development.

In Southeast Asian countries,

the Chinese dominates 70% of Malaysian economy, and over 90% of Indonesian
economy, though the Chinese population is small.

When China improves the

bilateral relations with these countries, the FDI from the overseas Chinese may be
increased at the same time.

Thus, the attraction of more FDI will be beneficial for

China5s economic growth in the new century.

And the economic ties between

China and the ASEAN countries will bring a prosperous trading activity in the longterm.
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Concerning the area in the Central Asian region, the strategic link between
China and the Central Asian republics is one of essential geostrategic considerations
for China’s great-power aspirations in the new century.

As China is a continental

power, its geostrategic calculation should focus on the extension of land.

If China

can control the predominant position in the Central Asian region, the quest for great
power will be fulfilled in the near future.

In fact, there are several geopolitical

advantages for China to consolidate its diplomatic relations with Central Asian
countries.

Firstly, China9s diplomatic relations with the Central Asian republics help
stabilize the ethnic unrest in the areas of northwest China.

Although a multipolar

world system opens up new political and economic opportunities for the expansion
of China9s influence in the Central Asian region, the collapse of the Soviet Union
presents a new threat of regional religious and ethnic instability.

China’s

northwestern provinces (Gansu and Qinghai) and autonomous regions (Ningxia,
Xinjiang, and Tibet) are the most unstable areas, where political crisis have occurred
under the rule of the Chinese government.

Xinjiang is a province that comprises

ethnic minorities, including Turks and Muslims.
border on Xinjiang.

And three of the five republics

Both people in the newly republics and Xinjiang share the

same religion and languages to a certain extent.

Hence, a series of independence

movement in Central Asia in the early 1990s stimulated the rise of nationalism in
Xinjiang.

And nationalist movement in the interior area may threaten China9s

national security.

Moreover, the new Central Asian countries provide supporting bases for the
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separatist movement in Xinjiang.

Former separatists continue to live in exile in

Kazakhstan, and there are reported links between Uighurs and the Turkestan
Liberation Movement and between Kirghiz in Xinjiang and tribesmen across the
border who may have provided arms during the April 1990 riots (Walsh, 1993,
pp.276-277).

In the wake of independence, it is clear that resurgent Islam and pan-

Turkism are forces that present security challenges for China (Walsh, 1993, p.277).
Since 60% of Xinjiang’s 15 million residents are Turkic Muslims， pan-Turkic
sentiment may cause conflicts among those ethnic minorities.

Since northwest China is a dangerous place in the post-Cold War period,
China9s establishment of bilateral diplomacy with the Central Asian republics may
help China to prevent separatists from infiltrating its volatile northwest frontier
region of Xinjiang.

It is expected that geopolitical competition of Central Asia

among China, Turkey, and Russia will become more violent in the new century.

If

China can improve the closer ties with these countries, and maintain peace and
stability in the region, its predominant land power will be strengthened.

Secondly, the bilateral diplomatic relations between China and the Central
Asian republics can help China search for new energy resources.
oil-producing country, but it is also a major oil consumer.

China is a major

With the further growth

of the economy，China’s demand for oil will increase significantly (Zhang, 1999,
p.155).

In 1993, China for the first time became, an importer of petrochemical

products, and in 1996, it became an importer of crude oil (Zhang, 1999, p.155).
The present oil fields in China are drying up and the new oil fields cannot quickly
meet the oil demand of China in the near future.
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resources will dry up around 2025， and in view of present and long-term
development, a strategy for developing oil and gas resources in the Middle East and
Central Asia should be a top priority (Zhang, 1999, p.155).

For China’ energy

security, the Central Asian republics have become the main oil suppliers for China in
the future.

After China has developed its normal bilateral relationship with Central Asia, its
shortage of oil and gas resources will be diminished.

China plans to build and link

a long, expensive pipeline through Xinjiang reaching Kazakhstan to the centers of
consumption in eastern China (Menon & Wimbush, 2000, p.83).

Since Central

Asia is regarded as an oil-rich region, especially Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, this
region contains strategic consideration for China to strengthen its land power.
Moreover, Central Asia is a steeping stone for China to search for more energy
suppliers in the Middle East.

The opening of Xinjiang to Central Asia marked an

important landmark in rebirth of the old Silk Road (Walsh, 1993, p.280).

The

Middle East and the Caspian Basin are the significant energy producers in the world.
When China established friendly relations with the Central Asian republics,
importing oil and gas through pipeline development from the Silk Road to Xinjiang
became one of the choices for China to achieve long-term energy supply.

Thus, China’s strategic partnerships with those newly republics can preserve its
energy security.

From a geostrategic point of view, the control of energy is one of

important elements to become a great power in the world.

Those infrastructure

developments preserve the long-term Chinese strategic hedging against dependency
on oil controlled by an adversarial power (Ross, 1999, p. 108).
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Thirdly, the established bilateral relations between China and the Central Asian
republics accelerate economic ties, including border trade, the establishment of
various kinds of ventures, the opening of transportation, and the expansion of
telecommunication links.

According to People’s Daily (November 24， 1999)，

Kazakhstan has become the second largest trade partner with China among all
partners in the former Soviet Union with two-way trade expected to reached one
billion US dollars in 1999.

The transnational economic cooperation between

Xinjiang and the republics can maintain stability among the ethnic minorities in
order to decrease ethnic separatism in Xinjiang.

In fact, economic cooperation

among the republics and with China plays an important element in China’s
geostrategic consolidation.

Since the expanding of economic and technological ties

among ethnic groups in Xinjiang and the republics can divide the separatist
movement in northwest China.

This development can help China strengthen its

land power in the Central Asian area.

The Central Asian region contains geostrategic moves for China in the postCold War era.

When China needs to achieve the goal of great power status, Central

Asia is an important area that China has to control.

Indeed, this region preserves

several strategic perspectives for China to fulfill its great-power aspirations.
Economic integration and cultural development between Xinjiang and the republics
maintains China’s territorial integrity.

Energy resource in this region and the

pipelines to the Middle East preserve China’s energy security.

This region

possesses all geopolitical, economic and energy interests for China in terms of
geostrategic concern.

Thus, the friendly diplomatic relations among China and the

new republics in the 1990s, confirm that the Chinese leaders have a goal to reach
128

CHAPTER 4
CHINA'S ROLE AND STATUS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: A GEOSTRATEGIC
ANALYSIS

great power.

The Middle East is no longer a distant region, which seems unimportant for
China to enlarge its influence in terms of geostrategic perspective.

With the end of

the Cold War, the strategic significance of the Middle East has become one of
prominent geostrategic doctrines for China5s great-power aspirations.

First， the Gulf countries serve as the largest oil suppliers for China’s total
energy import in the 1990s.

With China’s economic growth， its need for imported

oil will increase significantly.

Although coal is China’s leading energy source, oil

is nonetheless vitally important to the well being of the Chinese economy (Calabrese,
1998, p.357).

China surprised the West in 1997 when, between June and September,

state oil companies made a series of major investments in oil-production deals
around the globe (Jaffe & Manning，1999, p.124).

Most construction included the

building of pipelines through the Central Asia region to Iran and Turkey.
Furthermore, according to Turkish Daily News (July 30, 1999), Turkey constitutes a
large energy market for further Caspian/Gulf supplies of oil and gas and independent
power producers.

For China’s long term security interest, China needs to form a

good-neighbouring policy towards the Middle East in order to preserve the
construction of more pipelines to the region.

In the 21st century, it is expected that

the energy strategic significance of the Middle East will become more important for
China’s economic development.

Second, the established diplomatic relations among China, Israel and Palestine
more or less enhance China’s influence in Middle East affairs.
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to the Middle East, he expressed his appreciation that the Palestinian National
Authority, led by President Arafat, has chosen the correct solution in setting the
dispute between Israel and Palestine through peace talks.

On the Middle East peace

and stability, according to People’s Daily (April 14，2000)， Jiang said that China
believes the peace process will succeed in the end and that region will eventually
become one of peace, prosperity and dynamism, so long as the parties concerned
engage themselves in the talks in a serious and realistic manner and on the basis of
the relevant United Nations Resolutions and the principle of “land for peace”.
Meanwhile, Peopled Daily (April 29, 2000) stated that leaders of the three Middle
East countries (Israel, Palestine and Turkey) spoke highly of the efforts made by
President Jiang in promoting the Middle East peace talks.

Thus， after Jiang’s tour，

China’s influence in the Middle East was strengthened and consolidated.
friendly relations help China elevate its international status.

The

The most important

implication is that China can balance the US influence in the Middle East region.
This part will be discussed in more detail later.

Finally, the most significant geostrategic concern of Africa for China is to
contain Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomatic policy.

Since the countries in Africa are

very weak in terms of national power, the Taipei government provided economic
assistance to woo their relations in order to gain more political power in the world.
The diplomatic rivalry between Beijing and Taipei indicates the importance of
diplomatic recognition of a country.

If China can establish its ties with those

African countries, its superpower position will be confirmed to a certain extent.
Thus, in the 1990, China put efforts to gain closer ties with the African countries.
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Having observed China’s gains in several regions, we can conclude that the
Chinese leadership is on the road to achieving its dreams of a global power.
Despite the above discussions, there are two other important geostrategic
implications for China in terms of global perspective.

First of all, China’s strategic

pattern is a challenge to the dominant position of the United States.

Although the

two sides have signed a joint statement in 1997, which aims at strengthening the
strategic cooperative partnership in the 21st century, and establishing bilateral ties
between the two countries, they will not be strategic partners according to their
geographic locations.

Each power owns their strategic and economic regions in

order to establish their influence around the world.

Rather, they will be strategic

competitors engaged in a traditional great power struggle for security and influence
(Ross, 1999, p.96).

When China is on an increasing trend to reach its great-power

aspirations, simultaneously, the conflicts between China and the US will be
heightened.

In East Asia, China and the US are the two influential powers in the regional
affairs.

In the post-Cold War period, the power of the US could not be ignored.

Though the US military bases are not as many as the Cold War period, the allied
countries such as Japan, South Korea, Philippines, and Singapore contain the US
military force.

Traditionally, the relations between the US and the Asian countries

are relatively good indeed.

When China established friendly diplomatic relations

with the ASEAN nations， this diplomatic strategy may create conflicts with the US’
regional interests in East Asia.

Meanwhile，China’s strategic front in the Southeast

Asia directly counterbalances the dominance of the US status.
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In the same way，China’s cooperative relations with the Middle East countries
such as Palestine and Israel affect US’ power in the Middle East.

The United States

dominates the Middle East peace progress and it certainly attempts to dominate
regional economic cooperation (Zhang，1999, p.156).

China’s active attitude and

constructive role on the progress of the Arab-Israeli peace process may threaten US
interest in the Middle East.

It is predicted that China will take the opportunity and

work out a Middle East strategy for the 21st century.

Geopolitically speaking, China

has also established diplomatic ties with Iraq and Iran, the enemies of the US.
was considered as aggressive behaviour towards the US.

This

Beijing has cultivated

military and economic ties with Iraq and Iran, exploiting an opportunity created and
fuelled by the Western economic sanctions against both states (Jaffe & Manning,
1999, p.125).

China’s ties with Iraq and Iran may let it gain geopolitical leverage in

the Middle East region.

Thus，China’s diplomatic establishment in the Middle East

creates a pattern of balance of power in the regional level.

Secondly， the “strategic partnership” between Beijing and Moscow is just a
tactical bond, not a long-term alliance.

As discussed before, China needs to gain

the support of Russia in order to maintain close ties with the Central Asian republics.
The current friendliness between China and Russia is just a temporary alliance.

The

Russians want cash: the Chinese want military equipment, it is a relationship of
convenience (Dettmer，2000，p.21).

China is strengthening bilateral ties with the

individual Central Asian countries such as Kazakhstan.

This development shows

that China has the ability to play a dominant role in the Central Asian region without
the assistance of Russia.

From a geopolitical location, Russia and China must not

have a strategic partnership in the future.
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and have similar strategy fronts around their territories.

The rivalries between the

two states will surface in the future when China has offset the United States
dominance in the international order.

In sum, the implications of China9s consolidation of its strategic fronts aim at
showing that China is a great power in the international system.

China is a rising

superpower, which will play a challenging role towards the US predominant position.
From the development, China will still keep its good-neighbour policy to maintain
cooperative relations with its neighbours.

Then China9s great continental power

will be strengthened in mid-2000.

CONCLUSION:

This chapter applies a worldwide perspective to our survey of China9s greatpower aspirations.

The international structure is dynamic, not static.

Under a

changing international environment, the end of the Cold War world order provided a
leadership vacuum in which China has an opportunity to consolidate its power and
influence in different regions.

Meanwhile, China aimed at establishing its

economic and military capabilities that would increase China9s power and status in
the world.

This kind of capability building made the Chinese leadership realize the

importance of creating good relations with the other nations.

Through the

establishment of closer ties with the world, China’s internal building would be
consolidated.

Thus, there is a link between capability and foreign relations, which

is discussed in Chapter 3.

In the 1990s, China adopted a good-neighbour policy and

established partnerships with the nations at its fringes.
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structure, starting from the later stages of the Cold War to the end of the Cold War,
did encourage China to seek opportunities to develop its power and status.

From a

geostrategic perspective, China is on the road to fulfilling its dreams of being a great
power.

Geostrategic analysis, first, provides a clear structure for the change of the

international environment.

Second, it gives an explanation for why China saw its

own ability to challenge the great power status in the world as being so important.
Finally, it focuses on what strategy China is using to expand its influence around the
world.

From the steps taken under China’s geostrategic considerations, China’s

hope to become a great power is clearly shown to the readers.
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INTRODUCTION:

As I outlined in Chapter 2, the definition of power includes two perspectives.
First is self-image of a nation.

This perspective emphasizes the importance of

statesmen’s national self-image on the process of foreign policy.

In other words,

when we discuss whether a nation contains any aggressive manner on foreign policy
and ambition to attain a great power status, the element of leadership^ self
perception is very important on answering this question.

This means that human

behaviour is one of significant sources of foreign policy making.
approach is suitable for applying in the case of China.
leaders have a hope to quest for big power status.

In fact, this

Traditionally, the Chinese

When Mao Zedong found the

People’s Republic of China in 1949, he had an intention to make China one of the
important countries in the world.

Nevertheless, constrained by the Chinese

comprehensive national strength and the international structure in the Cold War era,
this hope was not easily to be achieved.

Not until Deng Xiaoping consolidated his

position in the Communist party, did China9s great-power aspirations begin to look
realistic.

For the past two decades, the Chinese leaders strove to join the ranks of

the great powers in the world.

Thus, the self-image of Chinese leadership is a

fundamental element by which to judge whether China is a great power.

The second perspective to discuss power is the perception of other states with
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respect to a state’s capabilities and its ability and willingness to express its power.
This is a more objective approach to any attempt to judge what is a great power in
the international system.

As great power status is not self-claimed, it has to be

recognized and accepted by the international society.

If the proposition of China’s

quest for great power status is testified， the next step to fulfill this goal is to gain the
respect and equal footing in the community of nations.

The most directed method

to get the recognition in the world is through participation both in regional and
international activities.

In the international community, one of prominent indicators

to measure a nation’s status is the involvement in world affairs.

Hence, the world’s

perception on China is also important to discuss China is a big power or not.

This chapter tries to discuss China5s great power status according to these two
angles.

The following sections are basically divided into the two main parts.

Firstly，China’s perception of its great power status will be discussed.

Secondly, the

world’s perception of China’s status in the world will be examined later.
Combining these two approaches, both China9s self-perception and its image in the
world as a great power, we will be better able to trace and analyze China9s quest for
global power status.

After that, the readers can have their own judgement on this

issue.

A GREAT POWER: CHINA’S SELF-IMAGE:
BASIC PRINCIPLES OF CHINA，S FOREIGN POLICY:

Although China decided to join the international organizations and take a more
constructive role in the world affairs in order to fulfill its economic development, the
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doctrine of Chinese foreign policy was generally kept on a firm stance.

During

these two decades, China9s diplomatic policy shows that it is a dissatisfied nation,
which will want to challenge and change the present world order.

In fact, the

Chinese leaders always oppose a world structure with only one single pole.
Throughout the visits to the other nations and summits with the leaders, China
demonstrates this idea clearly in front of the world.

According to Power Transition

theory, over the long run, with reasonable growth rates and maintenance of central
authority, China will overtake the United States and become a great power in the
future (Tammen, Kugler, & Lemke, 2000, p.171).

Evidence can be proven by the

principles of China’s foreign policy.

The basic principle of China’s diplomacy is to pursue an independent foreign
policy of peace.

The fundamental goal of this policy is to defend China’s

independence, state sovereignty and territorial integrity, to create a favourable
international environment for the reform and opening to the outside and for the
modernization drive, to maintain peace and promote common development.
fulfill these principles, a series of statements is needed to illustrate.

To

The main

contents can be summarized in the following seven points, as given by the PRC
Foreign Ministry, in a statement date December 21, 1999.

(1) China consistently persists in the principle of independence and taking the
initiatives in its own hands.

China will never yield to any big power or group

of countries, and will never establish military bloc, join in the arms race or seek
military expansion.
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(2) China opposes hegemonism and safeguard world peace.

It holds that all

countries are equal members of the international community whether they are
big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor.

All countries should settle their

disputes and conflicts through peaceful consultations instead of restoring to
force or the threat of force.

No country should interfere in the internal affairs

of another country under any pretext.

(3) China actively promotes the establishment of a just and rational new
international political and economic order.

To establish an international new

order which concurs with the development of the times and which accords with
the needs of the common development of mankind is an aspiration shared by the
international community and the people of the world.

China advocates that

such international new order should based on the Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-Existence and other universally acknowledged norms of international
relations

(4) China respects the diversity of the world.

China holds that the diversity of the

world should not be an obstacle to the development of relations between various
countries but should serve as an impetus to mutual exchanges, mutual
complement and mutual enrichment.

All countries are entitled to choose the

social system, development strategies and lifestyle that suit their own conditions

(5) China would like to establish and develop relations of friendship and
cooperation with all the countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful
Co-Existence namely, mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty,
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mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality
and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.

To actively develop good-

neighbourly relations with the surrounding countries is an important component
of China’s foreign policy.

Moreover, to strengthen China’s solidarity and

cooperation with the developing countries is the basic standpoint of China’s
foreign policy.

China attaches great importance to improving and developing

relations with the developed countries.

It stands for transcending differences

in social systems and ideology in handling state to state relations.

(6) China carriers out an all-dimensional opening up policy.

It is willing to

conduct trade, economic and technical cooperation, and scientific and cultural
exchanges with all countries of the world on the basis of the principle of
equality and mutual benefit to promote common prosperity.

Economic

globalization presents opportunities for economic development of all countries
and tremendous risk as well.

To maintain financial stability, to take

precautions against financial crisis and to ensure economic security are identical
challenges facing all governments.

(7) China takes an active part in multilateral diplomatic activities.
force safeguarding world peace and stability.

It is a staunch

Regarding arms control and

disarmament, China has always stood for the complete prohibition and thorough
destruction of nuclear weapons.

China has signed the Comprehensive Test

Ban Treaty and the Convention on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
After unilaterally cutting its forces by one million in the 1980s, China again cut
its forces by 0.5 million in three years beginning from 1997.
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step in international disarmament, which attracts great attention and a
significant contribution by China in safeguarding world peace and regional
stability.

The Chinese government has all along attached importance to human rights and
has made unremitting efforts to this end.
human rights conventions.

China has acceded to 17 international

In 1997, China signed the International Covenant

on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.

In October 1998, it signed the

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

At the turn of the century, the world is filled with hope.
with critical challenges.

But it is also faced

To seek peace and cooperation and to promote

development are the common aspiration of the people of the world.

As it did

so in the past, China will make its due contributions to safeguarding world
peace and promoting the common development of mankind (Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, December 21, 1999).

As aforementioned, three characteristics of the Chinese foreign policy principles
can be concluded as follows: China9s quest for great power status and its wish to
build a new just world, the opposition of US dominant world order, and China's
integration into the world structure.

When the Chinese leaders establish diplomatic

ties with other countries, and increase China9s status in the world, they will pursue
the goal under these principles.

In the following paragraphs, we will examine how

the Chinese leadership carries out its foreign relations according to the above
doctrine.
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CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN PRACTICE:

By the-mid 1990s, China began to fulfill its quest for great power status based
on the principle of independent foreign policy.

I will select some important and

representative examples to illustrate this proposition.

During 1997 to 1998, China and the US entered into a new diplomatic relations
after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989.

The successful mutual visits between

the two heads of state of the two countries marked that Sino-US relations have
entered a new stage of development.

Both President Jiang and President Clinton

decided to engage in joint efforts to establish a constructive Sino-US strategic
partnership for the 21st century.

The two sides agreed to further increase the

dialogue and cooperation in major international issues.

For a long-term perspective,

they agreed to promote the bilateral ties in a spirit of mutual respect, equality and
mutual benefit, and of seeking common ground while reserving differences.

President Jiang paid a visit to Japan in the late 1998; China had established a
friendly and cooperative partnership with Japan.

Jiang hopes that the Sino-Japan

relationship will enter a new phase after a historical first visit to Japan.

The

declaration defined the Sino-Japan partnership as one of the most important bilateral
relationships on the international political landscape.

Moreover, during Keizo

Obuchi9s China tour in 1999, the two sides clarified the key points and direction for
furthering fruitful cooperation between Japan and China in all fields.

At the same

time, China shows its consistent stance for Japan9s aggression during the Second
World War.

Jiang said that the Japanese military had gone down the wrong road,
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which resulted in great tragedy for the people of China and other Asian countries.
China, in this case, definitely requests for an apology from Japan.

When China and Russia established the strategic partnership in 1996? both sides
agreed to develop bilateral ties in several areas.

Both China and Russia argued they

had no choice but to draw closer to counterbalance US dominance.

The two sides

have condemned the proposed US national missile-defense system and rule out
accepting changes to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

The bilateral relations

between two sides are not against any third-party interference.

The two

governments are supportive of multipolarity and opposed to hegemony and power
politics in all forms and the two countries will make further efforts to safeguard
regional and world peace and stability.

Jiang paid a Six-Nation tour in the late 1999, which included the three western
nations - Britain, France, and Portugal.

The speeches of Jiang in this tour fully

showed his hope to make China a great power.
needed to become more openness in market.

In Britain, Jiang said that China

China will join the world as a more

active player and work to improve the all-dimensional and multi-level opening-up
pattern in wide-ranging areas.

Jiang said that the economic cooperation and trade

between China and Britain have immense potentials.

He also praised the steady

development of both sides on economic cooperation and trade has brought
substantial benefits.

China is ready to work together with Britain to bring dynamic

Sino-British partnership of all-round cooperation into the 21st century.

Both in

Britain and France, Jiang also spread the idea of five principles of peaceful co
existence.

He called for a democratic and full participation by all countries in the
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process of establishing a new political and economic order.

Both China and France

stood for a multipolar world and oppose a world structure with only one single pole.
At last, Jiang expressed China is ready to make tireless efforts for the establishment
of a just and reasonable new international political and economic order and
prosperous new century of humanity.

During these two years, China has signed joint statements with several countries,
which are the neighbours of China.

In 1999, China and Kazakhstan signed a joint

statement emphasizing their wishes to strengthen bilateral relations and cooperation
in the 21st century.

In the-mid of May 2000, China and the Philippines singed the

joint statement that established a framework for further bilateral cooperation.

At

the same month, China and Indonesia developed the mutual beneficial cooperation
on the expanding in all areas.

In the late May 2000, China and India decided to

establish constructive partnership of cooperation oriented towards the 21st century on
the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

These joint statements

expressed the idea of China with the other nations - the establishment of a just and
equitable international political and economic new order.

When Jiang paid his visit to the Middle East and South Africa in 2000, China’s
quest for great power status was showed to the world.

In the Middle East peace

process, Jiang showed that China was willing to play a role in advancing the peace
process in the Middle East.

In South Africa, President Jiang and President Thabo

Mbeki signed a declaration in the partnership between the two countries.

The two

sides take cognizance of the moral imperative for developing countries to strengthen
capacity for cooperation and mutual support in the international economic milieu.
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Moreover, both China and South Africa share many objectives with regards to key
multilateral issues and on the urgent need for the reform of the international
multilateral political, economic and financial architecture to reflect new global
realities.

IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA，S FOREIGN POLICY:

After having reviewed on China9s state to state relations recently? there are the
strong links between China’s foreign policy principles and its practice in the
international structure.

Regarding the above contents of Chinese foreign policy

doctrine, we can conclude Principles (1)， （2)， & (4) into the first category.
Principles (3), (5), & (7) are the second category.

Principle (6) is the third category.

The first category mainly shows China’s dissatisfaction with the US hegemonism
and its opposition of US dominate world order in the post-Cold War period.

As

China deems that the world should become more multipolarity, however, the US
government always poses as an international police and interferes with the other
nation’s domestic affairs.

The second category aims at demonstrating China9s

global role and its wish to build a just and rational new world order.

The last

category focuses on fastening China’s integration into the world， especially on global
economic system.

In fact, the Chinese foreign policy fulfills one goal - to show

China’s great power position in the world structure.

Hence，China’s foreign policy

during the late 1990s illustrates how the Chinese perceives itself a great power in the
global system.

In the following paragraphs, I will pinpoint some significant

implications of China’s establishment of bilateral relations with these selected
countries.
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First, there is one universal point on China’s establishment of joint statements
and diplomatic relations with the other nations.

Jiang always publicly expresses

China’s willingness to keep cooperation and exchange with all countries of the world,
especially on trading development.

The last category (Principle 6) in the doctrine

of Chinese foreign policy explains this point.

As China perceives itself as a rising

power, the Chinese leaders realize that only through both economic and diplomatic
cooperation with the other nations can upgrade China’s capabilities.

Despite the

noticeable nationalist sentiment, aspirations, and even ambitions common to a rising
power, China appears to have accepted to have accepted two basic facts of today9s
international relations: First, the world is organized in a nation-state political system
and an international market economy rather than anything like the ''Chinese world
order” of the Middle Kingdom; second， China is still clearly a backward or
developing nation that lacks the economic clout, capital, and technology necessary to
realize its potential as a great power (Wang, 1999, p.22).

Hence, when Jiang

develops diplomatic ties with the other countries, he usually emphasizes the progress
in bilateral trade and economic ties.

In fact, this principle implies that China’s

self-image of great power is displayed to the world.

Although the national power of

China cannot compare with the US or the other developed countries at this moment,
the Chinese leaders believe that China will become a strong state through a
continuous openness of China’s economic market.

As China believes this logic, its diplomatic strategy should match China9s selfimage.

Keeping the good relations, with the US and Japan, the developed countries,

can increase China9s economic development, since these two countries are the largest
non-Chinese foreign investment for China.
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powers in the post-Cold War world order, their economic capabilities are counted as
the top level in the global economy.

In terms of security and economic capability,

Japan often adopts the stance of a junior partner to the US.

When China develops

partnerships with these two countries, the Chinese leadership will not expect to form
any long-term relations between them.

The relationships are founded on common

interests - global trade.

Second, we can observe China’s self-perception as a great power in the first
category (Principles 1， 2, 4).

In the post-Cold War period, the international

structure is still dominated by the US.

China understands there is only one

superpower in the transitional period.

Nevertheless, Beijing describes its

diplomatic philosophy as one of “multipolarity”； a concept that officials say
embraces a desire for a more equitable world less in the control of Washington.

The

core Chinese interest is to reduce, contain and dilute US influence in the world
affairs.

China believes the world is in a multipolar system, each state participates

independently and on relatively equal terms with the others.

Thus, China’s

diplomatic strategy shows its discontent with US hegemonism and US’ foreign
policy.

This strategy implies that the Chinese leadership has possessed the

perception of great power spirit, as China decides to challenge the position of
superpower - the United States.

In this sense, China is not satisfied with merely a

great power status, it wants to become a superpower on a par with the United States.

China’s great-power aspirations in terms of opposing US hegemonism can be
seen in China’s foreign relations.

The diplomatic ties with Russia and France

illustrate that their attitudes towards the US control in the world affairs are very
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similar indeed.

All the three countries meet a commitment that the world should be

on the trend towards multipolarity.

No country can dominate the world system.

Both Russia and France are on the same line with China to oppose the proposed US
national missile-defense system.

Russia even supported China when the NATO

bombed the Chinese ambassador in Belgrade accidentally.

The US-led NATO is

blamed by most of the countries that carried out hegemonic behaviour in the
multipolar world.

Thus， these examples justify that China’s diplomatic ties with the

other countries can help build China’s great-power aspirations.

Third, the second category (Principles 3, 5, 7) fully represents China^ selfimage as a great power.

The essential point of these principles aims at giving

prominence to China’s role in the world.

China wants to promote a just and rational

new international political and economic order, which basically follow the
instructions of Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence.

To fulfil this goal, China

needs to establish diplomatic ties both with the developed and developing countries.
Having strengthened cooperation with the other states, the advancement of China9s
value to the world will be solidified.

When China plays an active role in different

kinds of international organization, its influence to the world will increase at the
same time.

For the long-term, a new international order with the common

development of mankind will be created under the promotion and effort of China.
From this perspective - a creation of a new global structure, it is believed that China
perceives a great power first, then possesses anxiety to lead the world.

China’s diplomatic policy reflects this wish thoroughly.

To build a just and

new international order, China needs to extend its foreign ties all countries in the
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world.

China’s relations with the Middle East and African countries are likely to

strengthen the idea for a just world order.

Since some Middles East countries such

as Iran and Iraq are the traditional enemies of the US, the diplomatic strategy
between China and these two countries can form a counterbalancing force, which
assists China to be a new global power.

The diplomatic ties between China and

Africa spread the idea of China’s preservation of world peace and the promotion of
justice.

China is regarded as the leader of the developing countries traditionally.

China9s self-perception as a great power has influenced the leaders to seek the
international respect and recognition generally enjoyed by major powers.

This

quest for international prominence has motivated China to establish relations with
developing countries and position itself as the champion of world peace and justice,
both activities functioning as ways to distinguish itself from other great powers
(Payne & Veney， 1998，p.868).

The friendly diplomatic ties between China and

Africa help China build a new international and political order, which fulfills the goal
of China’s great power aspirations.

As a whole，China’s independent foreign policy testifies China’s self-image to
become a global power.

China believes itself emerging as a dominant force in Asia;

its diplomacy is on the right direction to fxilfilling this goal.

In the doctrine of

Chinese foreign policy, we can see that there is step by step to make China a great
power in the world.

First, China should enhance its economic development.

This

strategy has allowed China to become a great power and may eventually permit it to
challenge for dominant power status (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000, p.171).
Second, China’s balancing power with the US hegemonism shows that China
contains a relatively equal footing of the US.
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step to demonstrate China's self-image as a global power.

Third, the change of

unequal world order and the establishment of a just global system are the final steps
for China9s self-image as a great power.
to the perceptions of the Chinese.

This is the highest achievement according

From China’s own image， we can conclude that

China is on an increasing ambition to quest for great power status starting from the
1990s.

THE WORLD’S PERCEPTION:
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS OF GREAT POWER:

In the international structure, there are several criteria to judge what states can
be claimed as powerful states in the world.

When we discuss China’s quest for

great power status, perception of the global community plays a prominent role to see
whether China is a great power.

This section tries to investigate the factors, which

affect a state’s great power status.

Firstly, great power status needs the recognition by the world through
participation both in regional and global organizations.

Traditionally, great power

status is formally recognized in an international structure such as the nineteenthcentury Concert of Europe or the United Nations Security Council (Goldstein，1999,
p.81).

China replaced Taiwan as the permanent member of the UN Security

Council in 1971.

In international relations, the great powers include the five

permanent members of the UN Security Council - the United States, Russia，France，
Britain, and China.

The permanent members of the UN Security Council possess

the highest decision of world affairs.
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continuous economic and military development, and a seat on the UN Security
Council, China qualifies as a great power.

In the views of Western countries, China

is expected to play a central role in world politics in the 21st century (Goldstein, 1999,
p.82).

In fact, China’s success in gaining recognition of the most significant
international structure is a turning point, which makes the other major powers view
China as one of great power in the world politics.

From that time onwards, the

Western countries put down their hostile attitude towards the Communist China and
tried to cooperate with China.

Both the US and Japan began the normalization

relations with China in the 1970s.

The ideological difference between China and

the West will not form a great obstacle when discusses some world affairs.

Thus，

the recognition of the UN Security Council changes the view of others perception on
China’s international status.

Second, great power status is measured in part by participation in institutions
that increasingly regulate interstate behaviour (Johnston, 1998，p.77).

In recent

years, China has joined in regional institutions, such as APEC, ASEM, and ARF, the
Informal Summit between ASEAN and China, Japan and South Korea.

Moreover,

China is very active in other multilateral organizations on regional and international
political, economic, security and other issues of common interest.

The image of

great power ought to play a more important role in eliciting cooperation in highprofile multilateral institutions.

China has done a role as responsible major power

in the eyes of Western countries due to it shows up its multilateral diplomacy
successfully.
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Third, the general judgement of great power in views of the international
community is the involvement and influence in world affairs.

In reality, the United

Nations acts as the international government that solves both the regional and
international conflicts and preserves the peace of the world; however, history of
international relations does not like this.

According to the neorelaist perspective,

the world is dominated by the several powerful states that comprise of strong
capabilities.
system.

In the Cold War period, the world was formally under the bipolar

World affairs and stability were basically maintained by the two

superpowers - the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the post-Cold War period,

the world is under the multipolar structure; more great powers involve in the process
of decision making in world affairs.

China9s active involvement in regional crises

makes the other major powers perceive that China is responsible for the role of great
power.

In the Asian financial crisis, 1997, China9s involvement in solving the damages
of those Asian countries makes a very impressive feeling for the other countries.

In

views of European countries, China emerged relatively unscathed, combined with the
perceived failure of Japan to get its house in order, has meant that in both
geopolitical and geoeconomic terms China is coming to replace Japan as the centre
piece of Europe9s Asia policy (Bridges, 2000, p.9).

Thus，China’s role as regional

great power in Asia is consolidated in the eyes of European Union.

In terms of regional peace and stability, China has played an active and
constructive role in Asia.

On the question of the Korean Peninsular, China is one of

participants in the Four-Party Talks.

In safeguarding peace and stability on the
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Peninsular, China5s important role as a peacemaker has been well received in the
international community.

As a whole, according to the international requirements of great power, China
has fulfilled the above three norms.

The perception of the other major powers,

more or less， affects China’s international status.

Thus, a positive general

perception for giving recognition of great power of China by the world will inspire
China9s quest for great power status in the 21st century.

THE ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES:

Having discussed China’s image in the world, in general, China’s great power
status is established in the international community.

More and more Westerners

have viewed it to be final that has become a world-class power (Wang, 1999, p.23).
According to the Power Transition theory， the discussion of China’s potentials is to
treat as an eloquent example of foreign image of China as not only a “big power”，
but as a fliture superpower to vie and “overtake” the US.

It is predicted that China

will by 2050 overtake the United States to become the new dominant superpower.

The “power transition” theory came from A.F.K. Organski’s study of
international politics.

Organski rejected the power parity hypothesis that an

equality of capabilities between adversaries contributes to peace and argued that such
a condition of parity is more likely to lead to war (Dicicco & Levy, 1999, p.681).

In

other words, the power-transition theory holds that peace is not due to the parity
between the major powers， but to the “preponderance” of power held in the hands of
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one hegemonic power or dominant power.

Order is the intended result of actions

taken by a dominant state, which attempts to shape the international system in such a
way that advances stability and enhances its own interests (Organski, 1958, p.326).

However, a breakdown in peace results in a ‘‘hegemonic war”， the results of
which will determine the next round of power configuration across the international
system.

A “hegemonic war” results not from the loss of equilibrium, but from a

“rear-end collision’’， when the second most power state， most likely one that is
“dissatisfied” with the status quo of the system， is catching up from behind and
“overtaking” the incumbent “dominant power”. A more cautious challenger, having
overtaken the dominant country, will aim for more than a redress of grievances
(Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000, p.27).

Applying the power-transition theory in the views of foreign perceptions of
China, it offers a foundation for exploring international politics.

In fact, the power-

transition theory is one kind of theory that is relevant to policy making.

It provides

a framework for understanding great power relationships as well as regional politics
(Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000, p.41).

This concept is relevant to the

geostrategic thinking, which I discussed in Chapter 4.

Evidence shows that China is

a dissatisfied nation that does not like the US hegemonism in the post-Cold War
period.

China9s strategic foreign relations aim at establishing a just and rational

new world order, which logically favors to its benefits.

Hence, when China

strengthens the power that surrounds its periphery, it is on the road to becoming a
superpower on a par with the United States in the future.
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Nowadays, the United States can be claimed as the dominant power in the world,
whereas China represents a potential challenger to the United States, which remains
dissatisfied with its international role under the dominant power5s regime.

Since

China has been a dissatisfied power, China will dismantle the world order built under
US hegemony and alter it to China’s liking.

In views of the United States, China is

not a normal nation, it is a potential challenger (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000,
p.173).

The Organskiite group believes that China will be the first to overtake the

United States in terms of GDP but it will take many more years before that
momentum can be channeled into actual power (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke, 2000,
p.42).

The US remains the dominant nation in the international community,

commanding a very strong alliance and network system around the world.

If the

statement of China does overtake the United States in the size of its economy and
then in international power in the-mid 21st century, the US strategy should take its
international advantages to prevent China’s overtaking.

This section tries to

investigate how the US? response justify China is one of global powers.

After the post-Cold War period， the US adopts the “constructive engagement”
rather than the “containment” as its China’s policy.

A more concrete description of

this concept is “realignment”. It is a policy designed to accomplish a fundamental
and far-reaching objective - the realignment and harmonization of the ruling
coalitions in both countries (Tammen, Kugler & Lemke，2000, p.158).

Recently,

the US and China have made a deal of China’s accession into the WTO.

This event

shows that the US and the other nations tend to draw and integrate China into the
current international political and economic order, with the specific aim of
converting China into a “satisfied” power.
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the United States should be the creation of a satisfied China, either by direct
integration into an alliance or by creating opportunities to socialize it into the
existing international system whereby it accepts prevailing rules and norms (Tammen,
Kugler & Lemke, 2000, p.34).

If China moves into the world as a satisfied rather

than a dissatisfied nation; the challenge to overtake the dominant position of US will
be minimized.

Even China?s economic development will one day surpass that of

the US; China will not become a threat to the US economic domination.

The implication of US’ China policy - by converting China into a “satisfied”
power rather than a ‘‘ dissatisfied” power， shows that China is definitely a great
power in the international community.

The Washington government deems that the

rise of China, especially on economic challenge, is a threat to the US predominance
in international relations.
transitional period.

Thus, creating a satisfied China is the aim of US in this

In views of the US, China will pursue a higher international

recognition in the following years.

What the US can do is to use its leverage on this

situation, and cooperate with China.

In this sense, China is a great power, which

makes the US need to change its containment policy is a very good example to verify
China’s quest for great power status.

CONCLUSION:

As a whole， the question of China’s great-power aspirations are justified from
two perspectives.

First, China9s foreign policy principles show that the Chinese

leaders have their beliefs.

They have confidence to build multilateral and bilateral

relations with institutions and nations, since they perceive China is a great power in
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the world.
status.

Second, the international community recognizes China9s great power

This achievement demonstrates that not only China9s self-perception, but

the other major powers also deem China is a great power.

In the following years,

these two perspectives will inspire China9s quest for great power, until it reaches the
superpower status in the-mid 21st century.
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INTRODUCTION:

This chapter aims at discussing China’s quest for great power status from the
two selected methods and perspectives.

Regarding the methods, linkage-politics

paradigm and geostrategic analysis are applied to explain the shape of change in
China’s diplomacy and global politics.

First, linkage-politics paradigm helps us to

understand the relationship between the domestic policies of the national leadership
and their foreign-policy endeavors in the external environment.

Starting from 1978

onwards, China began to launch a series of domestic reforms, including economic
reform, military modernization programme, which require a new orientation in
foreign policy.

In views of the Chinese leaders, the reforms were aimed at

increasing China’s comprehensive national strength that would boost China’s
capabilities and status in the world.

The linkage paradigm is to justify two points:

(1) that China’s domestic policy shift has helped its foreign relations， and conversely
its expanding open foreign relations have proven instrumental in fostering China’s
domestic development; and (2) that with the impressive gains in China’s economic
clout in recent decades, its influence in the world has been on the increase.

Second， geostrategic analysis tells us about China’s strategic considerations
towards other states in the international system.

This method, first, mainly

emphasizes how change of the international environment creates an opportunity for
China to become a rising power in the international arena.
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the overall reactions of the other nations towards China are no more as antagonistic
as before, but become more conciliatory to China in international relations.

This

phenomenon is probably the result of change in the international environment.
Second, geostrategic reasoning provides a global perspective to understand how
China expands its power and influence geographically, in resulting China5s great
power position receives a great recognition from the rest of the international
community, which accords to the Chinese geostrategic planning.

This study tries to combine the methods of linkage-politics paradigm and
geostrategic analysis in order to illustrate the Chinese endeavors to become a great
power in the post-Mao era.

The linkage-politics paradigm concerns the areas of the

domestic-foreign linkage and China’s increased influence abroad to discuss China’s
quest for great power.

The geostrategic reasoning entails a geography strategic

angle to understand how China quests and seeks for a higher rank in the international
arena.

In addition to these two perspectives， this study uses China’s self-image and the
world’s perception to discuss China’s great_power aspirations.

Having discussed

China’s quest for great power status according to the above two theoretical
frameworks, the comparison between self-claimed and the world5s recognition can
give a relatively comprehensive judgement to China9s global status.

First, the self

perception of Chinese leadership is one kind of motivations, which makes China
become great power.

When China believes its great power position in the world, its

foreign policy will become more aggressive than that of before.

As a result,

China9s search for great power status will achieve in the near future.

Second, the
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other states9 perception is an objective perceptive to justify whether China is a great
power.

As China’s great power status has to be accepted by most of the nations， the

influence of China is on the right track on an equal footing with the other major
powers.

Consequently， the world’s recognition will assist China to become more

ambitious enhancing its power in the global system.

Hence，China’s foreign policy

will become more active questing for great power status.

As a whole， this research attempts to investigate China’s great-power
aspirations with the two frameworks and the two discussion methods.

The rise of

China is definitely a crucial event in the international arena; China9s seeking for
great power status is an important study in the 21st century.

To understand China9s

journey to become a great power, the chosen theories and perspectives can give a
coherent and critical analysis of answering China9s quest for great power.

MAJOR FINDS AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE:

The previous chapters have already discussed China9s great-power aspirations
from different angles, including national capabilities, foreign relations, strategic
calculation, self-image and the world9s recognition.

The following paragraphs will

display the significant findings of China’s quest for great power status.

First, two essential points of this study are the words “power” and “prestige”.
In international relations, power is a key concept that defines an international system
and the status of its actors.

K. Waltz (1979) and J.S. Goldstein (1999) rank power

to be the capabilities of states.

Capabilities are mainly divided into two categories,
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including economic and military.

In reality, capabilities give a state the potential to

influence the world affairs and its status in the world.

Prestige, the other term,

consists of the “perception of other states with respect to a state’s capabilities and its
ability and willingness to express its power”. In sum, power and prestige are the
two prominent concepts in this study.

Some findings probably follow the ideas of

power and prestige.

Second, in terms of China’s economic capability， we can see at least two
important things that imply China’s quest for great power status.

First of all, the

growth rate in China’s GDP， foreign trade， and FDI show that China’s domestic
policy shift has helped its foreign relations, and conversely its expanding open
foreign relations have proven instrumental in fostering China’s domestic
development.

When Deng Xiaoping decided to give priority to economic

modernization among those domestic constructions，China’s economic development
has met a rapid growth for the past two decades.

China’s economic achievement,

more or less， involves the contributions of other countries.

Foreign investments are

the most directly significant elements for China’s domestic economic growth.
Hence, we can conclude that China’s expanding open foreign relations accelerate its
domestic development and its foreign relations with the other developed countries.
It is predicted that China’s economic power will continuously upgrade by its
openness to the world.

The domestic-foreign linkage assists China9s great-power

aspirations in the new century.

The second important thing of China’s economic growth is that China’s
influence in the world has been on the increase.
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foreign trade indicate that China’s economic contribution in the world trade is on an
increasing trend.

When China succeeds in joining the WTO, its integration into the

world is an inevitable movement for the development of China’s economy.

China’s

economic clout in recent decades accelerates China9s participation in international
economic order.

As a result, China9s influence abroad leads to the expansion of

China’s horizontal linkage vis-a-vis other countries.

China’s regional influence is

upgraded and shown by the cases of East Timor and the Asian financial crisis.

Third, in terms of military capability, China cannot be regarded as a ufirst-rank
power” in the world.

China’s military technology and military industrial complex

are still backward compared with the US.
power beyond its borders is limited.

China’s military capability to project

However, evidence shows that China’s

military capability has increased for the past decades.

The arms sales from Russia

and the Middle East countries to China improve the Chinese PLA5s force.

At the

same time, the foreign military technology enhances China’s ability of building up its
own military force in the long run.

Although China cannot be counted as a global

power in terms of military capability, its regional military power in the East Asia is
confirmed.

China’s involvement in the Spratly Islands and the Taiwan issue

illustrate its aggressive military power in the regional area.

Fourth, the international change really affects China’s global status in
international relations.

From Mao’s era to the post-Cold War period, China’s status

was greatly influenced by the international environment.

A tight bipolar system

interfered with China’s great-power aspirations in the 1950s.

However,

multipolarity in the post-Cold War era gives China more geoeconomic leverage and
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more geopolitical space than bipolarity before.

Fifth，China’s geostrategic thinking to empower its influence abroad is through
the adoption of good-neighbour policy.

In other words, China’s quest for great

power status starts from neighbours that surrounds its periphery.

The major regions

are Southeast Asia region, Central Asia region, and Middle East and Africa region.
For the past decades, China has established a relatively friendly and cooperative
relations with the major countries in these regions.

Finally, based on the facts and data, the scholars of power-transition theory
believe that China is the second most powerful state， and a “dissatisfied power” at
that， which is going to catch up from behind and “overtake” the United States in
terms of GDP growth in the mid-21st century.

The US’ China policy，nowadays，

tries to create a satisfied China that will not threaten the dominate role of US and will
prevent a “hegemonic war”.

ASSESSMENT ON CHINA’S GREAT POWER STATUS:

This section wants to give an evaluation of China’s great-power aspirations and
foresee its international status and prestige in the 21st century.

Having reviewed

China’s national capabilities and its geostrategic plan for upgrading its status in
world politics, we have a general picture of China’s quest for great power status
during these two decades.

The next step is an assessment of China9s great power

status.
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Firstly, China cannot be regarded as a global power at this moment, though
China has achieved a rapid growth in economic capability.

In reality, China’s

technological skills, science, military power, and education still have much room to
improve.

Its backward in these areas indicates that there is a far distance between

China and the other Western countries.

When China hopes to become a great power

in the-mid 21st century, the Chinese leaders must need to know its weaknesses.

To

make China fulfill the dreams of global power, reform is the essential task for the
further

development,

especially

on

education.

knowledgeable persons are able to innovate.

Only

well-educated

and

Hence, the key to China’s rising in the

21st century is the improvement of education.

Secondly, China’s advocacy of its independent foreign policy shows that China
believes itself as one of great powers in the world.
force of the world affairs.

China will become the leading

In the doctrine of Chinese foreign policy, China is step

by step to reach the goal of great power status in the international arena.

First of all,

China needs to establish ties with the other nations in order to strengthen its
economic development.
power in the future.

This strategy allows China to become a great economic

Next, China’s balancing power with the US hegemonism

shows that China contains a relatively equal footing with the US in the world.
performance shows China’s self-perception as a global power.

This

Finally, the change

of unequal world order and the establishment of a just global system are the final
steps for China’s great-power aspirations.

The Chinese foreign policy principles

show that China is on a right road to fulfill its quest for great power status in the
future.
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Lastly，China’s great power position has received certain recognition from the
world.

China’s permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council proves that

China is one of great powers in the international system.

In addition，China’s

involvement and influence in world affairs are increasing.

The most important

indicator to show the world’s recognition is the US response to China’s rising.

The

US’ China policy aims at developing China as a satisfied power in the new century.
The US’ strategy tries to avoid China’s overtaking of the position of the US in themid 21st century.

Thus, China9s influence and image in the world are being

strengthened.

CONCLUSION:

In sum, China9s quest for great power status has been testified for the last two
decades.

The methods of linkage-politics paradigm and geostrategic analysis show

that China possesses both capabilities to quest for higher-ranking status and ambition
to expand its influence abroad.

The Chinese leadership believes that China will

become one of significant powers in the 21st century.
way to fulfill this goal.

Its foreign policy is on the

The world’s recognition probably deems that China has

already reached the qualification of great power status.

Despite China as a potential

great power, China is still on the road to achieving a dominant role in international
relations in the-mid 21st century.
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